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ABSTRACT 
The. Intellectual Framework of Voluntary Social Service c. 1940-60 
This thesis examines the debate on the future of voluntary social service following the 
establislu-nent of the post-war welfare state, commonly regarded as a painful period of 
adjustment for voluntary organisations, and argues that this debate sheds light on the 
later resurgence of the voluntary sector. It assesses the policy instruments available to 
governments in managing the voluntary sector in the 1940s, and the influence of this 
regulatory framework on the institutional forms available to voluntary organisations. It 
explores the legal and ethical distinction between endowed charities and voluntary 
organisations which Labour inherited from the Liberal political tradition, and how this 
interacted with the conceptual fi-amework articulated by leading proponents of voluntary 
social service. The nature of voluntary organisations meant that traditional theories of 
voluntarism were often at odds with the routine maintenance of extended organisational 
structures, especially with the methods required to finance voluntary organisations. A 
consensus on proposals to resolve this conflict emerged in the late 1940s and this 
reflected structural changes within the voluntary sector which had given rise to a class of 
professional managers whose views increasingly converged with those of Labour policy 
makers. The proposals included the creation of autonomous funding bodies to be 
financed partly from the assets of defunct charitable endowments, providing financial 
stability for voluntary organisations, satisfying the requirements of accountability 
without compromising the independence of voluntary organisations. The new funding 
bodies were not created, but a new framework of corporate governance for voluntary 
organisations was implemented in the 1960 Charities Act, which brought voluntary 
organisations within the regulatory regime governing charitable trusts. The assimilation 
of voluntarism to charity ensured that the Idealism that inspired voluntary social service 
organisations was tied to compliance with institutional and legal forrns which impaired 
their capacity to express social criticism. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis investigates aspects of the intellectual framework of the voluntary social 
services in the middle decades of the twentieth century. In order to prise open the 
significance of changes in thinking within and about the voluntary sector the thesis 
examines a debate on the future of voluntary social service that took place following the 
establishment of the welfare state in the late 1940s. The thesis concentrates on the 
discussion of the financial condition of voluntary organisations. It does so because the 
finances of the voluntary sector emerged as the single most important subject of 
discussion as the debate evolved. 
The thesis argues that in the debate on the future of the voluntary social services 
in the late 1940s mone-%. r and organisation provided a medium for discussing moral 
questions. To be more specific, the financial problems of voluntary social services 
provided the protagonists with a structure for expounding the value system that they 
believed underlay these services. The emphasis on financial and organisational matters 
in turn influenced the value system. I take this process of re-constituting the value 
system of the voluntary sector to be the 'intellectual framework' of voluntary social 
service in the 1940s and early 1950s. The thesis argues that this debate elucidates 
something of the nature of the consensus on welfare that shaped post-war domestic 
British politics and sheds light on the political quietism of subsequent generations of 
voluntarists compared with their Victorian and Edwardian predecessors. 
Voluntarism and consensus 
The creation of a National Health Service and the establishment of a system of universal 
income maintenance, though these were partial and provisional in character, represented 
an historic transformation of welfare provision. Emblematically they rendered voluntary 
organisations redundant, and they sparked a brief, though intense, discussion of the 
future of voluntary social service. This debate involved civil servants, Government and 
opposition politicians, as well as leading representatives of voluntary organisations. The 
- 
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debate is revealing of the wider intellectual framework that underpinned thinking on 
social policy in the middle decades of the twentieth century. The Attlee Government's 
response to the debate was to appoint a departmental enquiry under the chairmanship of 
the Labour Peer Lord Nathan of Churt. The recommendations of the Charitable Trusts 
Conn-nittee (1949-52) are widely regarded as giving rise, more or less directly, to the 
1960 Charities Act. ' 
The conventional narrative is the epitome of simplicity, dominated as it is by 
David Owen's monumental account of three centuries of ELiglish PhilanthrPPY, which 
concludes with the passing of the 1960 Act. Owen's account remains unsurpassed as a 
source of detailed empirical evidence of the protean character of English voluntarism. It 
is also, however, a classic of the Whig interpretation of history. Owen's empiricism was 
embedded in a narrative of progress that, from his vantage point in the 1960s, saw the 
earlier history of voluntarism as leading inexorably towards the post-war welfare state. 
The Charitable Trusts Committee and 1960 Act taken together amounted to a fme-tuning 
of the relationship between voluntary organisations and the state, prefigured in the events 
of the previous 300 years, and which had been gathering pace under the Victorians. 
Although they became, in Owen's phrase 'junior partners in the welfare firm', voluntary 
organisations accommodated themselves relativeI3,, unproblematic ally to the new 
political consensus, which they saw as a logical and inevitable outcome of preceding 
events. The redistribution of responsibility for welfare services implicit in the creation 
of the Welfare State necessitated some adjustments and Owen devotes three chapters to 
this period of adjustment, the post-war debate on voluntary social service and the 1960 
Charities Act. 2 
The order of events is relatively straightforward. In the late 1940s, the Labour 
Govenu-nent came under pressure to make a clear cominitment to the future of voluntary 
social service. This pressure came from a small number of high profile supporters of 
voluntarism with the support of voluntary organisations, led by the National Council of 
Social Service. 3 The debate itself briefly captured the public's attention. This was at 
1 D. Owen, English Philanthropy 1660-1960, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1964), 532,577-97 
2 Owen, Philanthropy, 525-597 
3 Charitable Trusts Committee, Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice 
relating to Charitable Trusts, cmd. 8710 (hereafter CTC), (London: M4SO, 1951), 1-2 
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least in part because of the prominence of those who pressed the voluntary organisations' 
case - the most venerable of these were William Beveridge, one of the architects of state 
welfare, and the former Liberal Home Secretary Herbert Samuel. The issue rapidly 
disappeared from public discussion, however, and the 1960 Charities Act was the 
Macmillan Government's belated rqjoinder to the Committee's proposals and to the 
aspirations of leading voluntarists that they encapsulated. In contrast to the earlier 
debate on voluntary social service, the passing of Charities Act excited little interest 
outside Parliament, and the circles of those directly affected by its measures. 
Owen explains the debate, the Charitable Trusts Committee and the Charities Act 
as a seamlessly connected process - an exercise in tidying up. For Owen this was merely 
a logical continuation of a secular tendency; a significant but relatively unproblematic 
phase in the process of assimilation of voluntary social service to charity law. This is his 
bland summary of the effects of the Act: 
It brought a degree of order into the tangled jungle of charity statutes, and 
introduced refonns, of greater or less consequence, in the statutory 
procedures affecting endowed charities. 4 
In this interpretation, the 1960 Charities Act is merely the culmination of an inexorable 
historical process. 
There is, of course, some truth in the view that the reforms introduced in 1960 
were an administrative matter. Over centuries, voluntary social service in England and 
Wales has been assimilated to the law of charity, itself a subsidiary branch of the general 
law of trusts. This process of assimilation has fashioned a regulatory framework within 
which voluntary organisations have taken shape and developed. Until the passing of the 
1960 Act, however, voluntary organisations generally fen within the penumbra of charity 
law. Historically voluntary social service has assumed a variety of organisational fom-ts. 
One of the oldest fonrns was the charitable endowment. Voluntary organisations were a 
progression based upon earlier forms of welfare institution. Their social, legal and 
political position had developed partly by analogy with these earlier forms but the 
extension of the law on charitable trusts to voluntary organisations had proceeded in a 
one-sided fashion: voluntary societies had by the end of the nineteenth century obtained 
Owen, Philanthropy, 594 
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most of the priNileges of charitable status, but were subject to few of even the minimal 
5 super-visory requirements imposed on endowed trusts. 
Before the Charities Act, voluntary organisations occupied an ambiguous 
position: they enjoyed many of the benefits of charitable status but they were monitored 
only patchily for compliance with the duties it entailed. There was, it is true, a host of 
reg lations governing specific fields of -voluntary social service, especially those areas in gu 
which the state itself had assumed some responsibility. Before 1948, one of the biggest 
changes affecting an important branch of voluntary endeavour had occurred in 1899, 
when the Education Act had conferred on the Ministry of Education extensive powers 
over charities and voluntary organiscations operating in that field. Health services too 
were increasingly, governed by regulations issued from Whitehall, and the establishment 
of the National Health Service in 1948 marked a further step along this path. Education 
and health were significant fields of voluntary provision, but they were not alone in 
being sulýject to government regulation: many other services in other fields were 
governed by some statutory controls. Nevertheless, there existed no overarching system 
of supervision for voluntary organisations as such. To this deficiency, the Charities Act 
supplied an administrative remedy. 6 
Put in these tenns it is not hard to see why the debate has attracted little attention. 
It lacks many the features of other discussions of the role of the voluntary sector that 
possess an intrinsic appeal. In contrast to the 1905-8 Royal Commission on the Poor 
Law, for example, it lacks the entertainment value of an 'Edwardian Mixed Doubles' 
between the Webbs and the Bosanquets. Although there was disagreement over the 
Committee's fmal report and one member of the Committee, the barrister Henry Salt, 
issued a dissenting appendix, his dispute with the mz(Jority concerned what appeared to 
be an arcane matter of legal terminology and, in any case, Salt was no Beatrice Webb. 
The absence of any major politician or political thinker from the detailed discussions has 
also been a disincentive to analysis of the debate. Eileen Younghusband, later a 
5 Graham Moffat, Trusts Law: Text and Materials, (London: Butterworths, 1994), 688 
Owerý PhilanthrQpy, 272-3; Moffat, Trusts Law, 610-14 
7 
A. M. McBriar, An Edwardian Mixed Doubles: The Bosanquets versus týe Webbs: 
A Stu4 in British Social Policy 1890-1929, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), discusses 
the fort-nation of social policy through the prism of well-documented personalities and 
institutions. 
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renowned theorist of social work, sat on the Committee, but she did not play a prominent 
role in its deliberations nor in promoting its recommendations. The ma or political J 
personalities, who played a role in the early stages of the debate, increasingly disengaged 
themselves from the action once the Charitable Trusts Committee was established. 
Be-v,, erid(: Ye,, vvhose early involvement appears to have been animated by resentment at the 
Labour Government's neglect of his talents had, by the time the Committee began its 
work, been rewarded with the chairmanship of the committee on the future of 
broadcasting Although he played, in .8 an important role in initiat g the debate, his later 
involvement was perfunctory. Those involved in the Committee itself were, like Nathan 
himself, second division in terms of their political and historical importance. The 
Committee's report, in spite of Salt's memorandum of dissent, was seemingly the 
epitome of what has been termed consensus politics. Disagreements between 
personalities, where they existed at all, generally remained below the surface, and the 
exposition of contradictory political and social ideologies was muted. 
The debate on voluntarism might seem an unprepossessing suýject for historical 
study. The lacklustre setting and the sense that much of the action was happening 
elsewhere (as it certainly was) have focussed historians' attention on other important 
topic s surrounding the establistu-nent of the Welfare State. The miýjor decisions had been 
taken: the Charitable Trusts Committee was a sop to an interest group that had lost out in 
the reshuffling of welfare arrangements and its deliberations could safely be left to the 
supervision of a minor political functionary. A study of the discourse surrounding the 
Committee might appear to be something of a' Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead' 
for the National Health Service. 
Yet, the 1960 Act significantly altered the regulatory framework of voluntary 
social service and laid the foundations for later developments in the voluntary sector. 
Nor is the connection between the debate and the Charities Act as clear-cut as it appears 
in Owen's presentation of it. Some puzzling shifts occurred from the topics aired in the 
debate to the contents of the Charities Act. These have received scant attention from 
historians. The first puzzle is the constitution of the Charitable Trusts Committee itself. 
The Committee, as its title and terms of reference made clear, was primarily concerned 
with the law governing endowed charitable trusts. Yet this was the Attlee Go-venn-nent's 
y 
8 Jose Harris, William-Beveridge: A BiogrqpLiv, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 451-63 
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response to a public debate on the future of social services provided by voluntary 
organisations, a distinct, though cognate, institutional form. 9 The contents of the Act, 
which is conventionally held to have flowed from the Committee's deliberations, add to 
the conundrum. The most important ingredient of the Act as far as it applied to 
voluntary organisations was that it brought them within the jurisdiction of charity law 
more clearly than had previously been the case. Most significantly, it brought them 
under the supervision of the central body for regulating charity, the Charity Commission. 
In the context of the debate in the late 1940s, this outcome is rather surprising. Though 
the issue of regulation had been raised during the debate and was discussed by the 
Committee, these discussions had focused ovenvhehningly on improving the supervision 
of endowed trusts. The fate of the principal issue concerning voluntary organisations 
that was aired in the debate is even more telling. The debate had largely revolved around 
the question of how to provide voluntary organisations with a secure financial base in 
order to ensure their continued survival in the shadow of the new welfare settlement. 
Yet the Charities Act did not put a penny into the collecting tins of voluntary 
organisations and it did inaugurate a new regulatory framework for voluntary 
organisations. A further puzzle is that leading voluntarists embraced this new regulaton" 
regime with enthusiasm. 
There is, therefore, some justification in principle for taking a fresh look at this 
episode ancL/a closer examination of the debate on voluntary social service reveals that 
the consensus on this issue was not clear-cut. Before proceeding to a discussion of this, 
however, it is necessary to examine two further approaches to the narrative and 
ideological framework within which the 1940s debate on voluntarism might be located. 
Though they lack the most obvious defects of the 'progressive fallacy' that mars Owen's 
account they do bear the stamp of that W'higgish sin of 'presentism. I argue that neither 
offers an adequate account of voluntarism that can illuminate the developments 
discussed in the rest of the thesis. For the sake of convenience, I have labelled them the 
'libertarian' and the 'declinist' versions of the history welfare in the twentieth century. 
Moffat, Trusts Law, 612-3 
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The libertarian thesis 
The libertarian , approach sees competition between state and voluntary organisations in 
the proi,, ision of social services as a continuous and often one-sided battle. This is a view 
expounded with vigour by Frank Prochaska. 10 Prochaska shares Owen's pragmatic 
approach to voluntary social service-, emphasising the variety of fon-ns which 
philanthropy has assumed. He departs from Owen, however, in his understanding of the 
relationship between philanthropy and the state. Where Owen sees a burgeoning 
partnership, Prochaska finds underlying antagonism. For Prochaska the Leviathan of the 
state perpetually seeks to engross itself at the expense of voluntary social services. This 
was not necessarily a consciously driven process at first, but it gave birth to social forces 
that had an interest in pushing it forward. For Prochaska the "most damaging result of 
piecemeal social reform to the voluntary sector was that it enlarged the public sector 
bureaucracy. " Prochaska explains the nationalisation of health services partly by the 
bureaucratic gluttony of state employees: -as their strength and numbers grew", state 
welfare workers "disregard for the voluntary sector increased". As a result of the 
increasing power of this bureaucracy, the "tendency of health and welfare departments in 
local and central government to dismiss perceptions of social need that differed from 
their own was to become deeply ingrained. " 11 The culmination of this process was the 
establishment of the National Health Service by Aneurin Bevan who "had little use for 
voluntary traditions". According to Prochaska, Bevan was the perfect tribune of the 
bureaucracy for his"Welsh mind" saw voluntarism as "an expression of the English 
class system. " 11.1 
10 Frank Prochaska, Philanthropy and the Hospitals of London: The King's Fund 1897- 
1990, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Frank Prochaska, Royal BogiLty: The Njaking of 
a Welfare Monarchy, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995); Frank 
Prochaska, The Voluntga ! Lnpulse: Philanthropy in Modem Britain, (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1988); Frank Prochaska, 'Philanthropy', F. M. L. Thompson (ed. ), The 
Cambridge Social History of Britain, 1750-1950: Volume 3, Social Agencies and 
Institutions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 357-93 
" Prochaska, Philanthropy, 110- 11 
12 Prochaska, Philanthropy, 156 
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C -I ommentators -who lack Prochaska's highly developed antipathy to the state also 
tend to agree that there is a fundamental incompatibility between state and voluntary 
action. Although there is recognition that voluntary organisations may enter into 
mutually beneficial arrangements with the state, their remains the lurking suspicion that 
these are ultimately detrimental to the independence of voluntary organisations. Other 
commentators share the worry that state support may undermine public support for 
voluntary organisations. Burton -Abrams and Mark Schmitz, commenting on the growth 
of government financial support for charities in the United States, suggest that such 
support has "crowded out" private charity and supplanted individual voluntary 
contributions. By acting as a substitute for voluntary contributions and by reducing 
donors' income through taxation state support has, they believe, "served to attenuate 
private charitable giving. " 13 Steven Smith and Michael Lipsky take this a stage further, 
seeing increased uniformity within voluntary organisations, because of greater 
dependence on public funding and the creation of a new layer of "street-level 
bureaucrats". 14 
The bureaucrats did not have things all their own way, howeverý. for the initiative 
and energy of the voluntary sector supplied a countervailing tendency to the expansion of 
the state. Whenever an opportunity presented itself these spontaneously generated 
voluntary responses to social problems outside the control of the state. Prochaska differs 
from Owen who regards voluntarism as a complement of or, more often, as a precursor 
to state action. Prochaska also takes the idea of the spontaneous generation of voluntary 
action much further than Owen does. Where Owen is content to describe and marvel at 
the myriad permutations of voluntary social service, Prochaska develops a more explicit 
theory of voluntarism. Central to Prochaska's theoretical construct is his celebration of 
the immediacy of the voluntary response to a perceived social problem. He draws 
attention to the apparently unmediated character of its activism and its impatience with 
13 Burton A. Abrams and Mark D. Schmitz, 'The Crowding-out Effect of 
Governmental Transfers on Private Charitable Contributions', Susan Rose-Ackeiman 
(ed. ), The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions: Studies in Structure and Policy, Yale 
Studies in Non Profit Organisations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 310 
" Steven Rathgeb Smith and Michael Lipsky, NoLiprofits for Hire: The Welfare State 
in the Age of Cong4gfin& (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 13 
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analysis and theoretical elaboration before taking action. "Here, 'in the meantime", 
Prochaska exalts, -is where philanthropists typically have found their essential work. "" 
Prochaska's stress on the spontaneity of voluntary social service has an affinity 
with Adam Smith's recognition of an altruistic motivation that coexisted with the self- 
interest animating much of human conduct. Opening his work on The Theo1y of the 
Moral Sentiments Smith observed, that "[h]ow selfish soever man may be supposed there 
are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, 
and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except 
the pleasure of seeing it. " For Stnith the existence of altruism was simply a given, 'a 
matter of fact', though he then proceeded to demonstrate its ubiquity at considerable 
length. 16 For Prochaska too, the altruism revealed in voluntary social service is merely a 
given that does not require much investigation. 
One problem with Prochaska's emphasis on the spontaneity of voluntary social 
service is that it leads to reductionism. All examples of voluntary social service are 
reduced to an idealised 'charity'. Given Prochaska's antipathy to the state it is ironic that 
his exploration of voluntarism parallels the legal definition of charity. The idealised, 
legal form of 'charity' contains a set of instructions for the conduct of voluntary social 
service. The legal rules of charity codify, a simple vertical relationship between two 
parties, one active (the donor) the other passive (the object). These are brought into 
relation by the observation of three elementary rules. First, the donor is not obliged to 
give; second, a logical corollary of this, the object is not entitled to receive the gift, and 
third, acceptance of the gift imposes on the object no obligation to the donor. In law, as 
in Prochaska's account, charity emanates unbidden from the human spirit. Like the law, 
Prochaska does not ask why, merely whether a particular activity observes this rule: as 
long as it makes "life in Britain more bearable and human, and gives meaning to the 
giver in the process, it has success enough. , 17 
As a result, the libertarian perspective neglects to analyse the specificity of 
charity's manifestation. Its intuitive approach tends to mystify voluntary social service. 
Voluntarism is transformed into its opposite as it becomes an involuntary response to an 
15 Prochaska, Voluntary 11ppulse, 89 
16 Adam Smith, The Theoty of the Moral Sentiments, Edited by D. D. Raphael and 
A. L McFie, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1984), 9 
" Prochaska, Voluntga Impulse, 89 
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external stimulus -a quasi-somatic expression of instinctive emotion. Fellow feeling 
may be a fundamental component of our sociability as a species, as Smith observed, but 
this observation begs a number of important questions. In real instances of voluntary 
social service, 'whether they involve the gift of time or money, there is always a social 
context. As Richard Titmuss noted, "[n]o such gift is or can be utterly detached, 
disinterested or impersonal" and some return is obtained by the donor whether "in the 
form of a similar or different material gift, in the overt expression of sentiment pleasure 
or pain. Underlying the gift is a working knowledge of social reality and the 
apparently simple interaction of donor and recipient embraces a wider complex of social 
connections. The issue is further complicated in connection with voluntary social service 
since this implies a longer-term commitment than a one-off donation. It also implies 
horizontal relationships with other members of a voluntary organisation and these 
relationships may constitute an important part of the donor's return. 19 The simplified, 
idealised conception of voluntarism embraced by Prochaska is erected on practices of 
much greater complexity than he is willing to recognise. 
The intuitive approach adopted by Prochaska is unable to explain either the 
pluralism that is such an important feature of voluntary social service or the historical 
specificity of its expression. Spontaneity becomes, like charity itself, its own reward. 
This permits a deontological closure. Prochaska has no need to investigate whether any 
particular manifestation of voluntary action derives from a sense of obligation or duty, or 
from some expectation of a material or emotional return. Nor is it clear why, if 
voluntarism derives from a sense of duty, this sense is better satisfied by voluntary social 
service rather than by state provision. According to Prochaska, there is no need to 
examine or validate the meaning of charity since it is a given. This way of 
18 Richard Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy., 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), 237 
19 Though this is more clearly a feature of mutual aid societies, Jack C. Ross's seminal 
article on voluntary association theory details an array of rewards of membership of 
voluntary organisations connected to the horizontal relationships involved that are 
largely unconnected with the overt object of the association. Jack C. Ross, 'Towards a 
reconstruction of voluntary association theory', British Journal of Sociology, 223, (1972), 
20-32 
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conceptualising voluntary social service delivers a description rather than an analysis, 
and ends by obscuring %vhat it purports to reveal. 
Prochaska's interpretation of -voluntarism also contains a political agenda. He 
counter-poses voluntary social services to the state and confers on them a special role in 
democratic politics. Througli voluntary organisations, citizens were empowered as 
active 'producers' rather than merely passive 'consumers' of government. This allowed 
voluntary organisations to act as a counterweight to the dominance of "indirectý 
representative democracy". Prochaska rejects what he regards as the indirect democracy 
involved in voting and the testing of public opinion at the ballot box in favour of the 
"spontaneous, pluralistic form of democracy which was immanent in the voluntary 
institutions of civil society. " 20 As a result, the range of institutions that Prochaska is able 
to enlist within his grand democratic alliance includes the monarchy and the hereditary 
peerage alongside voluntary organisations. 
Another defect of Prochaska's approach is that it tends to highlight the 
conformist and conservative aspects of -voluntary social service. Prochaska asserts that 
-voluntarists have achieved most "where they have blended into their surroundings, where 
21 their labours are personal, natural and unexceptional" . 
Yet, this glides over a 
significant change which occurred during the first half of the twentieth century. There 
was a growing recognition within the ranks of the voluntary organisations, themselves 
that the provision of relief on the scale required was simply be-yond their capabilities. 
This recognition was manifest in the voluntary organisations work among the 
unemployed in the 1930s and its effect was that voluntary organisations, often led 
campaigns for the state to assume a greater responsibility for welfare. Voluntary 
organisations were "increasingly convinced that it was the state's responsibility to ensure 
that every citizen had an adequate income, and they devoted an increasing proportion of 
their own time to the development of alternative forms of welfare provision". 22 In other 
words, by the end of the 1930s voluntary organisations, and the NCSS in particular, saw 
their role as providers of welfare services as secondary to that of government. 
20 Prochaska, Rpyal Bopply, 239 
21 Prochaska, Volunt4g Impulse, 99 
22 Bernard Harris, 'Responding to Adversity: Government-Charity Relations and the 
Relief of Unemployment in Inter-War Britain', ConteLnpor4q Record, (1995), 552-3 
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Prochaska's emphasis on the antagonism between state and voluntary welfare is 
over, kvrought. Though examples of competition between public service and voluntary 
models of social service provision abound, this does not mean, as Estelle James has 
pointed out that the relationship taken as a whole between the state and the voluntary 
sector is necessarily antagonistic. If it were, it would be difficult to explain why 
government has been so generous in financing voluntary orcr,, anisations . 
23 As Martin 
Daunton points out, the relationship could be even closer than this. The boundaries 
between voluntary organisations and the state were often blurred, and institutions might 
64migrate between categories or have a dual identity, such as the endowed charities which 
often relied on the parish as a trustee. ý, 24 The recognition that there was a close 
relationship between voluntarism in the state need not mean a return to Owen's account 
of Panglossim harmony between the state and voluntary organisations. Rather it points 
to the need for a more otýjective appraisal of the interaction of the state and voluntary 
action in the 1940s. This interaction was characterised by co-operation and conflict. 
In spite of these criticisms, there is much of value in Prochaska's account. 
Noting thatý in spite of the prognoses of contemporary connnentators, "voluntarists 
showed great resilience in the post-war years"; Prochaska attributes the "enlivened" 
-\,, oluntarism of the late 1940s to "the very nationalisation of welfare that voluntarists had 
so long opposed. -2' Though Prochaska's understanding of the causes of this 
regeneration of the voluntary sector is erroneous, it does have the benefit of departing 
from the rather gloomy conventional historiography of philanthropy in the 1950s. It is to 
one variant of this that we now turn. 
23 Estelle James, 'The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective, Walter W. Powell 
(ed. ), The Nopprofit Sector, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1987), 
397 
'14 Mai-tin Daunton. 'Introduction', Martin Daunton (ed. ), Chgfi r, self-interest and 
welfare in the Engliýh past, (London: UCL Press, 1996), 10 
25 Prochaska, Philanthropy, 165,193; Ro-yal Bognty, 243 
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A silver age 
11'rochaska's lop-sided libertarianism is marred by its uncritical acceptance of all things 
voluntary and its celebration of the spontaneous and emotional aspects of voluntarism 
precludes any detailed consideration of the intellectual context of voluntary social 
service. The declinist interpretation adopts an opposite approach, criticising the 
intellectual deficiencies that the effervescence of the -voluntary sector helps to disguise. 
The work of Jose Harris represents most sophisticated exposition of this approach. She 
indicts voluntarism as co-author of a fatally flawed consensus on welfare. The 
intellectual shortcomings of this consensus doomed it to evaporate when faced with a 
serious political challenge. Harris identifies the origins of this consensus in the 
Edwardian movement for social reform. This upsurge in civic awareness and activism in 
the years before the First World War was marked by "the re-emergence and 
reformulation of a popular and voluntaristic social- scientific culture that in both 
personnel and social purpose was strikingly similar to that of the mid-Victorian years. " 
The language of Victorian Idealist social reform prevailed but the appearance of 
continuity was superficial. Victorian Idealism influenced the Edwardian movement "not 
necessarily in a formal philosophical or methodological sense, but in more general 
inspiration and tone". This unsophisticated Idealism sustained a broad network of 
voluntary social service organisations. Its adherents viewed themselves as p -art of the 
march of progress and saw their practice as "means to the end of attaining perfect justice 
and creating the ideal state. " 26 
What united these Edwardian voluntarists was a belief in action as the core of 
voluntary social service. Edward VIII, confronted with conditions in South Wales steel 
works in 1936, showed himself to be a product of this intellectual climate when he 
announced that 'something must be done'. Taking a view of voluntarism diametrically 
opposed to Prochaska, Harris argues that this emphasis on 'doing something' 
undermined rigorous examination of political consequences and fatally weakened 
voluntarism which had been the powerhouse of ideas about welfare and society. As a 
result, the conceptualisation of state, citizen, and society that 
informed the voluntary 
26 Jose Harris 'Political thought and the welfare state 1870-1940: an intellectual 
framework for British social policyT, Past and Present, 135, (1992), 121-6 
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movement led it to embrace, albeit sometimes reluctantly, state provision of welfare, and 
this contributed to the erosion of the intellectual framework that sustained it. There were 
disagreements over the "'precise boundaries of state action, " but the most telling feature 
of the discourse on welfare in the inter-war period "is the fact that virtually no major 
social theorist or writer on social policy of this period dissented from the view that the 
ultimate sphere of "welfare" ... was or ought to be the institutions of the state. 1727 This 
gave the movement the appearance of ideological coherence for it fitted activism into a 
wider social and political framework. In the 1920s and 1930s, supporters of voluntary 
social service defended it 'ýnot on pragmatic grounds, but as a means of enhancing wider 
corporate consciousness". 28 As a result, those who advocated social reforms did not see 
"themselves as mere technicians... many of them believed that they were building a new 
kind of social and political [order] rooted in a wholly new relationship between the 
citizen and the state. "29 
The impulse to 'do something' in response to social problems was progressively 
matched by a readiness to see the state as the repository of the social. This unreflective 
approach was distant from the approach of the Victorian Idealism that had influenced the 
Charity Organisation Society. Bernard Bosanquet, the house philosopher of the COS, 
re ected any such facile equation between the state and society. Indeed his major treatise 
set out to demonstrate that the state's capacity to embody the public good was directly 
proportional to the extent of conscious, individual activism on the part of its citizens. 'O 
The understanding of the complexity of the relationship between the individual and the 
state, which had characterised the Victorian voluntary movement, was missing from the 
Edwardian movement. The successors of Edwardian activism in the 1940s who are the 
subject of this thesis, inherited this deficiency - at least according to Harris. 
The lack of detailed theoretical consideration of the relationship between civil 
society and the state in the first half of the century was even more damaging since it 
27 Harris, 'Intellectual framework', 134 
28 Harris, 'Intellectual framework, 135 
29 Jose Harris, 'Political ideas and the debate on State welfare, 1940-45', Harold L. 
Smith (ed. ), War and Social Change: British Sociejy in the Second World WAE, 
(Manchester: University Press, 1986), 234 
30 Bernard Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theojy of the State (London: Macmillan, 
1910) 
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coincided with a majJor transformations in their actual relationship. The collectivist 
welfare structures that emerged in the late 1940s were the crowning achievement, Harris 
argues, of a project to build 'the good society' based on the concept of individual 
responsibility. The high water mark of this tendency was the public reception of the 
Bev eridge reports on Social Insurance and Allied Services (1942) and Full Employment 
in a Free Socie (1944). However., the public reaction to these reports, "tended to stifle 
rather than stimulate serious debate", according to Harris, and "virtue was defined by 
popular flat, thus foreclosing rational discussion of alternatives. "31 Ironic ally, although 
Britain increasingly lived up to an Idealist image of the state, this image was no longer 
underpinned by a coherent Idealist political and social theory. 
By the 1940s, according to Harris, technical and pragmatic concerns had 
supplanted even the superficial philosophy of welfare characteristic of the social and 
political thought of the 1930s. As a result, and "in marked contrast to the Edwardian 
period and the inter-war years, much public and academic debate on major social and 
political issues in the period after the Second World War was curiously devoid of 
reference to first principles. " 32 nUS ,a coherent philosophy of state welfare failed to 
emerge alongside the institutions embodying it, as "in spite of the profusion of ideas that 
surrounded its conception, the Welfare State came into being with no clearly defined 
perception of welfare and no coherent theory of the state. " 33 Instead, Harris argues, there 
was a narrowing of public debate on social policy. These changes were concentrated in 
the field of social service, precisely the field in which intellectual development had been 
so luxuriant in the Victorian period. The statements of some voluntary organisations and 
policy makers in the 1940s reveals the persistence of traditional ways of thinking about 
the roles of voluntarism and the state in social welfare provision, but Harris invites us to 
view these survivals as ruins rising on wasted intellectual foundations. 
Harris weaves this lengthy period of intellectual decline into a wider narrative, 
using it to explain the ease with which right wing political theorists were able to mount 
their attack on state welfare in the 1980s. This she attributes to the fact that its 
foundation coincided with a long-term decay of political philosophy that prevented 
31 Harris, 'Political ideas', 250 
32 Jose Harris, 'Political thought and the state', S. J. D Green and R. C. Al-liting (eds. ), 
2 The boundaries of the state in modem Britain, (Cambridge: University Press, 1996), 
33 Harris 'Political ideas', 257 
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British political thinkers fi-om integrating the welfare aff angements put in place in the 
1940s into a satisfactor-y civic philosophy. Harris has also speculated that this 'dumbing 
down' of public discussion of citizenship and welfare was connected to the trend in 
academic philosoph) y in the direction of linguistic positivism that concentrated on the 
formal validity of statements rather than on their content. A general reaction against 
holistic political philosophies inspired by the horrors of fascism, which set in during the 
late 1940s, further weakened the intellectual foundations of social policy. 34 
The consensus on social policy in the 1940s and 1950s was, therefore, based on 
uncertain foundations for, although the "morally exhortative language" of Victorian and 
Edwardian social thought persisted, it was located only "rarely within any clearly stated 
philosophic framework. , 15 In the post-war period "not merely 'good' and original 
thou-Jait about the state but bad and bumbling thought about the state virtually vanished 
from the pages of British philosophical, political and sociological literature. "36 As a 
resultý when state welfare came under pressure from a resurgent right during the 1970s 
and 1980s, its supporters were unable to mount a coherent defence. 
The procession from golden age to silver in intellectual life had practical 
consequences. ý Statism' failed to develop a coherent intellectual superstructure during 
its period of maximum advance and Harris is particularly disparaging of the social 
thinking of the 1950s, a period which she dismisses as "a kind of historic vacuum of 
political theory". The welfare reforms of the 1940s developed, she argues, 661argely 
unbuttressed by systematic intellectual support. " The works of T. H. Marshall and 
Titmuss, though often brilliantý remained pragmatic, impressionistic and empirical. They 
lacked the rigour of an intellectual framework developed to a sufficiently high level of 
abstraction capable of providing a robust ýphilosophy' of state welfare. Titmuss's social 
and political thought was, Harris argues, "uneasily torn between a moral commitment ... 
derived from Edwardian idealism, and an approach to practical policies that was largely 
utilitarian. ,37 Consequently, the supporters of state welfare were intellectually ill 
prepared for the anti-state reaction that emerged at the end of the 1970s. 
Harris's analysis of the decay of Philosophical Idealism is. -cin ambitious attempt 
34 Hanis, 'Political thought', 24 
35 Harris, 'Political thought, 24 
36 Hams, 'Political thought', 15-16 
37 Hanis, 'Political thought', 25-6 
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to locate the decay of political support for the welfare state within the world of ideas and 
it has the seductive appeal of any epoch- spanning narrative of rise and decline. It also 
resonates with the mood that has settled over the historiography of the post-war Labour 
government and the founding of the Welfare State. This mood, which has its roots in the 
Left's own post-mortem on the Attlee Gmiernment, has produced a generally pessimistic 
assessment of that Governi-nent's achievements. Ross McKibbin, for example, though 
following a different itinerary, reaches the same terminus as Harris. He also concludes 
that the achievements of the first mztjority Labour Government were grounded on 
insecure intellectual foundations. The failure of the Labour Party "to enter the sphere of 
civil sociely, except in the most modest way, meant that the potential of wartime 
radicalism was never fully exploited. " Its reform of welfare and the economy, 661 eft the 
institutions of civil society almost wholly recognisable and the old 'ideological apparatus 
of the state' largely intact. " The transformation effected by the Attlee Government 
"depended for its existence upon the physical survival of the industrial working class" 
and "was not supported by the diffasion within civil society of social democracy as an 
ideology independent of such historic relationships. " When the social base for the 
reforms of the 1940s disappeared, their intellectual vulnerability was exposed. 38 
The theme of a failure of ideas is a persistent feature of the historiography of the 
welfare state, though there is disagreement on where responsibility for this failure lies, 
with recent work tending to absolve the Labour Party. Abigail Beach, for example, has 
taken issue with the assumption that Labour's leaders were indifferent to the need to 
elaborate an ideology of citizenship. 39 Steven Fielding, Peter Thompson and Nick 
Tiratsoo agree, asserting that the incoming Labour Government set out to inspire a 
generation of active citizens. They argue that this campaign foundered on the 
instrumental attitude of Labour's working class supporters to the Government's reforms. 
The party's electorate remained unmoved by its attempts to inspire their active 
38 Ross McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England 1918-195 1ý (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 534-6 
ý and the Idea of Citizenship, c 1931-1951, 39 Abigail Louisa Beach, The Labour PAr 
Unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, (1996) 
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citizenship. 
40 
ýA-Thatever the efforts of the Attlee govenunent to develop and broadcast an 
intelligible ideological defence of the Welfare State, these were soon jettisoned by its 
successors after Labour's defeat in the 1951 General Election. Unsympathetic to 
Labour's reforms but reluctant to risk an electoral backlash, the new Government 
hesitated to reverse Labour's measures but also refused to endorse them. 41 So , Jefferys, 
argues, "Attlee's government had actively sought to convince voters that social services 
were not 'free' but had to be paid for by an improving economy. " By contrast, "Tory 
administrations largety abandoned even this form of 'public education' as too expensive, 
thereby contributing to negative notions of dependency rather than building a more 
ý, 4Z constructive view of the welfare state. . Although, as Jefferys implies, by the end of its 
term Labour's motivation of its policies amounted to lecturing the electorate on 
economic realities, it conforms to Harris's thesis in connecting the faltering of the 
welfare state in the 1980s with the intellectual weakness of its foundations. 
However they apportion blame, few dissent from the conclusion pithily expressed 
in Rodney Lowe's observation that, in the end "it was not the construction but the 
destruction of the welfare state that was, in Britain, to become the object of conviction 
PolitiCS.,, 43 The poverty of the philosophy of state welfare rendered it vulnerable to the 
highly ideological onslaught of Thatcherism in the 1980s. 
Harris's thesis ranges more widely than the voluntary sector but the place of ideas 
about voluntary social service plays a central role in her argument, and her thesis 
explicitly contrasts the vibrant, intellectually coherent ideological structure of Victorian 
40 Steven Fielding, Peter Thompson and Nick Tiratsoo, "En-gland Arise": The Labour 
Pýgy and popular politics in 1940s Britain, (Manchester: N/fanchester Urdversity Press, 
1995), 120 
41 Harriet Jones, 'New Tricks for an old dog? The Conservatives and social policy, 
1951-5', Anthony Gorst, Lewis Johnman & W. Scott Lucas (eds. ), Conteipporga British 
History 1931-61: Politics and the Limits of Policy, (London: Pinter, 1991), 33-43 
42 Kevin Jefferys, Retreat from New Jerusalem: British Politics 1951-64, (London: 
Macmillan, 1997), 152-3 
43 Rodney Lowe, 'Resignation at the Treasury: the Social Services Committee and the 
Failure to Reform the Welfare State, 1955-57', Journal of Social Policy, 18 (4), (1989), 
524-5; Jefferys, Retre , 153; c. 
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voluntarism. to the lanor 
, guid, unreflective approach to social welfare of Edwardian 
v, oluntarists. The sin of the Edwardian voluntarists was to bequeath to the Welfare State 
this sloppy approach to civics. Yet, voluntary organisations continued to be important 
within the mid-twentieth century's transformed welfare landscape. Some, like the 
National Council of Social Service itself, played an important role in the provision of 
welfare and other services. Others included major national institutions such as the Royal 
National Lifeboat Institute, the National Council for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children, the National Institute for the Blind, and the National Institute for the Deaf, the 
Women's Voluntarv Service and even the Roy I. at Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals. At a local level - in hospitals, in schools and in local government - voluntary 
org, anisations continued to play a role. 
The response of voluntary organisations to the introduction of the Welfare State 
provides an opportunity to test Harris's thesis by interrogating their mode of survival, but 
in order to achieve this it is necessary to discard Harris's approach to the history of ideas. 
Harris suggests, albeit tentatively, that the direction taken by academic philosophy may 
have contributed to the decay of political and social thought in the mid-twentieth 
century. This raises a number of questions about her general approach to the intellectual 
framework of social policy. It is difficult to unravel the influence of formal philosophy 
on the day-to-day practice of politicians, let alone anyone else, with any exactitude, but 
the opinion of one practitioner may be indicative. Antony Flew regards the influence of 
the academic discipline of philosophy on public policy after 1945 as negligible and he 
notes that where a philosopher such as Bertrand Russell did exert political influence, this 
derived from his personal activism in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, rather 
than from his philosophy. 44 
One very good reason for doubting the influence of academic philosophy on 
political and social practice is rooted in English culture. Numerous commentators have 
remarked on the pride, often verging on philistinism, that thb English take in their 
indifference to abstract philosophical concerns. At the beginning of our period, George 
OrwelL noted the "absence in nearly all Englishmen of any need for an ordered system 
" Anthony Seldon, 'The Muence of the Discipline of Philosophy in Post-war 
Britain', (an interview with Antony Flew), Contejpporait3ý British flisto , 10(2), (1996), 
117-18 
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of thought or even for the use of logiC., 45 The twentieth century has not been 
exceptional in this respect. Echoing Onvell's observation 10 years later, Perry Anderson 
argued that the English elite had never needed to express its ascendancy in a "systematic 
m, -, jJor ideology" since its legitimacy derived from marrying traditionalism and 
empiricism in a pragmatic conservatism that required no intellectual elaboration. 46 
English antipathy to philosophical schemata makes it unlikely that changing fashions in 
academic philosophy alone can provide a satisfactory explanation of trends in public 
administration. It is at least possible that the retreat into formalism noted by Harris was 
itself the result of academic philosophy's inadequacy in the face of political and social 
reality, rather than itself being the cause of political failure. 
The problem with Harris's approach is that her methodological toolbox is 
equipped from the 'history of ideas' tradition, which is a subsidiary branch of philosophy 
rather than of history. As a result, her argument is replete with value judgements based 
on the integrity and compatibility of concepts rather than with their combination in 
practice. For Harris, it appears, ideas are almost entirely self-referential and, in spite of 
its broad sweep, her argument is eerily devoid of context. Harris, in fact, supplies a 
mirror image of Prochaska's position. Ideas inhabit the same ethereal plane as the 
emotions in Prochaska's schema. Neither approach is satisfactory for an historian. Both 
are, in a word, Idealist. 
To turn to the specific context of the voluntary sector, Harris's desire to connect 
developments within academic philosophy to thinking on social policy leads her to 
overestimate the novelty of the influence of unreflective idealism on voluntary social 
service in this period. Throughout the 19t" century, two strands of opinion had competed 
45 George Orwell, 'England Your England', The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and 
the English Genius, (London: Penguin Books, 1982) 
" Perry Anderson, 'Origins of the present crisis', New Left Review, 23, (1964), 40 
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47 for influence over the direction of voluntary social service. The regularity of the 
Charity Organisation Society's appeals for restraint in the distribution of charity and the 
higji quality of their arguments have misled Harris into equating articulacy with 
influence. The Society's combativeness on a wide front and over a lengthy period is 
open to an interpretation overlooked by Harris. In spite of its high public profile, and 
especially of its leading lights Bernard and Helen Bosanquetý the COS never went 
beyond its limitations as a metropolitan sect. Though it had branches in a number of 
provincial cities, its day-to-day influence over the delivery of voluntary social services 
was negligible . 
48 Its successes were indirect, coming through its lobbying of policy 
makers and through its use of the courts. It might embarrass prominent philanthropists 
47 In 1848, for example, Karl Marx identified two main strands in those concerned 
with the problem of poverty. Those whom Marx sarcastically labelled the 
"humanitarians", bear a striking resemblance to the 'tough-minded intellectuals' of the 
Charity Organisation Society. Though they sympathised with the plight of the poor, they 
relied on exhortation to achieve a more just society, counselling "the workers to be 
sober, to work hard and to have few children". The main distinction Marx drew between 
the humanitarians and those he called the "philanthropists", was the deten-nination of this 
latter group to act. The philanthropists, according to Marx, were not satisfied with 
words: for them it was always time to do. Karl Marx, The Povem of PhilosopLy: 
Answer to the "Philosophy of Povet1y" by M. Proudhon, Third Impression, (Moscow: 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, No Date), 119-20. 
48 Robert Humphreys, Siriý Organised Charity and the Poor Law in Victorian Englan 
(London: Macmillan, 1995), 7. See also Stephen Yeo, Religion and Volunta-ry 
Organisations in Crisis, (London: Croom Helm, 1976), 219-20. Beatrice Webb, though 
her polemical stance made her prone to exaggerate, made the same point. She thought 
that "the C. O. S. became itself the most exclusive of sects, making a merit of 
disapproving and denouncing much of the practice of other charitable agencies ... at. the 
same time failing to obtain anything like the army of personal 'friends of the poor', or 
anything approaching the great amount of money, that would have enabled it to cope, on 
its own principles, with the vast ocean of poverty that had somehow to be dealt with. " 
Beatrice Webb, My Apprenticeship, (London: Penguin Books, 1971), 214-15. 
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as it did in the 'trial' of Dr Barnardo . 
49 The ultimate effectiveness of even these tactics 
may be measured by comparing the position today of Barnardo's and the Charity 
Organisation Society (in its new guise as the FWA). Arousing the ire of the COS has not 
proved a mortal setback to Bamardo's. 
An alternative approach 
The libertarian and the declinist schools represented by Prochaska and Harris each adopt 
the standpoint of one tributary to the ideology of voluntarism: the rational and the 
emotional. Rejecting both viewpoints need not mean a reversion to Owen's view of the 
debate on voluntarism in 1940s and 1950s as merely one of those periodic adjustments of 
16 the division of responsibilities between the two partners. " 50 Rather it allows us to 
understand the problematic character of this adjustment. Divisions between proponents 
of different ideologies of voluntarism were as much of an obstacle to accommodation to 
the new welfare dispensation in the 1940s as was any common attitude to or philosophy 
of the state. Running parallel to the aqjustment of relations between voluntary and state 
welfare was an accommodation between the rational and the emotional currents within 
voluntarism. What is interesting about the discussion of voluntarism in the late 1940s is 
that the political debate provided a means to integrate the distinct vocabularies of the 
emotionalist and rationalist wings of charity into a common language of voluntarism. 
The rhetoric of the politicians who engaged in the debate was one indicator of this 
process, for their advocacy of voluntarism drew promiscuously on a melange of Liberal, 
Fabian, Conservative and Libertarian concepts. 
49 The COS targeted Dr Barnardo's Homes as an example of the indiscriminate 
philanthropy, which they believed sapped the morale of the poor, as early 1872. It also 
believed that the Homes falsified its publicity material, which pioneered the use of 
'before and after' photographs of clients, and that the Dr himself, a evangelical minister 
whose medical qualifications were of dubious provenance, was misappropriating 
contributions made to the homes by the charitable public. For a full account of the 
'trial' see Gillian Wagner, Dr Barnardo and the Charily Organisation Society: A Re- 
assessment of the Arbitration Case of 1877, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of 
London, (1977). 
50 Owen, Philanthropy, 595 
- 26- 
The very absence of overt contention surrounding the Committee may be a 
positive advantage to the historian. Nfichael Freeden has observed that the attractions of 
stud- . ying 
large and cataclysmic changes can have the effect of obscuring underlying 
continuities. Periods that exhibit the least signs of conflict may have most to reveal 
about the ideological underpinnings of social and political action. 51 In similar vein, 
Richard Tompson has argued that the historiography of nineteenth century social reform 
has been distorted by its historians' search for radicals, reform movements and 
campaigns for specific reforms. This pursuit has been at the expense of the less 
glamorous instances of top-down, administrative reforms that answered to no radical 
stimulus such as the work carried out by the Charity Comi-nission from 1818-37. This 
approach has obscured the essentially conservative elements of reform and the 
continuities with the period before the heroic 'Age of Reform itSelf. 52 Donna Andrews 
has made a similar point in relation to voluntary organisations of the eighteenth century. 
Noting the subterranean character of changes that proved significant over the long term, 
she has argued persuasively that new models of voluntarism emerged while going with 
the grain of existing ideas about civil society. The advocates of a new associational 
pattern of voluntary social service, which began to emerge in the later eighteenth 
century, were not conscious of striving to create a new form of social activism. Rather 
they orientated themselves by means of a conceptual vocabulary inherited from an 
existing tradition of charity, though in fact the mental landscape the old and the new 
traditions inhabited was quite different. This tenacity of tradition calls for explanation 
and as Andrews argues, "the retention and reformulation of ideas is as important and as 
worthy of historical investigation as their rejection. ý, 53 
The survival of voluntary social service in the 1940s and 1950s and the 
ad, aptation of its proponents to the new environment of state welfare provide an example 
of institutions renewing themselves within a traditional intellectual integument, albeit 
one that no longer met its requirements in its existing form. At the very least, it 
51 M. Freeden, 'The Stranger at the Feast: Ideology and Public Policy', Twentieth 
Century British Mstgj-y, 1 (1), 1990,9-34 
52 Richard Tompson, The Chabjyr Commission and the Age of Reforml (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 1-37 and 224-5 
53 Donna T. Andrews, Philanthropy and Police: London Charfty in the Eipjiteen 
Ce , (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), 5 
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demonstrates that voluntary social service was capable of renovating its ideological 
structures and even of contemplating new departures. 
This thesis, while accepting the broad outlines of Harris's scheme, departs from it 
on two points. First, it rejects the notion that before the Edwardian period all voluntarists 
shared a coherent ideology of welfare that contained a clearly allocated place for 
volunt, arism within a wider political and social philosophy. The chronology may ven b ee 
reversed: a uniform ideology of voluntarism is more of a feature of tile period after the 
Second World War than it is of the Victorian period. This conclusion flows from 
adopting a different approach to the character and role of ideas. Harris sees ideas as self- 
contained and self-sufficient entities, whose relationships are determined by logical 
consistency. In contradistinction Freeden argues that political ideologies are "groupings 
of decontested political concepts ... affected by the specific morphological 
arrangements that place them in relation to each other. " 54 Ideologies are, in other words 
coneatenations of ideas and the role that they are assigned in a particular ideology allows 
adherents to respond to them without having to derive their response from first 
principles. 
What Harris sees as the decay of political and social thought, may from the point 
of view of the voluntary sector, be better grasped as a change in the importance attached 
by its adherents and practitioners to different components of this ideology. Voluntarism 
is ideological in a double sense. The intellectual framework of voluntan, social ser\7ice 
is itself an ideology in Freeden's sense. In the 1940s, voluntarism was also ideological 
in the sense that other political ideologies assigned it a role in their constellation of ideas. 
These two levels interacted in the 1940s and 1950s to produce a particular pattem of 
thinking about the voluntary sector, both within the voluntary sector and in the wider 
political realm beyond it. 
The focus in this study is not how voluntarisin fitted into these wider political 
ideologies but rather on the internal ideological rearrangement of the voluntary sector in 
the period after 1945. At an earlier stage in its history voluntarism sought to provide an 
explanation of the totality of human experience. By the 1940s, the requirements of a 
viable ideology of voluntarism were quite different. Its orientation was primarily 
internal and aimed to provide legitimacy for existing voluntary organisations. 
It also had 
54 Nfichael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: a Conceptual Approach, (Ox-ford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996), 82 
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to supply a rationale for its relationships with exterior institutions, notably the state. For 
this reason the construction of a new morphology of voluntary sector ideology was 
carried out primarily in relation to the state. This is reflected in the prominence given in 
this thesis to the role of the debate on the future of voluntarism in the realm of high 
politics. This debate and the response of the voluntary sector provided a vehicle in 
which the voluntary sector reached its own internal version of consensus. 
Outline of the thesis 
The central position occupied by, financial and organisational questions in the debate 
means that the thesis draws very heavily on evidence contained in the financial and other 
records of some mzýjor voluntary organisations rather than on more conventional sources 
for intellectual history. This is not intended to be either a straightforward contribution to 
the history of ideas, nor as an account of the financial and organisational evolution of the 
voluntary sector during this period, though consideration of the financial and 
org, anisational issues is unavoidable given the central place they held in the debate. The 
purpose is rather to show that questions of money and organisations had displaced the 
language of moralitý, conventionally employed in discussions of voluntary social service 
by the middle of the twentieth century. The thesis explores some of the roots of this 
phenomenon and seeks to outline some of the implications of this shift for the later 
development of voluntarism. This displacement was not a gradual or subtle 
transformation of the terms of the debate as it unfolded in the 1940s. It was the starting 
point of the discussion and the rapidity with which it subsumed all other considerations 
suggests that this way of thinking about volunt, -, trism was already well established witWn 
the voluntary sector. 
The focus of attention in the thesis is how the discussion on the future of 
voluntarism. dealt with three sets of oppositions. The first of these was the opposition 
between voluntarisin and the state. This opposition is, of course, central to the 
Libertarian ideology of voluntarism, but the rationalist approach to voluntarism also 
gives pride of place to defming the relationship between voluntarism and the state, and 
this opposition of voluntarism and state holds a central position in any ideology of 
voluntarism. This opposition was prominent in the earlier stages of the debate on 
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voluntary social service but it soon moved into the background, supplanted by the second 
opposition that we shall be considering. This opposition was internal to the voluntary 
sector, it was formal and it was historic. This was the opposition of the voluntary 
organisation to the charitable trust. This opposition was the bequest of the Liberal 
political tradition to the debate on voluntarism in the 1940s. This opposition moved into 
a central place in the discussion, reaching its high water mark in the recommendations of 
the Charitable Trusts Committee. This opposition was neutralised in the 1960 Act and 
has played very little role in the discourse on voluntarism since the 1950s. The final 
opposition is the one that dare not speak its name. This was the opposition between 
voluntary organisation and voluntary organisation. It played almost no part in the 
discussions of the 1940s nor has it often surfaced since. This was the 'spectre at the 
feast' in the public discussion of voluntarism in the 1940s and 1950s. The effect of the 
debate was to shelter this tension within the voluntary sector behind the prominence 
given to the oppositions of state against voluntary and voluntary organisation versus 
charitable trust. 
The National Council for Social Service played a key role in the debate and one 
objective of the thesis is to determine the Council's role in developing the ideology of 
voluntarism. According such a prominent role to the NCSS presented a number of 
difficulties. The first of these were technical. At the beginning of the research period, 
the NCSS archive was not in the public domain. It became available only towards the 
end of the second year of research - it was still being catalogued as the research was 
under way. The archive, when it finally became public was large, which presented major 
problems of selection even for the relatively short period covered. The other difficulties 
were qualitative. The archive consisted largely of administrative documents - minutes 
and short reports predominate - the sort of documents, in other words, not likely to 
discuss ideas. The role of the NCSS made this inevitable. The Council was 
y sector as a whole and a large p representative of the voluntan art of its function was to 
promote cooperation between voluntary organisations. Its role was, therefore, to 
minimise ideological differences between voluntary organisations. As a result, it 
actively sought to exclude ideological questions that might exacerbate tensions. There 
were, however, occasional attempts by the NCSS leadership to explain the role and 
function of the Council and the wider voluntary sector. Though much relies on 
inference, the thesis attempts to use this archive material to shed light on the post-war 
debate on voluntarism. 
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The thesis falls into three palls. Chapters 2 and 3 are scene setting, looking at the 
voluntary sector and the state in the 1940s. Chapters 4 to 7 focus on the political debate 
while chapters 8 and 9 examine how far the ideas articulated in the course of the debate 
and the proposed institutional framework, which was meant to embody these, related to 
conditions within the voluntary sector. The National Council of Social Service was the 
principal architect and beneficiary of the new ideology of voluntarism and Chapter 2 
introduces the NCSS and its General Secretary George Haynes. The chapter locates the 
institution and the man within the developments in the intellectual framework of social 
thinking advanced by Jose Harris. A second major party to the debate on the future of 
-%7oluntarism was the state, represented by the government of the day. More material is 
available on the role of the state. Here the opposite difficulty applies. Chapter 3 
sketches historical developments in political and legal attitudes to charity in order to 
identify the limitations that they imposed on the Labour Government in setting out a 
policy on the voluntary sector. 
Chapters 4 to 7 adopt a broadly narrative structure and are largely empirical. 
They discuss four cardinal stages in the debate on voluntary social service. Chapter 4 
examines Beveridge's role in initiating the debate and how the Liberal ideology that 
underlay his intervention helped to determine the conceptual structure of the debate as it 
unfolded. Chapter 5 takes this analysis further by looking at the debate in the House of 
Lords that Beveridge prompted. This chapter pays most attention to the contribution of 
another Liberal, Lord Samuel. Samuel's intervention extended Beveridge's analysis and 
added a practical component. Samuel also followed up his intervention in the Lords by 
applying further pressure on the Government to take action to secure the future of the 
voluntary sector along the lines outlined in his Parliamentary contribution. The chapter 
closes with an examination of the Government's response. 
The Government was keen to appear to be taking an interest without making too 
many firm commitments. It particularly wanted to avoid any long-term financial 
commitment. The natural response was to establish an enquiry to examine the issues and 
deflect the political pressure for immediate action. Chapter 6 looks at the product of this 
enquiry, the Report of the Charitable Trust Committee, which codified and sought to 
give institutional form to the ideas about the future of voluntarism. generated during the 
earlier discussion. The chapter finds in the Committee's recommendations a 
4programme' for recasting the voluntary sector in the interests of voluntary organisations 
and at the expense of some of the endowed charitable trusts. The Macmillan 
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Go-\, -'erm-nent finally took up the Committee's recommendations at the end of the 1950s 
but the 1960 Charities Act was far from being a straightforward transfer of the 
Committee's proposals to the statute book. Chapter 7 looks at the differences between 
the programme for reform advanced by the Committee and the content of the Charities 
Act. Though there were a number of significant differences between the Committee's 
reconu-nendations and the Act, the chapter -argues that the defining difference was the 
nature and purpose of the register of charities proposed by the Committee and that 
imposed by the Act. The chapter argues that M spite of this major difference between 
the Act and the earlier debate there were underlying continuities of approach. These 
underlying continuities derive from the character of the voluntary sector in the period 
under discussion and the remainder of the thesis is devoted to an examination of the 
foundations of the ideological consensus in conditions within the voluntary sector. 
Chapters 8 and 9 are more discursive and somewhat more conjectural than the 
preceding chapters. They seek to answer the questions that arise from the supposed 
ýcrisis of voluntarism' that occurred in the middle decades of the twentieth century. How 
far did the intellectual framework that underpinned the debate harmonize with 
voluntarists understanding of this crisis? As chapters 4 to 7 establish, the politicians who 
concerned themselves with the future of voluntarism. in the 1940s generally perceived of 
the crisis as essentially financial in character. Yet the evidence for a financial crisis in the 
voluntary sector, in the sense of an absolute material deficiency that assumed a 
distinctive character in 1940s is, to say the least, ambiguous. Chapter 6 seeks to show 
how the language of financial crisis that both voluntarists and their political supporters 
deployed during the late 1940s gave the appearance of dialogue. 
Closer examination reveals that a different interpretation of the nature of this 
financial crisis lay behind discussions within the voluntary sector. Political debate 
tended to focus on quantitative aspects of voluntary sector fmance, and the solutions it 
generated sought to enhance the financial stability and security of voluntary 
organisations. Leaders of voluntary organisations were preoccupied with qualitative 
considerations, however. They worried about the moral implications of funding from 
traditional sources, particularly collecting voluntary contributions from the public. There 
was a noticeable inversion here. Politicians expressed concern that state funding would 
subvert the ethos of voluntarism and undermine its independence. Voluntarists were 
more anxious to disengage their fmances from accountability to the charitable public 
implicit in the collecting relationship. The morality of state funding seems barelyý to 
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have troubled them at all. Underlying all this were the unmentioned effects of 
competition within the voluntary sector. 
This divergence over attitudes to finances reflected the interests of a particular 
section of the voluntary sector. The latent hostility to professionalism within the 
voluntary sector, which surfaced intermittently, particularly from trustees and members 
of voluntary management committees expressed an inkling that a new interest had 
emerged within voluntary organisations and one that increasingly determined the 
direction of voluntarism. Chapter 9 examines the development of professionalisation 
within the voluntarN sector and the implications this had for the ideology of voluntarism. 
'Managerialism' offered an escape from the consequences of rivalry within the voluntary 
sector and competition for funding but it implied a much more quiescent voluntary sector 
and encouraged greater dependence on the state. The conclusion reviews some of the 
longer-term effects on voluntarism of the ideological settlement developed under the 
auspices of the managerial voluntarism that came into its own in the course of the debate 
in the 1940s and 1950s. 
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Chapter 2: George Haynes at the National Council of Social Service 
In order for the conceptualisation of voluntary social service implicit in the political 
discourse outlined in the following chapters to take hold, it had to be rooted within the 
voluntary sector itself. This chapter approaches the emergence of the new intellectual 
fr-x-nework of voluntary social service through an assessment of the thinking of George 
Haynes, Director of the National Council of Social Service 1940-67. By the end of the 
1940sý the National Council of Social Service, the representative of the rational wing of 
-voluntarism and the heir of charity orcranisation, had clearly emerged as the official 
national voice of the voluntary sector, a role to which it had aspired since its inception. 
This was a not a sudden apotheosis but rather the outcome of developments during the 
previous two decades. The Council's rise to dominance was contested - the voluntary 
sector is and was too fissiparous for it to concede formal leadership to any single body; 
but the position of the NCSS in the 1940s and 1950s was quite different from that of its 
precursor, the Charity Organisation Society. 
As the leader of an influential voluntary organisation, Haynes participated in the 
political debate and so contributed to the re-conceptualisation of voluntary social service 
under investigation here. The chapter examines the intellectual foundations of Haynes's 
contribution to the development of the voluntary social service in the 1940s and 1950s. 
It outlines his views on the future of voluntary social service and his experience of 
working in the voluntary social services that gave rise to these ideas. This forms an 
essential backdrop for the discussion of the political debate on the future of voluntary 
social service taken up in subsequent chapters. 
There is no evidence that at the end of the war, Haynes anticipated or desired a 
public enquiry into the voluntary sector, but he was quick to grasp the opportunities 
presented by the debate on the future of voluntarism that arose in the late 1940s. Haynes 
was close to the centre of the institutional framework of voluntary social service. The 
professional managers of voluntary organisations were an important group of 
stakeholders, and Haynes was especially well placed to observe the challenges faced by 
voluntary organisations in the 1940s. The National Council was pre-eminent in the 
discussion on voluntarism in the 1940s and Haynes's rise to its leadership from social 
work in Liverpool in the 1920s illustrates an important connection between the 
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institutional structures and the intellectual framework of voluntary social service. It also 
provides an example of the evolving role of professional managers in the voluntary 
sector. Haynes's career and outlook helps to illuminate the importance of the 
management layer to the harmonising of potentially dissonant elements within the 
voluntary sector. 
Planning the future of voluntary social service 
The roots of Haynes's intellectual outlook may be found in his early career in social 
welfare work. Born in 1902 of middle class parents in the Cheshire village of 
A/fiddlewich, his formative experiences were in the North of England during the 
economic depression of the 1920s and 1930s. His involvement in voluntary social 
service began while he was a student of physics at Liverpool University. His scientific 
studies had to compete with a growing interest in social problems, and he found himself 
Atracted to the thought of a social science. " Years later, Haynes recalled the impact of 
social conditions in Liverpool where he "confronted, for the first time, really, with a 
physical and mental shock -a rampant slum of a great city. " The poven)7 and squalor 
led him to campaign "to get one particularly fetid district removed. " Haynes's campaign 
followed the template established by Victorian and Edwardian social reformers: an 
enquiry to gather information was followed by lobbying of the City Council's Director of 
Housing for a clearance and re-housing scheme. An unexpected result of his success had 
a profound influence on Haynes's outlook. In spite of the improvement in the occupants' 
physical surroundings, Haynes learned, "many of them could not bear the monotony, the 
loneliness and the emptiness of this new urban environment, and pressed back into the 
neighbourhood from which they had been removed. " Haynes drew a moral lesson from 
this experience, concluding that material improvement alone was insufficient, having 
"discovered then that you can never be sure what it is that creates and makes a 
community live. " The lesson Haynes drew from this experience was not that material 
improvements sponsored by the state had no role to play, but that something extra was 
required to supplement it. ' 
I Sir George Haynes, 'Prospects for Human Welfare', First Dorothy King Memorial 
Lecture delivered 1\/IcGill University, 23 October 1964, LMA/4016/IS box 178 
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Haynes, already Deputy General Secretary, was appointed Acting General 
Secretary of the Council on 20 September 1940 following the sudden retirement on 
health grounds of his predecessor, Leonard Shoeten Sacký in the spring of 1940. Haynes 
was the effective leader of the NCSS throughout the war. Sack was retained as a 
4consulting officer' and his return to office was clearly anticipated. Haynes's 
appointment was initially described as temporary and even when it became clear that 
Sack was unlikely, to return it was declared as being for the duration of the war plus six 
months. His confmnation in office by the Finance and General Purposes Committee on 
2 26 March 1946 was never in doubt . Haynes's appointment as the senior paid officer of 
the Council, at the comparatively young age of 38, was the natural progression of an 
already blossoming career in the management of voluntary organisations. It was also 
partly a matter of luck: Sack had been in office for barely four years when he fell ill; his 
3 
predecessor, Captain Lionel Ellis, had served for 18. 
The NCSS was a complex alliance of different interests. It was an umbrella 
organisation and it had two aspects. On the one hand, it really was a Council consisting 
of representatives of voluntary organisations. The precise make-up of the Council 
fluctuated but in 1949 it had 176 members. In addition to 27 individual members, there 
were 65 representatives of major national voluntary organisations. These included the 
National Association of Guilds of Help, the Family Welfare Association and the 
Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen's Families Association, all founding members. The Council 
also included representatives of 10 Government departments covering health, social 
security and education, nine representatives of local authority associations, and 
2 NCSS Executive Committee, 25 April 1940; NCSS Executive Conunittee, 20 
September 1940, London Metropolitan Archive (hereafter LXIA) 4016/lSiOl/031 (2); 
NCSS Finance and General PpTposes Committee, 26 February 1946, 
LTvLk/4016/IS/01/048 (1); NCSS Finance and General PWoses Comniittee, 26 March 
1946, LMA/4016/lS/01/048 (1); Margaret Brasnett, Volunt4a Social Action: The 
Ifistory of the National Council of Social Service 1919-1969, (London: National Council 
of Social Service, 1969), 95-6 
3 Brasnett, Voluntarv, 84 
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representatives of professional bodies such as National Union of Teachers and the 
National Association of Local Go-\, vmment Officers. Representatives of the major 
religious denominations rubbed shoulders with the delegate from the decidedly secular 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research. These organisations came together 
once a year, usually in Church House, Westminster. 4 
Between annual meetings, the NCSS existed as a large voluntary organisation in 
its own fight. It operated at a national level, employing some 150 officers in its 
headquarters in Bedford Square and conducting a number of social welfare programmes, 
promoting the principles of the NCSS and following policy directions set by the annual 
Council meeting. The NCSS also had an expanding network of regional, county and 
local branches. It lobbied government on behalf of voluntary organisations and, in 
addition to promoting co-operation between voluntary organisations working in the same 
fieldý it encouraged collaboration between voluntary organisations and national and local 
5 government . 
The effective leadership of this unwieldy institution required tact and patience, 
two attributes with which Haynes was amply endowed according to those who knew him 
well. Sir John Wolfenden, who as Chairman of the National Council from 1953 to 1960 
had the chance to observe him at close quarters, praised Haynes for his ability to 
maintain an even temper. No matter how "tiresome other people might be - committee 
members, officials of central or local government, enthusiastically indiscreet voluntary 
workers",, Haynes displayed 6'a tireless readiness to listen and then to explain, with 
modesty and even apparent diffidence, what the other side of the picture might be. " 
Margaret Brasnett, who worked under him, thought he brought "a temperament and 
personality admirably fitted to the tasks" of leading the organisation during the crisis of 
the war and the period of reconstruction that followed, praising especially -his skill and 
devotion as a patient, sympathetic negotiator. " Wolfenden and Brasnett respected the 
breadth of Haynes's vision of voluntary social service: Brasnett admired his "gift of 
being able to see both the wood and the trees"; Wolfenden admired"the wisdom that 
[had] matured over the years" and his "capacity for a synoptic breadth of view into 
4 Joan S. Clarke, 'The National Council of Social Service', Lord Beveridge and A. F. 
Wells, (eds. ), The Evidence for VoluntaU Action, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1949), 253. See also National Council of Social Service, Annual Reports 1939-60. 
5 Clarke, 'National Council', 253 
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which the details must be made to fit. " As the latter comment suggests, Haynes's 
contribution was not - and Wolfenden had no qualms about spelling this out - "primarily 
as a theorist or a spinner of philosophical words about service. " His vision of voluntary 
social service was subordinate to action for he spent "his time living out his conviction" 
rather than indulging in lengthy, rationalisation. 
Haynes appeared to demonstrate the skills and aptitudes of the diplomat more 
often bracketed with intellectual flexibility than with rigour. He was clearly most 
comfortable negotiating person-to-person or in the numerous commissions and 
committees of which he was a member. There was, as Wolfenden's comments show, a 
natural tendency to see Haynes as all practice, and to underestimate his social philosophy 
but his renowned pragmatism sprang not from an absence of principle; rather it flowed 
naturally from a set of ideas formed in the course of his experience in the British 
voluntary sector in the inter-war years. 
Pivotal in Haynes's conception of the future of voluntary social service in the 
1940s was greater co-operation between state and voluntary organisations. The general 
tenor of his approach may be gleaned from his encomium to George Astbury, his 
opposite number at the Family Welfare Association, on the latter's retirement in 1956. 
Reflecting on the changed intellectual climate since Astbury's appointment in 1938, 
Haynes noted with approval his readiness to 'think the unthinkable'. Haynes singled out 
Astbury's role in persuading the Charity Organisation Society (COS) to endorse "the 
main recommendations of the Beveridge report", and contrasted Astbury's readiness to 
embrace the "new relationships between statutory and voluntary agencies" with the 
Society's approach under its first Secretary Sir Charles Loch, for whom state welfare had 
been anathema. Haynes believed that Astbury's policy departure was justified by the 
c6silent revolution which had transformed many of the issues of his day. " Haynes was 
6 Sir John Wolfenden, 'George Haynes: a tribute', Social Service Quarter , vol. XL 
No. 4,1967,139-40- Brasnett, Volunt4a, 95-6 
7 Family Welfare Association Annual Report 1956-57,24. The Charity Organisation 
Society, a vigorous opponent of collective welfare since its inception in 1869, became 
the Family Welfare Association in 1946, under Astbury's leadership. The change of 
name reflected the change in direction masterminded by Astbury as the Association 
focussed increasingly on casework at the expense of the wider role in regulating the 
voluntary sector that it had espoused at its inception. Owen, PhilanthrQpy, 246 
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himself deeply impliciated in this 'silent revolution'. Ffis support for co-operation 
between the state and voluntary organisations was not the sudden conversion implied by 
his Damascene narrative of Astbury"s reorientation of the FWA, nor was it a pragmatic 
response to changing political realities. It was ftmdamental to his outlook and to that of 
the NCSS, and it came into its own in the political conditions of the late 1940s. 
Towards the end of the war, Haynes detailed his ideas on the future of voluntary 
social service in an internal discussion document entitled 'The Future Purposes and 
8 Organisation of the National Council of Social Service'. Haynes's comments, give an 
insight into the complex operations of mid-century voluntary organisations. In a short 
introduction to the Council's principles Haynes expressed his warm approval of the 
organisation's founders, praising especially their "empirical approach" and the 
consequent breadth of mission they had set out. This had given "the Council maximum 
freedom in selecting its tasks and creating its machinery. " 
Haynes started by rejecting a common criticism of voluntary effort; he denied 
that social work should be "regarded merely as a social palliative ... [but as] a necessary 
instrument of social regeneration. " He asserted the importance of integrating voluntary 
social service with a strategic approach to social change, arguing that it was "crucial in 
the,, vvhole process ... that the attack on any social problem shall be informed by a full 
appreciation of its relation to general social progress". Haynes declined to elaborate any 
but the most general of principles for social service, however, and confined his 
observations on the role of the NCSS in developing a strategic s- ynthesis to the 
generalised aspiration to pursue "any contribution the Council can make towards a better 
appreciation of the relation between specialised activities". Haynes adopted a subjective 
focus superficially similar to the philosophical Idealism that had informed the COS. He 
asserted that the work of the Council rested "on a belief in the value of individual 
personality". He also accepted the Idealist recognition of a connection between 
subjective and social existence, for an individual could "only find himself and outlet for 
his powers in association with others". 9 He declined to suggest any intellectual 
foundations on which such associations of individuals might be formed. 
8 G. E Haynes, 'The Future Purposes and Organisation of the National Council of 
Social Service', appended to Minutes of the Annual General Meeting, 14 December 
1944, LMA/4016/IS/01/007(l) 
9 Haynes, 'Future Purposes', 1-3 
-39- 
Haynes assumed the actuality of social relationships and deferred their theoretical 
elaboration. His avoidance of prescription was partly, no doubt, tactical. The character 
of the NCSS meant that its leadership required great sensitivity. His reluctance to evoke 
a social theory also reflected what some have seen as a wider intellectual crisis of the 
social sciences. 'O NA-Iiat it yielded in the case of Haynes was a focus on organisation as 
such. Raynes argued that "it was with organised group life that the Council is primarily 
concerned", and particularly with fostering relationships between groups. "Satisfactory 
relationships between groups do not", he argued, "develop automatically but require just 
as careful thought and planning as the organisation of the group activities themselves. "" 
This was the level at which the NCSS could intervene, "to create out of this diversity of 
group interests and activities a real partnership of effort". The role of the NCSS's 
leadership was to set general standards for efficient administration. 12 Haynes offered 
quality assurance of administrative standards as the foundation stone for individual 
involvement in voluntary social service. 
Given Haynes's concentration on administration it is not surprising that the bulk 
of the prospectus was concerned with the technicalities of administering the Council, 
though here again Haynes's approach was revealing. Haynes urged administrative 
decentralisation. as the best means of achieving the partnership in diversity that he 
faN7oured. This suggestion was partly a matter of practicality. Haynes argued that at its 
existing size and with its variety of disparate activities, it was 6'iMpOSSible for one 
committee of the Council to be executively responsible for an the work carried out in its 
name. " The attempt of the Executive Committee to oversee all aspects of the Council's 
activities had resulted in "overburdened agenda and reports from groups and 
committees". This had made it "impossible for members of the Committee to 
concentrate their attention on important general matters of policy. " Haynes's solution to 
this overloading of the administrative machinery of the Council was to call for greater 
devolution of authority. He acknowledged that there were "important questions which 
arise from time to time on which general unanimity should be sought" but, he argued, for 
'0 See, for example, the discussion of Jose Harris's approach contained in the 
introduction and Jane Lewis, 'Women, social work and social welfare in twentieth 
century Britain: from (unpaid) influence to (paid) oblivion', Daunton (ed. ), ChLnfty, 215 
Haynes, 'Future Purposes', 3 
12 Haynes, 'Future Purposes', 8-9 
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the most part -actiN,,, ities should be left free for the determination of the different groups 
and committees whichare competent to deal with them. " Concentration of power in the 
hands of the Executive resulted "in frustration and delays" and was in any case a "sterile 
method of promoting the aims" of the Council. 13 
Decentralisation is an attractive strategy for the managers of voluntary 
organisations since it tends to augment the power of the professional managers at the 
expense of the voluntary management committees. The remoteness of the central 
management from the activities of the organisation increases its dependence on the chief 
executive, without necessarily increasing the power of those involved in service 
delivery. 14 h-nplicit in Hay nes's proposals for the dispersal of power was a drifting of 
power towards the professional managers of the Council. His plans for decentralisation 
of authority from the Executive Committee envisaged a greater role for the Council's 
administrative machinery. It would provide premises, staff and secretarial services for 
the autonomous groups working under its aegis. The Executive's remit was to be 
confined to the setting of broad general policy, and ensuring that "the conditions for 
efficient administration and organisation exist and to give its main concern to the 
provision of the services required. "" This adininistrative solution to the challenges 
facing the NCSS and the wider voluntary sector had a lengthy pedigree. Z: ) 
The influence of Frederic D'Aeth and the Liverpool Council of Social Service 
After graduating in 1923, Haynes spent a brief period as a schoolmaster before becoming 
Warden of the Liverpool University Settlement. He joined the National Council as its 
regional organiser in the North West in 1933, and three years later transferred to the 
Council's headquarters staff in London's Bedford Square. His voluntailZ social work in 
13 Haynes, 'Future Purposes', 7 
14 XUe Whitlam, 'At the top: The role of the chief executive', Chris Hanvey & Terry 
Philpot, Sweet Charfty: The Role and Workings of Voluntar-, %7 Organisations, (London: 
Routledge, 1996), 163. VVhitlam's insight is based on his own experience as Chief 
Executive of both the British Section of the Red Cross and of the Royal National 
Institute for the Deaf See also John Clarke and Janet Newman, The Managerial State, 
(London: Sage Publications, 1997), 29-33 
15 Hkynes, 'Future Purposes', 9 
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Liverpool in the early 1920s, particularly as Warden of the University Settlement, put 
Haynes at the centre of one of the most dynamic provincial centres of voluntary social 
service at a formative period in his development. As Warden, Haynes played a leading 
role in establishing the first of the City's 'Service Clubs' for the unemployed. The clubs, 
a local response to an appeal launched by the Prince of Wales in January 1932, which 
were quickly renamed 'Occupational Centres' in deference to the ob ections of local 
trades unionists, provided training and occupational therapy for the unemployed. The 
renaming of the clubs failed to placate their labour movement critics, but the network of 
centres survived the withdrawal of trade union support and grew rapidly both locally and 
nationally. 16 
The dominant influence in the Liverpool social service scene in which Haynes 
learned his craft was the Council of Voluntary Aid (LCVA). The LCVA was launched 
at a meeting of representatives of the City's voluntary organisations on 25 October 1909 
presided over by the Lord Mayor, H. Chaloner Dowdall. William Grisewood, Secretary 
of the Liverpool Central Relief Society, which had been established in 1863 to co- 
ordinate voluntary effort in the city and operated on the same lines as the London Charity 
Organisation Society, also sponsored the new LCVA. By the time of its first annual 
general meeting in May 1911,100 of the city's charitable agencies were affiliated to it 
and it included 50 representatives of official agencies as well a scattering of individual 
members representing Liverpool's great and good. The LCVA was already the 
powerhouse of Liverpool voluntary social services by the time Haynes arrived in the 
city. It became independent of the Relief Society in 1913 and progressively supplanted 
itý finally absorbing it in 1932, and changing its name to the Liverpool Council of Social 
Service in 1933, the same year that Haynes joined the National Council as a fiffl-time 
official. 17 
The Mayor's support was important in establishing the Council but its ultimate 
success depended on the commitment and flair of Frederic G. DAeth, a lecturer in the 
School of Social Sciences at the University and honorary secretary of the LCVA. 
D'Aeth was an archetype of the social entrepreneur favoured by modem day policy 
makers, and his approach provided the template for Haynes's career in the national 
16 H. R. Poole, The Liverpool Council of Social Service, 1909-59, (Liverpool: The 
Liverpool Council of Social Service, 1960), 49-51 
17 Owen, Pbilanthrop-y, 460-8; Poole, Live1pool, 7-8,14 
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leadership of -voluntary social service. Social entrepreneurs have to be able to articulate 
a sense of "mission. coherent and clear enough to command support, but flexible enough 
to allow growth. " The organisations they found depend on generating "the support and 
enthusiasm which keeps them going", often connnunicating "their values and motives 
through stories and parables", and encouraging their supporters to think imaginatively 
rather than analytically or procedurally. " Their aims tend to be concrete, often radical 
and "if an opportunity comes along they will try to take it, even if it does not fit their 
original plan. " The social entrepreneur's emphasis on practical results entails a 
reluctance to "be tied down to a political position as this would cut them off from 
potential supporters. " is D'Aeth fitted this profile of the 'visionary opportunist' 
admirably. 
The number of initiatives in which he was involved both in Liverpool and on the 
nationa stage shows that D'Aeth was an effective and charismatic social entrepreneur. 
Adept at building alliances, he was in touch with other leading figures such as Thomas 
Hancock Nunn, the disciple of Canon Samuel Barnett who established a Council of 
Social Welfare in Hampstead. He was also on good terms with Edward Vivien Birchall 
who inspired the foundation in 1911 of the National Association of Guilds of Help and 
became its first honorary secretary. The association with Birchall, who died in action in 
France during the First World War, was particularly significant for his legacy of L1,000 
provided the funds that "sustained the National Council of Social Service in its first 
precarious years of existence. " 19 From his base in Liverpool, DAeth rapidly became an 
itffluential figure on the national stage, playing a key role in the foundation of the NCSS 
in 1915. 
These individuals and organisations represented diverse currents within voluntary 
social service, but there were recurrent themes, and D'Aeth's approach to voluntary 
social service was typical of his generation. Flis thought had been moulded in the 
Edwardian upsurge of voluntary social service that preceded the Great War. D'Aeth was 
a leading figure in this movement. Ffis contribution to the LCVA, and ultimately to the 
NCSS, was ideological but not in the conventional sense. The Councils of Social 
Service that this generation of activists inspired were "less ideologically militant" than 
18 Charles Leadbetter, The Rise of the Social Entreprene , (London: Demos, 1997), 
78-80 
19 Brasnetý Volunt 18 
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the Victorian COS. 2" Like the guilds of help, to which they were close kin, they were 
"less inclined to propound a theory of charity than to promote ideas regarding its 
practice. " 21 D'Aeth, like many other representatives of this Edwardian. flowering of 
social service, accepted the COS's argument that social service could be improved by co- 
ordination of voluntary effort, but, like many activists, he recoiled from the Society's 
22 dogmatic insistence on clarity of policy as a precondition of co-operation. 
D'Aeth was typical of his generation in regarding relief work as part of a wider 
programme for community and civic regeneration. Cultural as well as social welfare 
prcýlects occupied a central position in his thinking. ý' In spite of this superficial 
similaritv with the COS, his holistic conceptualisation of voluntary social service 
actually inverted the approach of the COS. The Society saw the conscientious 
involvement of the active citizen in social welfare work as a preliminary to the 
foundation of the good SoCietY. 24 D'Aeth, in contrast, regarded the good society as 
immanent in organisations operating in different fields: all that was necessary to release 
this potential was to bring activists together. D'Aeth's repudiation of ideological 
preconditions for joint work went beyond co-operation between voluntary organisations 
for he also welcomed the extension of state welfare services. D'Aeth saw the Councils 
as acting as a bridge between the state and voluntary social service, hoping that they 
would be "representative alike of public and voluntary action". 25 From his perspective, 
far from representing a threat to voluntary social service, the greater involvement of 
governments in the delivery of welfare presented "great opportunities for co-operation 
with the state in the administration of new legislation such as the National Insurance Act 
20 Pat Thane, Foundations of the Welfare State, (London: Longman, 1996), 161 
21 Jane Lewis, The Volunt4U Sector, The State and Social Work in Britain: the Chari 
ar, Organisation Sociely/Family Welfare Association since 1869, (Aldershot: Edward Elg, I 
1995), 69 
22 Brasnett, Volunt 13-14; 
23 F. G. D'Aeth, 'The Social Welfare Movement', The Economic Review, (Oxford 
Christian Social Union), vol. XXIV, (1914), 404-14 
24 Stefan Coffini, 'The Idea of "Character" in Victorian Political Thought', 
Transactions of the Rpyal Historical Socie , 5th Series, vol. 35 (1985), 
29-50 
23 D'Aeth, 'Social Welfare', 408 
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the Mental Deficiency Act, and the Probation Act. " 26 A,, vvillingness to endorse state 
welfare made Councils of Social Service politically distinct from the COS. It also 
smoothed the way for them to become the preferred partner of Governments in welfare 
provision. 
D'Aeth 's agnosticism about ends was combined with a hard-headed approach to 
me-ins and under his guidance the LCVA developed two methods of moulding the 
voluntary sector that were of particular significance for the pattern of growth adopted by 
the National Council. The LCVA moved rapidly from simply promoting co-operation 
between existing organisations to sponsoring new ones. The precedent was set in 1911 
when an unsatisfactory record of youth work led to the establishment of the Liverpool 
Union of Boys' Clubs as an umbrella organisation to stimulate the setting up of new 
schemes. The corollary of sponsoring new organisations that were more effective than 
their predecessors was, as the Council's Secretary in the 1950s observed, "the putting to 
bed of charities which had become out-dated or obsolescent. " 27 In the case of the new 
Union of Boy's clubs, its unofficial power of accreditation gave it the means to pursue 
this goal. 
The LCVA and its creation the LUBC had another weapon in their annoury. 
D'Aeth had seen the role of the Council in initiating and co-ordinating disparate welfare 
services as crucial. . '8 The LCVA's ability to insert skilled professional staff to 
administer new initiatives was crucial to its shaping of voluntary provision in the City; 
the fu-st honorary secretary of the Union was Warden of the Gordon Working Lads' 
Institute. The creation of the Liverpool Personal Service Society to co-ordinate 
casework in the City provides another example of this process at work. Preparatory 
work on this plan to coordinate district visiting in Liverpool began in 1917. Lack of 
sufficient funds to appoint a full-time organiser delayed implementation of the scheme 
until D'Aeth persuaded one of the City's women's settlements, the Victoria Settlement, 
to appoint Dorothy Keeling, a forrner secretary of the National Association of Guilds of 
Help, as part-time Warden, thereby allowing the LPSS to employ her part-time as its 
29 
organiser. 
26 Brasnett, Volunt , 6-18 
27 Poole 
, LiverpooL 19 
28 D'Aeth, 'Social Welfare, 408-9 
29 Poole, Liverpool, 32-3 
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Ultimately the LCVA's capacity to shape voluntary provision in the City rested 
on its financial dominance. 30 At an early stage in the Council's developmentý Dowdall 
commissioned DAeth to produce a report on the funding of voluntary organisations. As 
well as equipping D'Aeth with a detailed knowledge of the city's voluntary provision, 
his survey of 241 agencies with a total income of some L460,991 provided him with a 
31 1 platform to set out his views on obtaining a better return on this expenditure . A7 hen, in 
1918, an anonymous donor offered D'Aeth L50,000 to set up a scheme for the benefit of 
Liverpool charities, D'Aeth had an opportunity to put his ideas into practice. The 
Liverpool Charities Fund he set up soon outstripped the resources at the disposal of the 
LCRS. Three fifths of the Fund's income was reserved for capital expenditure and new 
pr(ýJects and the remaining two fifths was distributed automatically to affiliates of the 
LCVA in direct proportion to their voluntary income. This created a powerful incentive 
for voluntary groups to all) y themselves with the Council, but D'Aeth's scheme went 
further: the distribution favoured organisations that provided annual accounts in the form 
approved by the Council. Those organisations that published a balance sheet and income 
and expenditure accounts received the full amount: those publishing a bare statement of 
receipts and payment received half . 
32 hnposing accounting standards armed the LCVA 
with a powerful mechanism for moulding the internal operation of voluntary 
organisations. 33 The Charities Fund extended the influence of the LCVA, as DAeth 
intended, by prompting the city's voluntary organisations to adopt the sort of 
'ýprogressive policies" he favoured . 
34 D'Aeth in Liverpool had achieved what Haynes set 
out to do nationally, impose a scheme of quality assurance on the administration of 
voluntary organisations. 
30 Owen, Philanthrqpy, 460-4 
31 Frederic G. D'Aeth, Report to the Chairman of the Live1pool Council of Voluntgry 
Aid on the Charitable Effort in Livelpool (Liverpool: [[LCVAI, 1910), 18 
32 Poole, Live1pool, 43-4 
33 D'Aeth's scheme provides a good example of the way systems of accounting are not 
neutral and descriptive, but can actually transform organisations by serving 6 Io constitute 
a reahn of facts, to make a world of action visible and hence controllable in economic 
terms. " Nfichael Power, The Audit Socie1y: Rituals of Verification, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 94 
34 Poole 
, LiverpooL 44 
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The oroganisation man 
The intellectual and administrative paradigm adopted by D'Aeth and the LCVA shaped 
Raynes's approach as leader of the NCSS. Indeed growth on the model of the LCVA 
had already reached a level of maturity by the time Haynes assumed control at the 
National Council. The NCSS extended its influence within. the voluntary sector by 
organising conferences and convening standing committees covering different fields of 
voluntary work. These broug it into contact activists from organisations not directly 
connected with the Council, and continued the strategy proposed by D'Aeth for gaining 
the confidence of voluntary organisations thioughjoint action . 
35 There were a number of 
subordinate groups and standing conferences that brought together individuals and 
organisations working in the same fields. The Churches Group, for example, was small 
but influential embracing as it did representatives from an the major Christian churches 
and from Jewish groups. The Standing Conference of Council's of Social Service 
provided a forum for representatives of the Council's own local, county and regional, 
branches. The Women's Group on Public Welfare and the National Old People's 
Welfare Committee (later Age Concern) brought together representatives from other 
voluntary organisations active in fields where the Council was keen to expand its 
operations in the 1940s . 
36 The Women's Group had the additional advantage in the post- 
, 
37 
war years that its members had strong connections to the Labour Part- . .Y 
These standing 
bodies played an important role in extending the Council's domain of influence for they 
often drew in organisations not affiliated to the NCSS. There were seven of these 
standing committees and conferences in the mid-1940s, each with a full-time official on 
38 
the staff of the National Council and based in Bedford Square. 
The Council was also adept at creating forums either to meet special 
circumstances or to bring together disparate organisations in the name of greater 
35 D'Aeth, 'Social Welfare', 408 
36 Clarke, 'National Council', 252; NCSS Annual Reports 1937-60 
37 Steve Fielding, Peter Thompson and Nick Tiratsoo, ELIgland Ai ise: The Labour 
Party and Popular Politics in 1940s Britain, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1995), 21 
38 Clarke, 'National Council', 254 
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efficiency in the provision of services. The Standing Conference of National Voluntary 
Organisations (SCN-\70) is a good example. Set up at the beginning of the war to co- 
ordinate wartime relief it drew its membership from a much wider constituency than the 
Council had been able to influence in the inter-war period. Early in the war, the 
Council's Executive Committee delegated its authority to the Special Emergency 
Conunittee of the SCNVO. Although it was thus nominally independent of the Council, 
Bedford Square closely monitored the Special Emergency Committee's activities. At the 
end of 1944, partly on account of the difficulty of arranging meetings in London during 
the flying bomb phase, the Special Emergency Committee passed its authority back to 
the NCS S Finance and General Purposes Committee . 
39 As a result of this process of 
devolution and the subsequent reversion of authority to the centre, groups that had been 
drawn temporarily into the orbit of the Council became increasingly subject to the 
Council's direction. 
The Council's capacity to provide senior staff with the expertise to organise 
national and local initiatives also played an important part in its expansion. This was 
itself the result of its continuing attention to finance, and this was in turn closely 
connected with its embracing of a working relationship with the state. The Council's 
rapid growth in the 1930s and 1940s appeared to confirm D'Aeth's vision of the 
compatibility of voluntary and state social services. The pattern was set with the 
Council's rural work during the 1920s, continued during the 1930s in its work with the 
unemployed, and was reinforced during the war when it supervised the establishment of 
a network of Citizens' Advice Bureaux. These programmes followed a consistent 
pattern. The establishment CAB network highlights the main characteristics and may 
serve as an example of the process in action. The initiative came from the Council; 
indeed D'Aeth himself had foreseen the need for such an organisation during the First 
World War. In the winter of 1938-9, the Council convened exploratory meetings with 
representatives of organisations with an interest in advice work under the chairmanship 
of Sir Wyndham Deedes, a member of the Council's Executive Committee. Branches 
were quickly established in the larger cities under the auspices of existing local 
organisations. Where no suitable local patron existed, the Council itself took the 
initiative in finding premises and recruiting voluntary or professional A4 often in co- 
39 NCSS Executive Committee, 24 October 1940 LMA/40164S/01/31(2); NCSS 
Executive Committee, 14 December 1944, LMAJ4016. /IS/01/031(2) 
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operation with local authorities. The Council also distributed a digest of changing 
regulations and legislation in the form of its Citizens' Advice Notes prepared by its new 
information department. Under the Council's supervision, the network of Bureaux grew 
rapidly, rising from 200 at the start of the war in August 1939 to 926 by the end of the 
year. 40 
The Council's influence over the development, of the CAB was not confined to 
providing the inspiration and administrative and technical support. It also secured 
control of the purse strings at an early stage, and this flowed directly fi-om its existing 
relations with the Government. The usefulness of the CAB to the Government was 
twofold. Not only did they provide an effective channel for disseminating information to 
the population at large, they also gave the Government access to infortnation on the 
public mood. Even so, the Government was slow to offer financial support. As the 
value of the service became apparent, however, financial backing was forthcoming, and a 
retrospective grant of 19,459 was made in 1940. By 1944, the annual grant reached 
L33,406. As with its rural activities and work with the unemployed, the Council used 
some of this money to finance the national administration of the scheme. Dorothy 
Keeling of the Liverpool Personal Social Services was drafted into the Council's 
headquarters to head up a CAB department, taking charge of a squadron of travelling 
officers to oversee work in the localities. 41 
The Council found itself once again administering a state grant programme that 
included funding for its own services. This created the perception of a conflict of 
interest. The Council's role as a service provider in its own right compromised its 
qualification to act as a co-ordinating body as "the bodies whose activities it sought to 
co-ordinate might come to regard it as a competitor and rival. " For this very reason, the 
Council's own constitution forbade its making "national appeals which might have 
affected adversely the appeals of its constituent organisations" but the inference that it 
used its relationship with the Government to pursue its own ends was hard to escape, and 
"suspicion remained. ý142 This suspicion had emerged during the Council's work with the 
unemployed in the 1930s. An anonymous, but sympathetic, correspondent remarked 
in a 
memorandum to the Chairman in 1938, that the NCSS was "not universally popular" and 
40 Brasnett, Volunt '99-101 
41 Brasnett, Voluntarv, 101-3 
42 Brasnett, Voluntgry 125-6 
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that there was a widespread belief that the Council in undertaking work with the 
unemployed, as well as trespassing on the work of others, had "placed itself in the 
position of exclusive receiver of grants from H. M. 's Government and the national 
Trusts Simila thi .,, 
43 -r criticism did not emerge over the CABx, but financial control of s 
funding programme undoubtedly gave the Council powerful means for proselytising in 
new localities and for regulating the structures of the organisations it furnished with 
grants. 
In spite of the misgivings expressed by some supporters, Haynes remained 
vigilant for further opportunities to extend the Council's influence. In doing so, he 
demonstrated his own credentials as a social entrepreneur on the model of his mentor, 
D'Aeth. In 1947, he was instrumental in the establishment of the National Association 
for Mental Health (now TvHND), and he played a leading role in the change of direction 
at the COS, serving on the Provisional National Council of the new Family Welfare 
Association . 
44 His role in the Council's work following the Lynmouth flood in August 
45 
1952 shows his readiness to seize opportunities when they offered themselves. Haynes 
visited the area within a few days of the flooding, making contact with those engaged in 
the immediate tasks of clearing up after the disaster and helping to set up an emergency 
Citizens' Advice Bureau in co-operation with the Family Welfare Association. He 
persuaded the North Devon and West Somerset Relief Fund to pay the salary of a 
member of the Council's staff, IVIErs Weeks, whom the Council seconded to the area for a 
fi 
. 
46 
month. Her stay was subsequently extended by a ortn gilt 
43 Anonymous Memo to Chairman, 6 April 1938, 'Ourselves as others see us - as we 
are and as we might be', LMA (not catalogued), box 139 
44 NCSS Executive Committee, 29 May 1947, LMA/4016iIS/01/32 (1) 
45 For a colourful account of the disaster and subsequent relief work, see Eric E. 
ynmouth Flood Disaster: The Full Sto , (Exmouth: 
Raleigh Press, Delderfield, The L 
1953) 
46 NCSS Finance and General PWoses Committee, 23 September 1952, 
LMA/4016/IS/01/050 (1); NCSS Finance and General PWoses Committee, 28 October 
1952, LNIA/4016/IS/01/050 (1) 
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Managerial voluntarism and the State 
Ha- ynes's ideological agnosticism and his emphasis on activism and administration 
reveals his debt to D'Aeth, but it was not necessarily as empowering of individual 
citizens as the rhetoric of the NCSS implied. The hortatory quality of management 
merged imperceptibly with the truncated idealism that imbued voluntary social service. 
The pragmatic approach to social policy measured worth by efficacy, and as a result 
measurable outcomes tended to usurp the less tangible criteria supplied by an ethical 
framework. The underlying assumption of both Haynes and DAeth was that priority 
was to be given to bringing individuals and groups together in action. Although they 
believed that this coming together would engender a dynamic that would ultimately 
produce a common perspective, this needed no direct intervention to bring it about. Tlie 
priority was maintaining the conditions for joint action, and this was the role of 
organisation. As a result, thinking about maintaining the organisation increasingly 
supplanted thinking about the goals of the organisation. 
The conception of voluntary organisations, elaborated by Haynes is supefflicially 
attractive. He presented active involvement in voluntary social service as a means to 
empower individuals for jt]he more they can be given responsibility, the fuller will be 
their citizenship in a free democracy". The Council's role was to help the members of a 
voluntary group "to look beyond the confines of its own specialised activities to the work 
of other groups and thus to the wider life of the community. " 47 Haynes's open-ended 
approach to questions of organisational form and ideological content is a prospectus for 
that bringing together of citizens on emotional rather than rational grounds. The 
connection between the activities of one group and that of another is announced rather 
than articulated with any precision. This may generate a feeling that they are ýproducers' 
rather than passive 'consumers' of governrnent but it offers no programme with which 
this 'production' of government might orientate itself. The tendency to make a fetish of 
activism strengthened the influence of professional managers. Action became the 
predicate of action and the gap in this circular conceptualisation of social service was 
filled, surreptitiously, by organisation - the handmaiden of action. 
47 1 Haynes, 'Future Purposes', 3 
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To some extent, the elaboration of a managefial ethos was an inevitable 
consequence of organisational development within the voluntary sector. The sheer size 
and complexitý, of many large national voluntary organisations called for supervision and 
direction of some sophistication and the development of management specialisation 
often facilitated further growth. Haynes's own leadership of the NCSS provides a good 
ext-, unple. During his first 10 years as General Secretary, the Council exhibited an 
impressive record of expansion. The Council's total assets grew from L104,805 in 1940 
to L266,385 in 1950, a rise of almost 60 per cent in real ten-ns. At the same time, its 
annual income rose by some 45 per cent in real terms. At current prices, it more than 
48 doubled from L44,312 to 1102,735. 
Haynes's reluctance to develop a theory of the role of social service was 
symptomatic of a wider intellectual retreat within the voluntary sector. T. S. Simey the 
Liverpool-based theoretician of social service, thought its main intellectual weakness 
was its lack of a totahsing thrust. He identified two main ideological structures 
underlying social casework practice. On the one hand he thought that psychoanalytical 
insights had their place, for "anal)4ic concepts might well be used as a means of 
understanding the situation in which individuals are placed so that the most effective 
help may be given to those in need". On the other hand, he wanted to locate the insights 
offered by psychoanalysis within a broader frame of reference. Psychology could reveal 
the mechanics of individual responses to circumstance, and, therefore, provide the social 
worker with instruments for modifying individual behaviour and equip the client with 
strategies that were more effective in dealing with their immediate problem. While this 
might produce satisfactory results in individual cases, Simey saw the scope of 
professional social work as moving beyond the treatment of individual cases to providing 
solutions to the circumstances that produced the client. For this the chent-centred focus 
offered by psychology was inadequate for "the situations themselves might be more 
adequately understood in a sociological context". This overarching framework was 
necessary if the situations which gave rise to casework were to be transformed and re- 
shaped so that "the needs of fewer individuals would have to be met" in the future. 
49 
48 NCSS Annual Reports, 1939/40-1950/51 
49 T. S. Sitney, 'Social Service as a Profession', Social Service Quarterly, xxx (3), 
1956/7,112 
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Simey believed that any resolution of the problem of providing an intellectual 
underpinning the professional status of social work had to accommodate both strands. 
Simey despaired that he was in quest of the Holy Grail of social science for, in factý the 
resolution of this problem amounted to the discovery of "precisely how behaviour and 
01e erivironment are related to each t 1r,,. 50 The uneasy cohabitation of analytic 
psychology and sociology undermined the capacity of caseworkers to achieve their 
ambitions of a professional status to offset their financial dependency. 
Haynes's leadership epitomised the modem voluntary sector. It was strong on 
organisation but the ideas that informed it were difluse. Athough some of the policies 
that the Labour govenu-nent pursued rebounded badly on the voluntary sector, Haynes 
was fortunate that the Labour government had an equally unformed view on the 
voluntary sector. This presented the NCSS with opportunities to advance its interest in 
cooperation with the state. 
50 Sirney, 'Social Service, 112 
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Chapter 3: The Labour Government and Voluntarisin 
The malleable philosophy of the NCSS under Haynes, combined with a flexible 
approach to strategy made it an ideal partner in Labour's desire to promote an active 
democracy. It permitted a closer convergence between voluntarism and the state than 
had been possible even in the 1930s. This re-alignment of voluntarism had, however, to 
overcome a number of obstacles. The fact that a number of Labour's objectives in social 
policy encroached on services previously managed by voluntary organisations was not 
insuperable. The main impediment to a more rapid and thorough blending of Labourism 
and voluntarism in the 1940s was that the government lacked policy tools to actively 
help those voluntary organisations, that it wished to encourage. Given its policies on 
health and income maintenance,, the governments inability encourage voluntary 
organisations in other fields made it appear to be actively hostile to voluntary 
organisations. Yet as this chapter sets out to explain the Labour government had no 
settled policy on the voluntary sector. 
This chapter discusses some of the available policy tools in order to set the 
Labour Goverm-nent's approach to voluntary social service within the context of methods 
of managing voluntarism inherited from earlier governments. This highlights the 
limitations of the policy equipment at the disposal of the Labour Government and the 
constraints these imposed on its attempts to develop a policy on the voluntary sector. 
This perspective serves to confirtn that the difficulties faced by voluntary organisations, 
in this period cannot simply be attributed to an innate hatred of voluntarism on the p -art 
of the Labour Government. It also reveals that one important influence on policy 
development thinking was a pre-existing disposition to discriminate between different 
types of voluntarism. The formal distinction between charitable trusts and voluntary 
associations, which surfaced at an early stage of the post-war debate, had solid historical 
precedents. The re-emergence of this historic distinction played an important role in the 
ongoing process of decontesting the conceptualisation of the respective roles of 
voluntary organisations and the state. 
The scope and scale of its welfare reforms tended to obscure the complexity of 
the Government's position, for the Attlee Government came to office with a 
contradictory posture towards voluntarism. Concerning health and income support the 
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government was eager to ensure uniformity of provision, but there were many Labour 
politicians who were keen to preserve a role for voluntary organisations outside these 
two main areas. Voluntary organisations appeared to have the potential to play a part in 
the realisation of Labour's grander vision of a rejuvenated civil society, acting as a 
bridge between the state and the individual, and so helping to cultivate an active 
citizenship. Yet, there were also clearly impulses in the opposite direction leading to the 
broadcasting of a 'mixed message'. One competing priority was ensuring uniformity of 
treatment. and fairness across the nation, and the antipathy to the role of traditional 
4charity' in welf4re services often cut across the division between left and right in the 
;, -- wk\v)oe- nv\ fcýeie q0t 
Party. We have already noted Callaoia'n's objection to the state-subsidised largesse of 
the wealthy, but leading members of the Party as different as Crossman and Bevan 
ex-pressed their dislike of conventional voluntary social service. ' 
The outlook of the govemment of the day is clearly one of the most important 
deten-ninants of the general framework of voluntary social service. Government action, 
therefore, represents a starting point for understanding the unfolding of the debate on 
voluntary social service in the 1940s and the rationale offered by its supporters for the 
continued existence of voluntary organisations. The approach to welfare issues of those 
in power obviously exerted an external discipline on voluntary organisations. 
Government pronouncements and the implementation of its policies had an immediate 
impact on the environment within which voluntary organisations operated and this 
environment impressed itself on the self-consciousness of voluntarists. 
A tax blow 
The election of a Labour government committed to extensive state intervention in the 
field of welfare clearly represented a direct challenge to voluntary social service for it 
carried the implication that this form of welfare provision was redundant. There were 
other signs that the new Government was unsympathetic to voluntarism. One early 
measure passed by the new Labour Goverm-nent dealt a potentially serious blow to the 
voluntary sector and seemed to represent a harbinger of worse to come. Hugji Dalton's 
I Beach, Labour Party, 212-13; David Gladstone, The Twentieth Cenigg Welfare 
State, (Basingstoke: A/facmillan, 1999), 49- Prochaska, PhilanthrM, 156 
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decision in the 1946 budget to remove from charities the right to recover Surtax on 
subscriptions made under seven-year covenants appeared to confirm that voluntary 
organisations faced a bleak future under the new regime. 
Ever since the introduction of the income tax, charities had been exempt and this 
privilege had received an unexpected boost during the 1920s. This was an unforeseen 
consequence of Section 20 of the Finance Act, 1922. This had set out to close a loophole 
that allowed the wealthy to avoid income tax by transferring income to family members 
who paid income tax at a lower rate. The Act introduced stricter rules governing such 
transfers, stipulating that the lower rate of income tax would be applicable only where 
the transfer "was paid over annually under a voluntary covenant capable of subsisting for 
at least six years. " This was a rather clumsy mechanism for achieving this goal, and a 
lawyer acting for the Liverpool Council of Social Service noticed one of its potential side 
effects. He enquired whether this meant that if the covenant were to a charity "the gross 
sum being transferred... was properly chargeable not at the donor's tax rate ... but at its 
own tax rate for ý annual payments', i. e., nil. " The Board of the Inland Revenue, after 
considerable deliberation, reluctantly agreed that it did. 2 
Following the Board's ruling the Liverpool CSS floated a scheme to take 
advantage of this new tax efficiency of covenanting a sum to charities. Subscribers were 
encouraged to commit themselves to paying a specified amount for at least seven years 
into a general charities fund administered by the Liverpool CSS. The Liverpool CSS 
then undertook to reclaim the tax and to distribute the composite funds to the charities 
nominated by the donor. The Liverpool scheme was a great success. The bulletin of the 
Liverpool CSS gave regular reports on the amounts contributed under the scheme and 
distributed to charities. In 1946-7, a total of 756 individuals and fn-rns donated 193,374 
to the fund .3 Other 
local Councils of Social Service and the National Council emulated 
the Liverpool scheme and this was an important source of additional revenue for many 
voluntary organisations and charities. 
The National Council rapidly followed the example set by the Liverpool scheme. 
As under the Liverpool scheme, the NCSS Benevolent Fund acted as an intermediary 
distributing the proceeds to the donor's favoured charity and relieving donors and 
1) 
Chestennan, Charities, 234-5; the period of the Covenant was subsequently changed 
to seven years, and later to five. 
3 Liverpool Council of Social Service Bulletin, No. 6 (New Series), July 1948 
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smaller charities of the administrative burdens of processing covenants, receiving the 
income from donors, reclaiming income tax from the Inland Revenue. The Council itself 
naturally expected to benefit from this service, though it experienced some difficulty 
costing the service and charging for it. On the other hand, there was the expectation that 
the subscribers to the benevolent fund would select the NCSS as one of the beneficiaries 
of their covenzinted subscription. As the Council's Assistant Honorai3-ý Treasurer, Mr R. 
Matthews explained to the Finance and General Purposes Committee in 1939, "most 
subscribers enter the Council ... for a contribution on the list of subscription under the 
e ff agreement" at least in order to cover the administration costs. For thos who prefe ed 
to pay for the administration separately from their charitable donation the Council 
charged il a year, although it was "sometimes necessary to increase this charge if the 
distribution involves a large number of small payments. " This group constituted about a 
quarter of the total number of subscribers to the fund. By 1939 the 11 charge was no 
longer sufficient to cover the running costs of these accounts, and the Council estimated 
that if the true costs were charged on these it would have an extra 1500 a year of 
income. 4 
In spite of this problem, the Council ran the scheme at a profit for other 
subscribers donated generously to the Council through the fund. Matthews was deeply 
anxious that in 'carrying' these under-payers, the Council was in effect misapplying its 
own funds. He wondered, "whether these generous donations which are intended to 
augment the general funds of the Council, are being rightly used in "carrying" those 
subscribers who do not pay sufficient to defray the bare costs of the very excellent 
service the Council is rendering. " This was, of course, a happy coincidence of 
conscience and self-interestý and Matthews's qualms were satisfied when the Committee 
decided to write to the delinquent subscribers making the position clear. 
5 
As well as being a source of income for the Council the Benevolent Fund also 
provided the Council with a means of influencing voluntary organisations. There would 
certainly have been the temptation to influence potential subscribers who wanted advice 
on which charities they should support. The intention to use the Fund to further the 
4 NCSS Finance and General PWoses Committee, 12 Januaty 1939, 
LMA/4016/IS/01/046(l) 
5 NCSS Finance and General PWoses Conunittee, 12 January 1939, 
LMA/4016/IS/01/046(l) 
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Council's ideas on voluntary social service was also made explicit in the Fund's 
constitution. This included provisions stipulating that beneficiaries must be members of 
the NCSS and the distribution of fimds would be subject to the Council's approval .6 The 
Benevolent Fund continued the practice, initiated by D'Aeth, of using funding as an 
instrument to exercise influence over voluntary organisations. The National Councils 
Fund was indeed a mighty instrument for achieving this objective. In 1938, it had 2,423 
subscribers and commanded a distribution of 054,489.7 
The Go-\, ýemment estimated that the cost to the Exchequer of beneficiaries of 
8 covenants reclaiming tax paid at the higher rate amounted to k1,250,000 a year. Not all 
of this went to charities. The NCSS alone obtained refunds of tax paid on covenanted 
donations of 1514,583 in 1946 but this included donations that attracted refunds at the 
general rate of income tax. The effect of Dalton's measure is, therefore, difficult to 
assess, but it probably amounted to deducting something less than il million annually 
from the voluntary sector. Its incidence was probably extremely uneven: larger 
voluntary organisations and major charitable endowments were more likely to have 
noticed its effects since these were more likely to have built up a subscription base 
organised around seven-year covenants. The NCSS Finance Committee was sufficiently 
alarmed to suggest seeking alliances with other interests likely to be affected by the 
measure, though little came of this. 9 The Council secured the support of the NW E. H. 
Keeling, who moved amendments to the Finance Bill during the committee stage. 
Keeling's amendments, which sought to restore the Surtax benefit to charities alone, 
never enjoyed much prospect of success. 10 
The Government was determined to close the opportunity for tax avoidance that 
the seven-year covenant still made available to the wealthy and its impact on the finances 
6 NCSS Finance and General PIlMoses Coimnittee, 12 January 1939, 
LMA/4016IS/01/046(l) 
NCSS Finance and General PuMoses Committee, 12 January 1939, 
LMA/4016/IS/01/046(l) 
8 House of Commons Debates, vol. 421,17 Apfil 1946, col. 2813 
9 NCSS Finance and General Ppgposes Committee, 30 April 1946, 
LMA/4016/IS/01/048(l) 
10 NCSS Finance and General PWoses Committee, 30 June 1946, 
LMA/4016/IS/01/048(l) 
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of the voluntary sector was incidental. There was no obvious method of removing the 
opportunities for tax avoidance that this loophole offered without also denying its 
advantages to charities. Indeed, arguing the Government's case in the debate on the 
measure, James Callaghan sought to make a positive virtue of the withdrawal of this tax 
privilege. He argued that the seven-year covenants effectively bestowed on surtax 
payers a system of voluntary taxation. It allowed them' 6to canalise their Surtax liability 
into channels they desire and not into the revenue channels. " One method he singled out 
for particular attackwas those "people, particularly those with landed estates, who give 
pensions to their old servants". Callaghan and the Government objected to the fact that, 
in effect, the State paid for these pensions since they were deducted from the overall tax 
yield. He oklected no less strongly to those wealthy individuals who donated money to a 
charity such as a hospital, condemning them as "public benefactors at the public 
expense". " Callaghan's comments point to an historic difficulty with charity -it 
represented a form of public spending that was beyond the control of the state. The 
resources applied to charitable objects represented a deduction from the public purse but 
the usual methods of ensuring accountability were absent. This theme reverberated 
during the debate. 
The Labour leadership had to take into account the attitude of its own activists to 
voluntarism. Hostility to old-style charity certainly existed, as Callaghan's comments 
reveal. This hostility was more than requited by a hatred of the Labour movement on the 
part of many voluntarists. Haynes's difficulties with Liverpool trades unionists have 
been mentioned, but similar squabbles occurred elsewhere. Ann Oakley recounts her 
mother's struggle to set up an unemployed centre in Fulham in the 1930s. Kay Miller 
found the local Labour Party implacably opposed to her, suspecting that the centre was 
being 'done up' Nvith cheap labour. The hostility was mutual. Miller in return believed 
the local council was dominated by "'reds' who want to tear down every constitution 
there is in England. " 12 This antagonism persisted in the 1940s but it was relatively 
isolated, though many supporters of voluntary social service feared that "conflict 
between statutory and voluntary agencies was inevitable. " 13 It was in the interests of the 
11 House of Commons Debates, vol. 421,17 Apfil 1946, cols. 2806-7 
12 Ann Oak-ley, IN/fan and Wife. Richard and Kay Titmuss: AjIv Parents'EarLy Years, 
(London: Flamingo, 1997), 3 8-42 
13 Brasnett, Voluntary, 134 
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National Council as much as in the interests of the Government to neutralise such 
sentiments for they threatened the development of co-operation along the lines envisaged 
by Haynes. INThen an attempt was made to mobilise voluntary organisations against the 
Labour Government, Haynes was quick to stifle it. 
Sir Robert Gower, the former Conservative X/IP for Gillingham and President of 
the Property Owners' Protection Association, launched one such attempt to foster 
resistance within the voluntary sector by building on the latent antagonism between 
-\i-oluntarists and Labour. Gower tried to stir up a defence of 'the voluntary spirit' with a 
letter to The Times. Denouncing the nationalisation of the hospitals, Gower called for 
the establisl-anent of an advisory council "to provide support for all voluntary 
organisations which come within the range of present or future legislation. " 14 He 
followed up his letter with a circular to leading voluntary organisations urging them to 
support his proposed advisory council which he intended would "help with advice and 
ultimately with effective practical assistance, any organisations threatened by the forces 
that are sapping the will to voluntary giving. " 15 Gower's proposed Advisory Council 
aroused Haynes sufficiently for him to circulate a letter to the Council's constituent 
bodies advising them to rebuff any advances from Gower. 16 Haynes's swift response 
contained this challenge to the NCSSs hegemony and Gower's resistance movement 
came to nothing, though the incident highlighted the NCSS's dominant role within the 
voluntary sector. 
The Gower incident might, however, have confirmed to many Labour supporters 
the close association that many assumed to exist between the Conservative Party and the 
voluntary sector in general and the NCSS in particular. This assumption, based on the 
role the Council had played under the Baldwin Government's policy towards the 
unemployed, threatened the prospects for co-operation with the Labour Government. 
14 The Times, 4 April 1946,5; Simon Haxey, Tofy M. P., (London: Victor Gollancz, 
1939), 46 
15 c To Preserve the Voluntary Spirit, Memorandum from Sir Robert Gower Outlining a 
Plan', LNLN, Uncatalogued box 139, NCSS Correspondence on Policy Matters 1938- 
1952) D1/1/4/2 
16 See for example Hon. Francis Faffer to G. Haynes, 15 April 1946; Haynes to Farrer 
16 April 1946, LMA, Uncatalogued box 139, NCSS Correspondence on Policy Matters 
1938-1952) DI/1/4/2 
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Mutual hostility between voluntary organisations and the labour movement had festered 
during the 1930s, particularly over the issue of services for the unemployed. The 
identification of voluntary organisations like the NCSS with the National Government's 
aid programme for the unemployed in the 1930s might have been expected to sour 
relations between the voluntan7 sector and the new Government. It has been argued that 
the government's reluctance to use voluntary organisations in the delivery of welfare 
provision in the fields of income support and health care was a legacy of this era. It is, 
therefore, often assumed that voluntary organisations were left in the cold following 
Labour's -victory in the 1945 general election and that philanthropy's "covert ideological 
bias ... was responsible for its nadir in the 1940s"'. 
17 This sentiment did not apply, across 
the board, however. Its principal victims were in any case the mutual insurance 
companies who had administered health cover in the inter-war period. A sense of 
injustice provided part of the explanation for the shift to a wholly state administered 
system of health care and the priman7 consideration was the pursuit of the universality of 
access that the inter-war system had conspicuously failed to provide. This had proved 
incapable of extending provision to all those in need, denying care to the workless poor 
and to the wives of those in work. 18 
It is true that the role of the National Council of Social Service in administering 
the National Government's schemes for the* unemployed during the 1930s had drawn 
criticism from some members of the Labour Party. "Miat is more striking, however, is 
that the main force of their criticism was reserved for the National Government rather 
than being directed at the National Council. '9 Given the 'collaboration' of voluntary 
organisations with the National Government it is perhaps more remarkable that there 
were still those the Labour Party in the 1940s who were prepared to make a case for 
voluntary organisations as the most appropriate delivery system for certain types of 
Rodney Lowe, 'Welfare's Mo-\7ing Frontier', Twentieth Cengn, British HistO , 6, 
(1995), 374 
'8 Noelle Whiteside, 'Private Agencies for Public Purposes: Some New Perspectives 
on Policy Making on Health Insurance Between the Wars', Journal of Social Polic , xii 
(1983), 165-93; M. J. Daunton, 'Payment and Participation: Welfare and State- 
Formation in Britain 1900-1951', Past and Present 150, (1996), 180-1 
19 Harris, 'Responding to Adversity', 340-5 
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social service. 'O Supporters of voluntary social service could build on this strand of 
thinking within the Party. 
At a lower level of politics, the Labour Party's strategy for maintaining its 
organisation during the war had also pa-\, ýed the way for rapprochement between Labour 
Party activists and voluntary organisations. The trend towards co-operation between 
constituency Labour Parties and the committees of voluntary organisations during the 
early, 1940s was one of the ways "local [Labour] parties ... 
involved themselves in the 
war effort. " The Labour leadership encouraged its members to demonstrate a practical 
conu-nitment to local affairs and local parties '"and individual activists were thus urged to 
co-operate with other organisations involved in the war effort, like the Civil Defence 
Ser-vices, and to represent Labour on appropriate public bodies". Labour's leaders had 
some reservations and warned parties to remain alert to the danger that involvement in 
local committees could become "a substitute for, rather than supplementary to, more 
explicitly political work. , 21 
Charity and the public interest 
Public policy in Britain has tended to favour voluntary organisations, in the delivery of 
social welfare and this tendency did not evaporate with the introduction of the welfare 
state. Encouragement of voluntary solutions often conflicted with other political 
objectives, though these conflicts were not unique to the Labour Go-x'ýernment. The 
withdrawal of the surtax concession highlighted the constraints operating on theAttlee 
Government's objective of promoting voluntary social service. In this case, encouraging 
voluntary effort was at odds with the traditional concern of the public authorities to 
maximise revenue by closing off opportunities for tax z7oidance. 
What animated Labour in government was a desire to improve the efficiency of 
voluntary social services in order to increase the benefit flowing to the public from the 
resources they controlled and, in this, they hardly differed from any of their 
20 Beach, Labour Party, 214 
21 Steve Fielding, Peter Thompson and Nick Tiratsoo, En dand Arise: The Labour 
P4M and Popular Politics in 1940s Britain, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1995), 47-49 
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predecessors. This was part of a wider concern to promote economic efficiency, which 
motivated the nationalisation of certain industries. Outright nationalisation of the entire 
voluntary sector was ruled out by ideological, practical and financial considerations. As 
in industrial policy, mationalisation would have "involved challenging existing patterns 
". 22 In the case of private industry, w of oNvnership. ,, 
here ownership was relatively clearly 
defined% it was possible to sweeten the pill of outright nationalisation by offering 
generous compensation which meant that "for many former owners nationalisation was a 
23 more profitable and comfortable method of rationalisation" than any of the alternatives. 
The peculiar character of charitable property meant that there were no readily 
identifiable owners to compensate in order to smooth the way for rationalisation in the 
voluntary sector. 
The public benefit implicit in charity seemed to offer an easy way to resolve this 
dilemma. In theory, the public interest claim on charity was not itself at issue when 
Labour came to power in 1945. 'Publicness' was intrinsic to the legal definition of 
charity and this conferred on the state the right to regulate the voluntary sector. The 
possibility of wider state interference if the public element in charity was capable of 
overriding the private element was, as John Stuart NO had recognised, limitless. XM 
himself felt that just such a watershed had been passed with the disendowment of the 
Church of Ireland. In pursuit of this policy, the state had abrogated to itself "the right to 
change altogether the application designed by the founder. "24 The election of a Labour 
Government committed to the large-scale nationalisation of industry appeared to make 
this threat more tangible. The fact that charity was a hybrid of public and private created 
a complication, therefore. Though charities owed an obligation to the public, they 
remained under private control. Government intervention in the voluntary sector, though 
legitimised by the public component of charity, encroached on the claims of the private 
custodians of charities and voluntary organisations, whether as trustees or as members of 
'71 
Helen Mercer, 'Industrial Organisation and Ownership, and a New Definition of the 
Postwar 'Consensus", Harriet Jones and Michael Kandiah (eds. ), The Myth o 
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23 Mercer, 'Industrial Organisation, 150 
24 j. S. Mill 
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management, committees, and this re-verberated against the wider interference with 
pfivate property in other fields towhich the new govertu-nent was conunitted. 
There existed the skeleton of a statutory regulatory framework in the Charity 
Commission but its jurisdiction was confined to endowed charitable trusts. There was, it 
is true, an arabiguit), about whether its powers did apply to some voluntary organisations. 
This ambiguity arose because, in practice, many voluntary organisations administered 
endowments that supported some of their services. This might have brought these 
organisations. -at least within the ambit of the Commission, but the law itself was not 
clear. The main obstacle to this was the diffidence of the Commissioners. Their 
interpretation of their powers was that their holding of these endowments did not bring 
the parent organisations within the jurisdiction of the Commission, rather the reverse: the 
fact that they were managed by voluntary societies led the Charity Commissioners to 
regard even the endowments themselves as beyond their jurisdiction. 
The Colmnission's weaknesses were partly a reflection of successful resistance to 
earlier attempts to reform the regulatory regime governing charities. A number of I 8th 
and 19 th century statutes had sought to impose a duty of registration on charities. The 
Return of Charitable Donations Act of 1786, also known as Gilbert's Act, had imposed a 
duty on-churchwardens to supply the clerk of the parliaments prescribed particulars of 
existing trusts 'for the use and benefit of poor persons. " 25 The Act applied only to 
existing trusts. The Charitable Donations Registration Act of 1812 went further, 
requiring that "charitable trusts, whether then in existence or subsequently founded, 
should be registered with the clerk of the peace of the county, city or town in which the 
beneficiaries were situated. " Although its stipulation of regularly updated records of 
charitable trusts marked an advance on Gilbert's Act, it rapidly became a dead letter. 26 
Neither measure achieved the desired effect of extending public information on 
charitable endowments. These efforts were eclipsed during the early nineteenth century 
by a series of Conn-nissions presided over by the Whig legal and educational reforiner 
Henry Brougham, Lord Chancellor 1830-4. The assembling of information on charitable 
property was Brougham's major contribution to the development of charity law. The 
information on charity uncovered by the Brougham Commission and its 
25 Chesterman, Charities, 2; see also Sheridan and Keeton, Modem Law, 12 
Z6 Sheridan and Keeton, Modem Law, 12, my emphasis; see also Chesterman, 
Charities 63; 
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recommendations led eventually to the Charitable Trusts Act, 1853 and subsequent 
amending acts of 1855, and 1860. 
Brougham's investigations originated in a Select Committee to investigate 
London Schools for the Education of the Lower Orders, which was established in the 
teeth of Tory opposition in 1816 . 
2-1 In 1819 this became a full-scale Royal Commission 
which during "the next twenty-one years ... toured the country carrying out a thorough 
and painstaking survey of the administration of virtually all charitable endowments in 
England and Wales . ý128 The Commission compiled 32 volumes of evidence on almost 
30,000 endowments and exposed the scale of mismanagement, negligence and outright 
fraud in the administration of trusts. 29 It focused on charitable trusts rather than on 
newer forms adopted by charity in the intervening century, drawing attention to the 
privileged position of this specific form of charitable property and bringing forward 
examples of waste and misuse of funds. Ffighlighting the public interest in the form of a 
moral obligation imposed on donors and trustees, it contributed to the reinforcement of 
the moral distinction between endowments and associational charity outlined above. 
The Tory Lord Eldon who opposed closer regulation of charitable trusts led 
opposition to Brougham. The "keystone" of the intellectual framework within which this 
opposition was articulated "was the conviction that the governing powers in church and 
state were not politically accountable to the public for their exercise of their lights and 
privileges, or the performance of their duties. 00 This Burkean principle of 'trustworthy 
unaccountability' was mobilised against Brougham's proposals. The Tory domination of 
the House of Lords and their support of this principle explain the elapsing of more than a 
decade between the Commission's reports and the passing of Charitable Trusts Acts. It 
also explains why these statutes fell far short of the reforms advanced by Brougham. 31 
The opposition of the endowed charities and their allies ensured that the statutes 
27 Chesterman, Charities 63; Sheridan & Keeton, Modem Laý-v, 12-13 
28 Chesterman, Charities 63-4 
29 Chestennan, Charities, 64 
30 G. F. A. Best, Temporal Pillars: Queen Anne's Bopply, the Ecclesiastical 
Commissioners, and the Church of Englan , (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 
1964), 178 
Pillars, 181 31 The phrase, 'trustworthy unaccountability' comes from Best, TeM 
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requiring information from charitable trusts lacked effective machinery to enforce their 
provisions. 
It. was the workings of this legislation and the effects of the accretion of 
subsequent enactments and case law that exercised those concerned with the voluntary 
sector in the 1940s. This was a complicated area of the law and an area where any 
Goverru-nent was likely- to proceed with caution. Reform of the law would not produce 
speedy results. Given that it wanted to encourage voluntary work in some fields, the 
Labour Government faced a twofold problem. In the first place, it needed to restore the 
morale of the voluntary sector following the introduction of the welfare state and provide 
some evidence of its commitment to voluntary social sei vices. NýNle doing so, it had 
also to ensure that the resources of the voluntary sector, held for the public good, were 
providing value for money. Apart from its rhetorical support for voluntary social 
service, the main method of intervening in the voluntary sector available to the 
Government consisted of manipulating the financial environment for voluntary 
organisations. It is to this that we now turn. 
The dilemma 
In managing the voluntary sector, the Attlee government faced pretty much the same 
dilemma that confronted all British governments in setting policy towards voluntary 
social service. The government's unwillingness to embark on major reform was partly 
the result of the Oficulties imposed by the policy tools inherited from an earlier period, 
but its acceptance of the limitations imposed by the instruments available inhibited its 
capacity to imagine new methods of encouraging voluntary action. FEstorically the 
policies of the secular authorities have sought to reconcile the existence of private 
voluntary organisations and the maximisation of tax revenues. These two objectives 
have not always been compatible. 
The difficulties were starkly in evidence in the pre-modem epoch when, in order 
to maximise royal income, administrators attempted to restrain the growth of land- 
holding corporations. Many of these corporations, the church being the most powerful, 
performed useful services for the state and these were financed from their estates. The 
Oficulty, from the point of view of the monarch, was that under feudal law '1he 
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corporation possessed the incident of perpetual succession, and this had certain 
unfortunate consequences for the Lord. ý3 2 Land was the principal source of state 
revenue, for taxation rested on the principle that land was held of the monarch a 
principle which legitimised what were, in effect, fees for the confirmation of title when 
land was transferred from one owner to another. Death was the most important 
contributor to royal as well as to baronial coffers, and the staple of royal revenue was the 
point at which land was inherited, for the "feudal incidents of tenure ... arose on the 
death of a tenant. , 33 This form of taxation, along with other legal and cultural 
impediments to permanent alienation of tand, curtailed the development of a market in 
land, thouegh the medieval state was constantly exercised by the ingenuity of its subjects 
in originating new devices designed to permit the transfer of rights of occupancy and 
exploitation of land, behind the king's back, as it were. 34 
With their privilege of perpetual existence, the landed endowments of the 
charities fell outside this system of taxation. Such bodies "never died, never committed 
a felony, and never left an infant heir, so that the lord was permanently deprived of the 
35 
most valuable incidents of tenure". This system also had "unfortunate political 
consequences, " for it allowed "large amounts of landed property, which carried with it 
political influence, to accumulate in the hands of a few bodies. " 36 On the other hand, the 
church was not only the source of legitimacy for the monarch, but also rendered 
important services from which the state derived tangible benefits. The result of this 
conflict of interest was the development of a distinction between private trusts, which 
could be established for only a strictly limited time, and public trusts whose perpetual 
existence was recognised but whose acquisition of property was governed by the law of 
mortmain, which placed obstacles in the way of their acquisition and disposal of land. '-'. 
32 Chantel Stebbings, 'Charity Land: A Mortinain Confusion', Journal of Lega 
Histoly, 12,1991,8; see also A. W. B. Simpson, An Introduction to the Histo1y of Land 
Law, (Oxford: University Press, 1961). 50; L. A. Sheridan and George W. Keeton, llie 
Modem Law of Charities, (Cardiff: University Press, 1983), 2 
33 Stebbings, 'Charity Land', 8 
34 Simpson, Introduction, 44-76 passim 
35 Simpson, Introductionl 50 
3 36 Stebbings, 'Charity Land', 11 
37 Stebbings, 'Charity Land', 13 
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The importance of the Church's welfare activities, ameliorating the effects of 
dearth and dampening tendencies towards social instability in times of economic crisis, 
was revealed most clearly during the English Reformation in the sixteenth century. The 
economic dislocation that followed the suppression of the monasteries and the 
sequestration of their property produced widespread misery and disorder. To these, in 
the absence of the monasteries, the Tudor state had no ready remedy. The Elizabethan 
response was the promulgation of the Poor Law and the Charitable Uses Aqý 1601. 
These statutes, which were intended to work in parallel, entailed a partial reversion to 
pre-refoitnation practice as regards public policy towards charitable endowments. They 
inaugurated a structure that, broadly speaking, continues to inform developments in 
public policy towards voluntarism. This structure had two components: "the incremental 
development, of an increasingly sophisticated poor law", financed from taxation, was 
wedded to "a parallel growth of legislation aiming to encourage secular charity and 
protect against fraud. ý738 The defeat of the Church and the removal of a large part of its 
resources had deprived it of its earlier capacity to threaten the monarchy in the secular 
sphere. In the new dispensation, therefore, the revenue maximising impetus behind 
public policy towards charities lost some of its political animus. The creation of 
unofficial bodies to undertake part of the burden that might otherwise fall upon the state, 
either in costs of policing or of paying for welfare, could be encouraged. It no longer 
raised the danger that these institutions, through their association with a powerful church,, 
might become a threat to the state. 
The Elizabethan legal structure asserted the public character of the charitable 
trust. The explicitly public Poor Law effected one category of public purpose while 
private initiative was encouraged to accomplish other public purposes. The result of this 
structural change in pre-modem political culture was that the emphasis of state policy 
towards charity shifted slightly. The determination to restrict the growth of charities in 
order to maximise revenue was now accompanied by a concern to ensure that any 
revenue foregone was well managed and applied to the purposes intended. The 
implications of the doctrine of the public benefit as a test of charity, especially the role of 
the state in embodying and articulating the public interest, were more fully developed in 
y 
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the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as the power and effectiveness of the central state 
increased. 
The state's acknowledged interest in encouraging charity, at least in certain fields 
was inhibited by a conflict of interest with potential heirs of landed estates. During the 
eighteenth century, with a parliament and judiciary dominated by landowners and their 
offspring, this conflict of interests produced the perverse effect of widening the 
definition of charity employed by the Court of Chancery within whose jurisdiction 
charity law fell. The Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1736, provided heirs with an 
effective instrument for overturning charitable bequests of real estate. Under the Act, 
"devises of land to established charities or to charitable purposes ... were invalidated 
unless the recipient was ... entitled specifically to exemption. " 
39 It was, therefore, in the 
interests of potential heirs to argue that any-thing which deprived them of what they 
regarded as their due, was a charitable purpose not exempt under the Act. Chancery 
judges tended to agree with them, equating 'charitable' with 'public', and striking down 
gifts of land accordingly. The definition employed in Chancery tended to widen the 
scope of what was considered charitable. The same motive had the opposite effect when 
property other than land was at stake. In such cases heirs had an interest in 
demonstrating that a bequest had not been made to a charitable purpose, thereby falling 
foul of the general rule against perpetuities. In these cases, litigants generally advanced 
the narrowest interpretation of charity and the Court supported their interpretation. 
40 
This dual-track development of the legal definition of charity, combined with the 
ambivalence of the state towards revenues appropriated by charity, erected the legal 
framework within which charity still operated in the middle of the twentieth century. 
The impetus towards state intrusion was reinforced by the accretion of further tax 
benefits to charitable status. Until the end of the eighteenth century immunity from the 
rule against perpetuities, and the protection against failure of the trust administered by 
the Court of Chancery, was the main legal privilege attached to charitable status. When 
Pitt exempted charities from liability for the new income tax in 1799, he enhanced the 
fiscal privilege that derived from the endowed charities' right of perpetual existence. 
The unpopularity of the income tax and the social power of charitable and religious 
corporations meant that the exemption required little ideological justification. 
Chesterman, Charities, 56 
Gladstone, Chari , 
42 
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Ne-vertheless, it did reflect continuity in public policy with the Elizabethan outlook, for it 
signalled recognition of the public purposes effected by charity. 
This benefit accrued ont- y to charitable endowments, by ng one type of passi 
voluntary body that played an increasingly important role in total charitable activi . y ty 
Voluntary societies had existed at least since the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth 
they had increasingly modelled themselves on the business pattern of the joint-stock 
company. A period of experimentation and rapid growth occurred during the eighteenth 
century and this growth continued during the nineteenth century. It is probably an 
exaggeration to argue, "-that the Victorians increasingly abandoned the traditional 
endowed trust for the more democratic voluntary association or society. "41 Nevertheless, 
it was relatively easy to establish a charitable society that relied on income from 
subscriptions and donations and the flexibility of the form made it especially attractive to 
the entrepreneurial philanthropists of the nineteenth century. The distinction between 
these voluntary associations and the more traditional charitable endowments was not 
hard and fast. Voluntary associations came to administer endowments received as 
legacies or bequests. They also enjoyed some recognition as charitable in law for "since 
1610 the courts had held that an 'implied' trust underlay their activities so that they were 
governed by the same rules and regulations as 'express' trusts. , 42 
The motive for W. E. Gladstone's assault on the tax privileges of the endowed 
charitable trusts was mainly fmancial, but he couched it in the rhetoric of fairness for the 
voluntary societies. In so doing, he elaborated a moral distinction between different 
kinds of voluntary activity according to their form of orgranisation. The Taxation of 
Charities Bill, which accompanied his 1863 budget, would have abolished the trusts' 
exemption from income tax which he reckoned amounted to a public subsidy of 
E) 165 000 a year. 43 Gladstone believed that the exemption had arisen from administrative 
convenience rather than a considered policy for Pitt's "was a personal income tax; and it 
was hardly possible, by its machinery for him to have got at the revenues of 
corporations. "44 Although Peel had proposed, unsuccessfully, a separate sixpenny tax on 
41 Gladstone, Chari , 
42; Andrews, Plfilantlu-ppNý 4; 198 
42 Gladstone, Chgn -3 ýt(, 42 
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charities Nvhen he revived the tax in 1842, the exemption fi-om income tax as such 
45 
sur, vived . 
Gladstone expressed his opposition to the exemption of the endowments from 
income tax In terms of the moral quality he attached to the formal distinction between 
trusts and voluntary societies. This distinction was, in turn, integral to the political and 
economic philosophy that animated his statecraft. Gladstone pointed to the discrepancy 
between the significant, 1701untary associations made to social welfare and the fact that 
they derived no benefit from the exemption from income tax. He found it a "grave 
anomaly ... that voluntai-y charities in effect were taxed (since taxes had been paid on the 
incomes of their contributors) while charities set up by the will of a dead person enjoyed 
their income tax free.,, 46 
Gladstone's hostility to the charitable trusts derived from a presupposition of his 
financial system: "that equilibrium in the economy would naturally be achieved at the 
fall utilisation of available resources". 47 Charitable trusts, funded by perpetual 
endowments, often tied resources to unproductive uses. Gladstone's support for 
voluntary associations was inextricably linked to this distaste for charitable trusts. He 
objected to the fact that the tax system "encouraged posthumous vanity, while donations 
by the living, made regularly and unspectacularly, came out of income which was 
taxed. "48 Gladstone's support for voluntary organisations against the charitable trusts 
had an ideological as well as a fiscal dimension. The political economy of free trade 
espoused by Gladstone, with its vision of a truncated role for the central state, also 
"presupposed the capacity of a vast network of voluntary organisations to superintend ... 
the range of moral, charitable, educational and welfare services. " Although Gladstone 
foresaw a role for the state, particularly for local government, in all this, the extrication 
of the central state from the economy, "was premised on the active involvement of the 
citizen in local affairs". 49 This conception of charity was connected with the interests of 
the Liberal Party which, in the context of the franchise reforms of 1850s and 1860s, 
45 Gladstone, Financial Statements, 429; Francis Gladstone, Charily, Law and Social 
Justice, (London: Bedford Square Press, 1982), 57-8; 
46 Owen, Philanthropy, 332 
47 H. C. G. Matthew, Gladstone 1809-1874, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 
331-2 48 Matthew, Gladstone, 139, see also Owen, Philanthr! ppy 
49 Matthew, Gladstone, 116 
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sought to lead a re-vived civil society imbued, at least rhetorically, with the civic ethos of 
Greek Democracy. "0 Ironically, Gladstone's wider political vision of a "free, self- 
regulating market, reflecting natural law and epitomising social justice" was undermined 
by the activities of the very bodies he wanted to encourage, for it "collapsed in the face 
of facts uncovered bi-, the increased awareness of socio-economic illS.,, 51 
Gladstone underestimated the power of the charities lobby to mount opposition to 
his reform of the taxation of charities. He confessed his surprise at the "skilful manner in 
which the charitable army ... has been marshalled. " 
52 The 'charitable army' ensured that 
Gladstone's proposals were defeated and subsequent governments did not attempt to re- 
introduce the measure. 5' In spite of the defeat of his measures, Gladstone's critique of 
the charitable trusts eqjoyed wider support and it remained a vital strand in Liberal 
thinking on this subject. 
The emergence of mass politics in the nineteenth century created the conditions 
in which the public interest in charitable property acquired a sharper political edge. The 
fact that many charitable endowments consisted of landed property meant that the 
assertion of the public interest claim on charitable property attached itself to the moral 
distinction between landed property and property acquired by labour coinciding with 
Rousseau's "collective claim from natural law". 54 Charitable property was, by dint of an 
explicit public dimension, eminently subject to the test that ownership entailed 
responsibility. Endowed charitable trusts first felt the effect of this awakening 
50 For an account of this aspect of late Victorian social and political life see Jose 
Harris, Private Lives, Public Spirit, A Social History of Britain 1870-1914, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), 11-23; cf. Jolm Vincent, The Formation of the British 
Liberal P, (Hannondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), 13-32 
51 Nfichael Freeden, The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Refort-n (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978), 19 
52 Gladstone, Financial Statements, 438; Owen, Philanthrgpy, 332 
53 Owen, PhilanthrLDU, 332-3 
54 Avner offer, Properjy and Politics 1870-1914, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), 3 
- 7/2 - 
consciousness in the early nineteenth century, and local campaigns against the misuse of 
55 charitable funds and corrupt trustees often reflected social and party political concerns. 
Attacks on corrupt charities were again "popular with radical 'land question' 
agitators in the 1870s and 1880s. , 56 This sentiment inspired a number of movements 
-igainst endowments that exhibited glaring deficiencies, and some of these were 
successful. One such movement was the reform of the City Parochial Charities in the 
1880s led by the former Chality Commissioner and scourge of inefficient charities, 
Arthur Hobhouse. Hobhouse publicised what he regarded as the scandal of the vast 
resources of parochial charities in the City of London either lying unused or being 
activel3r misused. The Parochial Charities Act, 1883, gave the Charity Commission 
powers to frame "schemes for the more than thirteen hundred trusts" and in framing 
these schemes, the Conn-nissioners "were permitted to ignore founders' wishes and the 
canons of cy-pres and to proceed on a utilitarian basis. 1157 
Campaigns to educate the public against particular kinds of charitable activity 
also achieved some success in changing the pattern of giving. A campaign against dole 
charities, which provided relief without investigating the circumstances of the recipient, 
was again spearheaded by Hobhouse and the Charity Organisation Society, and 
supported by the Charity Commission. This was bound up with the rationalistic attitude 
to charity characterised by the COS and which stressed the danger that indiscriminate 
55 Martin Gorsky, 'CharLty, 1\/Iutualiiy and Philanthropy VoluntgU Provision in Bristol 
1800-70', Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Bristol University., 1995,70-3, 
56 Offer, Prope 
, 
95 
57 Owen, PhihanthrQpy, 290-1. The cýyy-pr&s doctrine governed the procedures to be 
followed when a charitable trust could no longer fulfil its intended role, usually because 
the need identified by the founder no longer existed or was satisfied by state provision. 
The doctrine governed the tenns on which a trust's resources could be transferr ed to new 
charitable objects. As the term suggests, these had to be close to the founder's intention. 
The doctrine assumed a prominent position in the early stages of debate on the future of 
voluntary social services and its application is discussed in more detail in'chapter's . One 
difficulty with this legal term is that different authors employ a variety of different 
typographical styles and formats. For the sake of consistency, I have employed the form 
'py-pres' throughout. Mentions of the term in quotations have been amended to 
conform to this style. 
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charity would undermine the self-reliance of the recipient rendering them permanently 
dependent. Education was inevitably a gradual process and public opinion could be 
refractory. The novelist Charles Reade, for example, drew the fire of the Commission in 
the early 1880s when he insisted on founding what the Chief Charity Commissioner 
!.,, 
58 described as 66a pure and simple dole charitý 
Voluntary organisations often benefited from the middle class public's suspicion 
of endowed trusts, but the revival of public support for charity in the second half of the 
nineteenth century confronted public officials with the same dilemma as that presented 
by endowed trusts. This dilemma grew as these organisations gradually secured through 
the courts many of the legal and financial privileges already enjoyed by endowed 
charitable trusts. The most important of these was exemption from the liability to pay 
income tax. Historically a variety of organisational forms have been available to chafity 
but for most practical purposes only one of these forms, the endowed trust benefited 
from the fiscal privileges of charitable status. A's long as the main advantages of 
charitable status accrued to endowed trusts alone, voluntary organisations had no 
incentive to seek it. AThen this discrepancy in terms of taxation between the two forms 
of charitable activity was finally removed in 1891, it was in an opposite way to that 
advocated by Gladstone. The decision of the Law Lords in Pemsel's case had the effect 
of extending the right to tax exemption to any body, however constituted, provided its 
activities met the legal test of charity. 59 
Following Gladstone's term at the Exchequer the Inland Revenue Commissioners 
had adopted a much narrower definition of charity than that which had developed in the 
Court of Chancery. This was derived, by close analogy, from the specific causes 
mentioned in the 'Preamble' to the Elizabethan Charitable Uses Act. 60 Before the House 
of Lords'judgement in the leading case of Commissioners of Wand Revenue v. Pemsel 
in 1891, two separate legal definitions of charity co-existed. One was applied in 
Chancery in cases involving charitable trusts and usually involving bequests of land 
disputed by heirs to an estate, and a second, independent definition was applied by the 
Inland Revenue in determining the fight of an endowment to exemption from income 
tax. As long as no procedure existed for appealing against decisions of the Wand 
58 Oweni Philanthropy, 309 
59 Chesterman, Charities, 62 
60 Chesterman, Charities, 59 
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Re, \,, enue, the inconsistency between the Inland Revenue's definition and the wider 
definition employed by the Court, had no more than a hypothetical interest. The 
introduction of an appeal procedure in 1874 cleared the ground for Pemsel's case. The 
case revolved around the legality of the Board of the Inland Revenue's denial of 
exemption to a Moravian Church but in looking at the issues, the Law Lords were 
obliged to consider the definition of charitable status and their ruling had wider 
implications for the status of voluntary organisations. The Lords' ruling in this case 
66 
extended into a new arena - that of central government taxation -a demarcation of the 
boundaries of charity". 
61 
In deliv ering their judgement, the Law Lords held that in determining the right to 
exemption from income tax the Board had to apply the Courts' definition of charitable 
status. Its significance was that the judgement made "'charitable' ... a password to 
financial benefit. '" It had the effect of unilaterally extending the privileges enjoyed by 
endowed trusts umunbiguously to charitable activity organised in other forms. "All 
institutions, " following the decision, "whatever their legal form, which could establish 
that they were charitable within the general law definition ... 
had something tangible to 
gain from so doing". 62 
For the following half century, the Board of the Inland Revenue fought a 
rearguard action seeking a return to the status quo ante Pernsel. As late as the 1950s, in 
its evidence to the Royal Commission on Taxation, the Board reiterated its call for the 
enactment of a separate definition of charity for tax purposes. The Conurdssion was 
persuaded that there was a problem and observed that what was "amiss in the present 
system is not the idea of giving income tax relief in respect of charity but the undue 
width of the range of what ranks as charity for this purpose. " 63 Recognising the 
complexity of trying to draft a new definition, however, the Commission itself held back 
from recommending this change in its final report. 
The judgement in Pemsel 's case created a clear financial inducement for 
voluntary organisations to design their services in order to harmonise with the legal 
definition of charity. This legal definition, therefore, backed up by the tax benefits it 
61 Chestenuan, Charities, 61 
62 Chesterman, Charities, 61-2) 
63 Rgyal. Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, (Final Report) (London: 
HMSOI 1955), cmd. 9474,56 
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confeffed, subtly moulded the development of the -voluntaij! social services. Charitable 
status became a gateway to other financial benefits, exemption from local authority rates 
for ex, -unple, and, especially important in the mid-twentieth century, access to central and 
local government ftmding. It also became the foundation stone of a system of regulation. 
The definition of ch,,, iritable status assumed a new importance for the management of the 
voluntary sector. In order to pass through the portal of charitable status, voluntary 
orga at ganisations had to meet the requirements of public benefit, and the cost to the st e of 
the exemption from income tax meant that the state had a clear financial interest in 
ensuring that they met this criterion. 
The financial tools 
The extension of the fiscal advantages of charitable status provided an indirect incentive 
for voluntary organisations to move into particular streams of service delivery. Even 
today, the exemption remains a considerable financial advantage and is often one of the 
main reasons for an institution to seek charitable status. At the same time, the 
establishment of the voluntary organisations' right to exemption from payment of 
income tax also handed Governments a set of fiscal tools for managing the voluntary 
sector. The exemption of charities from income tax made available to the Government a 
means for manipulating growth in the voluntary sector. 
In theory, the government could influence the growth of the voluntary sector 
through the manipulation of the tax privileges enjoyed by organisations that epJJoyed 
charitable status. In practice, the matter was complicated. Two methods were available: 
change the legal definition of charity or alter the fiscal privileges associated with 
charitable status. The latter, by increasing or decreasing the benefits available to 
charitable institutions, added or subtracted from the advantages of charitable status, 
increasing or diminishing the resources available to institutions and types of activity 
already designated charitable. The first method was an extension of the principle 
contained in the Elizabethan Charitable Uses Act. The preamble to the Act set out a list 
of activities ranging from the provision of education, care of the sick and elderly, relief 
of poverty, and the provision of bridges, ports and other public workS. 
64 By designating 
64 Chesterman, Charities, 25; Caims, Owen 
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certain activities as legitimate charities, it acted as a filter, controlling entry into the field. 
By widening the scope of what qualified as charitable in law, policy makers could 
encourage or discourage the growth of services and institutions receiving the benefit of 
tax exemption. Thus, policy makers could promote growth, at least in theory, either by 
increasing the tax benefits available to all charities, which would encourage growth in 
existing fields of activity, or by widening the scope of charity, which would promote the 
growth of new areas of activity. Conversely, if a contraction of the voluntary sector was 
required, the Government could reduce the tax advantages of charitable status. This 
would reduce the income and inhibit the growth of existing institutions. By legislating to 
narrow the definition of charity, it could reduce the funds available causing a contraction 
in specific fields. 
Manipulation of the definition of charity was a rather blunt instrument and, given 
the complexity of voluntary sector, the effects of its use, particularly to narrow the 
definition, were unpredictable. There was a further difficulty in deploying this method: 
the definition of charity was not exclusively in the gift of government. The courts 
interpreted the law and they expanded or reduced the scope of charity independently of 
the legislature. The judiciary, in effect, had "the right to impose entry barriers on the 
market". 65 The courts had extended by analogy the list of public works and charity 
contained in the preamble to the Elizabethan statute over the four centuries following its 
enactment. Its codification by Lord Macnaghten was another outcome of Pemsel's case. 
Lord Macnaghten, one of the Law Lords included in his judgement an outline 
classification of charity as previously determined by the Courts. Macnaghten's 
classification encompassed trusts for the relief of poverty, the advancement of education 
and the advancement of religion, but it also included a catch-all fourth category of "trusts 
for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any one of the 
preceding heads. -66 
Macnaghten's categories have proved extremely yielding in the face of social 
change, acconnnodating a wide range of goods and services. 67 As a result the services 
65 Perri 6) 'The Case for Liberty', Perri 6 and Anita Randon, LibeLlj, Charity and 
Politics: Non-profit Law and Freedom of Speech (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995), 160 
66 Owen, Philanthropy, 324 
67 Gareth Jones, 'Charitable Trusts: What is Public Benefit', Cambridge Law Journal, 
(1974), 63 
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undertaken by organisations erýjoying charitable status have historically been very wide. 
Although a significant proportion, conn-nanding perhaps a third of the total resources 
held by charities, have been dedicated to the consumption of the poor, the wealthiest 
charities have generally been those devoted to the consumption of the social and political 
elite. A substantial group of services, designated as charity under law consisted of 
68 
corporations "designed for the consumption of the upper classes". This group included 
such institutions as the Church of England, the ancient universities, public schools, 
gentlemen's clubs, and the learned societies. These institutions were "committed... to 
the preservation and development of upper-class codes and culture, symbols and values, 
means of coercion and modes of control. ýý69 Many of these, such as the established 
Church and the ancient universities were protected by statute, but some of their property, 
held as individual charitable endowments was not so protected. The existence of this 
politically Muential interest constituted a further limitation on government action. This 
powerful lobby was likely to oppose any policy initiative that threatened their property 
whether by re-defining charity or by reducing the fiscal benefits it attracted. 
The behaviour of the Courts during the 1930sýmderlined the complexity of 
interfering with the definition of charit37. The charitable status of a number of 
institutions had been thrown into doubt by the House of Lords' ruling in 1940 on the will 
of Caleb Diplock. Confirming the judgement of the lower courts, the Lords ruled that 
Diplock's will, in which he had left his residual estate of some 1250,000 to "charitable or 
benevolent ob ect or objects" chosen by his trustees, was void for uncertainty. The j 
uncertainty arose from the use of the word "or" rather than "and". Charity law protected 
only gifts to charitable objects: benevolence, the Court held, embraced objects outside 
this field. This ambiguity, the result of a simple and avoidable drafting error, created a 
scandal that Diplock's intentions, which seemed clear enough, could be oveiturned in 
this way. Lord Justice Goddard, who sat on the appeal, accepted that the judgement was 
correct in law, but expressed profound misgivings about its practical effects. He could 
not muster "any enthusiasm for this rule" which he regarded "with some distaste. " More 
68 Offer, Prope 94 
69 Offer, Prope , 94 
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pertinent, in ten'ns of public policy, was his fear that careless drafting of wills[ 
widespread for this was "a trap into which the unskilled draftsman frequently falls. ý 70 
The ruling was also a personal disaster for the trustees, in this case the Chichester 
Diocesan Fund and Board of Finance, who had already distributed the proceeds. The 
heir's attempt to claw back the money also affected the 139 organisations that had 
already received and spent Diplock's largesse. The NCSS for example had to launch a 
special appeal fund to repay the k1,000 donation it had received from the trusteeS. 71 It 
was feared that the problem of defective trust§ might affect a much larger number of 
charities than those immediately beholden to Diplock. The Charitable Trusts Validation 
&tý 1954, finally cleared up the matter following the recommendations of the Charitable 
Trusts Committee. The Act aimed to preserve the status quo by confirming the 
charitable status of bequests made prior to 30th December 1950, thus protecting existing 
trusts and voluntary organisations from sudden large losses arising from doubts about the 
validity of bequests made before that date. , 7" The case, however, had exposed the fact 
that what appeared to be the minutiae of charitable law could be wide-ranging and 
capricious in their ramifications. 
Mtering the definition of charity was a subject to be approached with caution. 
This left the Government with one main instrument for managing the voluntary sector: 
the adjustment of the value of the tax privileges that accrued where charitable status was 
recognized. This privilege represented a substantial subsidy of voluntary social service, 
though it is difficult to gauge its value with any exactitude. The Commissioners of the 
Inland Revenue estimated in the mid-1950s that the cost of the charities' exemption from 
income tax alone amounted to some L35 million in tax foregone. 7,3 This somewhat 
exceeds the amount implied by the Board's regular estimates of the income of charities 
given in its reports for that year. In 1954/5, the Report of the Inland Revenue 
Commissioners' put the income of all the various bodies entitled to exemption in 1954/5 
70 John Brunyate, 'The Legal Defmition of Charity', The Law QuarterLy Review, 61 
(1945), 268; Owen, Pbilanthr-qp. -; v, 576; CTCI 120 
71 NCSS Finance and General PMoses Committee, 28 November 1950, 
LMA/4016/IS/01/049(3) 
72 CTCý 133; Owen Pbilanthropy, 291; 
73 Royal Conunission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, Final Report, (London: 
HMSO, 1955) cmd. 9474,54 
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, 01 million. If charities had paid income tax at the standard rate of nine shillings in 
the p. ound, these figures suggest a benefit to charities, and consequently a loss to the 
revenue, of only 123 million. The discrepancy may be accounted for by the fact that the 
Cominissioners ' figure included an estimate of the amount which would have been 
payable at the higher rate of tax. Officials may also have deliberately irfflated the figure. 
Bearing in mind the Board's rearguard Gladstonian campaign for reform of the tax status 
of charities, it had a clear interest in exaggerating the cost to the Exchequer of the 
exemption. 
Even allowing for any potential bias, the Conm-iission's regular reports do 
suggest a substantial public 'donation' to charity in the form of the exemption from 
income tax. In 1945, the Wand Revenue estimated the income of charities exempt from 
taxation at around L54 million. At rates of taxation current in the mid-1940s, this 
suggests about L27 million in tax foregone. In 1960, the Wand Revenue estimated at 
L69 million the total charitable income exempt from tax. 75 With falling rates of taxation, 
this would again have yielded. at)outQ7 million at the standard rate. These were pjany 
surns in relation to total government spending but they represented an important fon-n of 
indirect support for charities and voluntary organisations. Had they been liable for 
income tax at the standard rate, charities and voluntary organisations would have seen 
their disposable income reduced by up to half at the rates of tax current in the 1940s and 
1950s. Though it wanted to support some voluntary social services, the provisions in the 
Finangýý_ýc 1946, make it clear that Labour was unlikely to countenance any extension 
of the tax privileges of charity. 
The search for a policy 
The tax regime was the focus of Government and voluntary sector interaction and the 
site of a number of earlier conflicts. Taxation was one subject that brought into focus the 
elementary opposition of voluntary to state. The removal of the charities' privilege of 
reclaiming surtax on covenanted subscriptions shows that however generous the 
Government's rhetorical support for voluntary social service was, its practical policies 
74 Inland Revenue Rep ort, 1955, Table 21 
75 Wand Revenue Rep ort 1961, Table 33 
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were motivated by fiscal and political priorities that overrode its sentimental side. The 
Government was, like its predecessors, concerned to secure a good return on what 
remained, even after the withdrawal of this benefit, a significant investment of public 
funds in charities by means of the tax system. This consideration was further impressed 
upon ministers by an Inland Revenue Board that cherished the long-standing aim of 
restricting availabilit-y of this benefit, which it regarded as indiscriminately applied to 
charity. Charities, a group that included most major voluntary organisations, were in a 
situation where they were, "perhaps uniquely amongst taxpaying entities, positively 
prejudiced by a reduction in the basic rate of income tax. " They stood to gain more from 
the tax ýsubsidy' when taxes were high and until, the 1946 budget, d-Lis tax advantage had 
been even more valuable as a result of the entitlement to reclaim surtax on covenanted 
donations. 76 
As the removal of the surtax concession revealed, however, the Government's 
priorities on taxation were not geared primarily towards the health of the voluntary 
sector. The financial damage to voluntary organisations caused by the removal of the 
surtax advantage should not be overstated. Even after the withdrawal of the right to 
reclaim surtax on charitable subscriptions, charities could still reclaim income paid at the 
basic rate and covenants remained a valuable source of income for voluntary 
organisations. At a national level, the NCSS even noted a slight increase in subscriptions 
to the fund as the cut-off point at which covenants would no longer attract relief on 
surtax drew nearer. 77 The Liverpool CSS's scheme went. from strength to strength in the 
late 1940s, in spite of the withdrawal of the surtax concession. In 1950, just a few years 
after the ending of the right to reclaim surtax, the Liverpool CSS even decided to close 
its moribund general Charities Collecting Department in order to devote more effort to 
its thriving fund for covenanted subscriptions. 78 
Although it expressed a general desire to promote voluntary social service, little 
was new about Labour's approach to the voluntary sector in the 1940s. The legal and 
fiscal privileges that accrued to institutions enjoying charitable status provided a general 
administrative incentive to ensure that this public interest in charity was realised and the 
76 Chesterman, Charities, 235 
rposes Committee, 25 Janua y 1949, 77 NCSS Finance and General Pui py 
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Labour Government inherited this disposition. It also provided the government with an 
instrument for managing the voluntary sector for the tax regime was the main macro tool 
available to the Labour government in managing the voluntary sector. Clearly, however, 
the impact on the voluntary sector was never a primary consideration when it came to 
defining fiscal policy. This is one reason why, in common with earlier and later 
Governments, the post-war Labour government resorted to other measures to support the 
voluntary sector. The main alternative to the macro tool of manipulating the tax regime 
to support voluntarism was the micro option of directly subsidising individual charities 
either by providing grants-in-aid or by paying fees for services rendered. Government 
departments might pay these grants directly to voluntary organisations or they could be 
channelled through the local authorities. This method of influencing developments in the 
voluntary sector had several advantages: it was easier to target resources to achieve 
previously defined policy objectives, and the immediate results were relatively 
predictable and could be measured. Its main drawback was that it threatened to 
introduce distortions into the voluntary sector. In spite of this danger direct support. to 
selected voluntary organisations and services remained the most common method of 
government intervention in the voluntary sector throughout the period. This was partly 
because manipulation of the fiscal regime, the main macro instrument for intervention, 
was constrained by wider political and economic considerations, but it also had to do 
with the difficulties associated with the deployment of this instrument. 
The constraints on the government help to explain the apparent mismatch 
between government statements on the voluntary sector and its practice. Nevertheless, 
the Labour government's desire to encourage the voluntary sector was an important first 
step in the construction of a modem ideology of voluntary social service. The essential 
follow-up was to engage with the concerns raised by supporters of voluntary social 
service. The concerns of voluntary organisations centred primarily on finance. As has 
been outlined above, the means available to the government for managing the voluntary 
sector were cumbersome and their impact was often difficult to predict. This helps to 
explain the receptiveness of some members of the government to proposals put forward 
by Lords Beveridge and Samuel, which seemed to promise an alternative approach. 
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Chapter 4: Voluntary, Social Service in the Social Service State 
We have seen that the NCSS was anxious to extend its cooperation with the state. The 
main obstacle to their mutual embrace was the fact that the opposition between voluntary 
sector and the state in addition to being an ideological construct coincided with a fiscal 
question. This chapter shows how Be-vvridge's intervention helped to restore the 
centrality of an element of the Liberal approach to voluntarism. at was overlooked th 
when public attention was focussed on the opposition of state to voluntarism, as it had 
been by the nationalisation of the health services. 
With Beveridge's assistance, Gladstone's endorsement of the moral and 
economic value of activist voluntarism continued to animate political discussion of 
voluntary social service. Though it had conspicuously failed to fulfil the role he had 
envisaged for it, the belief that voluntary social service had the potential to energise civil 
society and nurture an active citizenry became part of mainstream Labour thinking on the 
voluntary sector. The hope that it might relieve some of the burdens on the welfare state 
also had a lingering appeal, particularly on the Conservative benches. One consequence 
of this was that discourse on voluntary social service was conducted in highly idealised 
terms. Beveridge set the tone for this - his argument paid scant attention to the real 
condition of the voluntary sector. Beveridge was inconsistent M his approach to the 
question of relations between voluntary organisations and the state. He occasionally put 
forward a fire and brimstone version of the antagonism between the state and the 
voluntary sector, but he was also anxious to encourage cooperation. In spite of his 
inconsistency, his introduction (or rather re-introduction) of the opposition of voluntaiy 
organisation to charitable trust shifted the debate away from the opposition of state to 
voluntarism thereby defusing the ideological tension it produced. 
The language of liberalism 
The state's assumption of specific responsibility for health care and income maintenance 
removed outright the raison d'etre of many voluntary organisations. This alone would 
have called for some kind of investigation of the resources still held by defunct 
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org, anis-ations. Even those organisations not directly affected by this transformation felt 
the impact of the changes as their supporters absorbed the implication that the state was 
the ultimate and primary source of welfare provision. In these circumstances, some 
attention to the voluntary sector was likely and the emergence of a wider public 
discussion of -volunt-arism was not an altogether unwelcome development. Unless it was 
willing to countenance the wholesale nzitionalisation of the voluntary sector, the 
Goverm-nent had to find a method of reassuring those voluntary organisations that 
remained. The financial difficulties of the NHS in the late 1940s lent an added urgency 
to this point. The Gmi-ernment also had an interest in preventing voluntarism acting as a 
rallying point for its Conserxrative opponents. The debate initiated by William Beveridge 
provided the Government with an opportunity to assert its support for voluntary social 
service. 
The linoua franca of Liberalism provided a medium for the influence of liberal 
social and political ideas on the development of policy towards the voluntary sector 
during the 1940s and 1950s. This shared language stretched beyond the Labour and 
Liberal parties, however, and many Conservatives embraced its vocabulary. Although 
these different groups did not necessarily speak the same language, this political Creole 
fortified the assumption that certain ideas were so widely held that they required no 
further elaboration in the course of the debate. This common phraseology helped to 
defme what was and what was not discussed in the course of the debate and facilitated 
Beveridge's resurrection of the traditional Liberal distinction between voluntary 
organisations and endowed charitable trusts. 
The fact that Liberal political ideas had a purchase on both the Conservative and 
Labour parties underpinned the influence of Beveridge and his fellow Liberal peer 
Herbert Samuel on the development of Labour policy on voluntary social service. I'lle 
strength of Liberal influence was partly a matter of personnel. The protracted 
disintegration of the Liberal party during the first half of the century had prompted the 
migration of Liberal politicians to both Labour and the Conservatives. The 
Government's appointment of H. L. Nathan, for example, as chairman of the Committee 
of Enquiry on Charitable Trusts is one token of the Liberal presence within the upper 
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echelons of the Labour P, ",,. Nathan, having abandoned his earlier allegiance in 1934, 
was one of a contingent of fort-ner prominent Liberal MPs within the Labour Party. 
The earlier impact of New Liberal ideas on the embryonic Labour Party 
strengthened the influence of this Liberal contingent. Although Socialist and Liberal 
ideas retained their individuality and distinctive emphases, this cross-fertilisation had 
produced a shared conceptual vocabulary or "homology in which the new liberalism 
came to establish the basic terms of the relationship". Discussion of social policy issues 
came to be conducted in terms of "this or that essentially social liberal alternative even in 
situations where some of the most important contestants for power presented a more 
radical alternative for the long haul. " It was perfectly natural, therefore, that 
reconstruction of the voluntary sector, should be discussed in terms of this shared 
language and heritage. The policies proposed by Beveridge, Samuel, and Nathan, 
though their rhetoric occasionally smacked of radicalism, generally reflected the outlook 
of this "single, inherently liberal, knowledge community. ,2 The structuring of the debate 
within this 'social-liberal homology' was important for setting the terms of the debate. 
Equally important was the silence of the Fabian tradition. 
The Fabians had played a key role in this process in the course of guiding the 
emerging Labour Party away from any commitment to the sort of socialism advocated by 
the Marxist Social Democratic Federation. In creating a bridge between Liberalism and 
Socialism, the Fabians had isolated the ethical ends of socialism from the collectivist 
means advocated by socialists. 3 yet , the Fabian tradition 
had been an outspoken 
4 
opponent of charity and voluntarism in all its forms. Beveridge, himself a former 
acolyte of Beatrice and Sidney Webb, played a key role here. Ihs language retained the 
1 On the continuing vitality of liberalism and its influence on Labour, P. F. Clarke, 
'The Progressive Movement in England', Transactions of the RQyal Historical Socie1y, 
5th Series, vol. 24, (1974), 159-8 1; Freeden, New Liberalism 
2 Ira Katznelson, "'Knowledge about What? " Policy Intellectuals and the New 
Liberalism' Deitrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds. ), States, Social Knowledge 
and the Origins of Modem Social Policies, (Princeton: University Press & Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1996), 36-7 
3 Clarke, 'Progressive', 162 
4 See, for example, Beatrice Webb's polemic against both oiganised unorganised 
philanthropy in My Apprenticesh , 206-25 
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-vitriol of the Fabian critique of philanthropy but reserved it for the charitable 
endowments. Beveridge, therefore, eqjoyed the best of both worlds: he preserved the 
radical timbre of Fabian rhetoric, while narrowing the range of institutions to which it 
was applied. 
Beveridge based his assumptions about the character of voluntary social service 
on the Victorian dichotomy between voluntarism and endowed trusts. This set the 
pattern for the entire debate. Taking for granted that there existed wide political support 
for the general principle of supporting voluntary social service, he tended to concentrate 
on the technical aspects of supporting voluntary organisations. There is an analogy here 
with the emergence of consensus around Keynesian economic policies in the 1940s. 
Policy makers of all political persuasions embraced Keynes's ideas, not as the result of 
an engagement with his thinking, but because the policies he proposed seemed to satisfy 
the need for an intellectual foundation for policies that were already being applied in 
practice In the same w,. 
_. .5 
ay, the unreflective adoption of a pre-existing Liberal paradigm, 
as re-cast by Beveridge, moulded the debate on voluntary social service in the late 1940s. 
Beveridge, who had played a prominent role in the design and implementation of 
the Welfare State, produced a third, often overlooked, report on Voluntgy Action in 
1948, which set in motion the process which led Attlee to appoint a Committee of 
Enquiry on charitable trusts. Beveridge regarded the growth of the functions of the state 
as problematic, and saw the defence of voluntary social service action as imperative, 
urging "co-operation between it and public action. " Beveridge's objective was to secure 
a working relationship between the state and voluntary action arguing that there was "a 
need for political invention to find new ways of fruitful co-operation between public 
authorities and voluntary agencies. " 6 Beveridge underestimated the extent of the co- 
operation between voluntary organisations and the state that already existed. Flis earlier 
report on Social Insurance and Allied Services had advocated a continuing role for the 
ffiendly societies in the administration of social insurance and his approach to the 
RitscheL Plannin , 342-5 
Lord Beveridge, Volunt4a Action: A Report on Methods of Social Advance, 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1948), 8 
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voluntary sector was coloured by his annoyance at the Labour Government's failure to 
7 
carry through this recommendation. ' 
Beveridge ought to have been well informed about the voluntary sector. With the 
financial backing of the National Deposit Friendly Society, he had set out to emulate the 
full panoply of an official commission of enquiry. The Report was to be based on an 
enquiry into the voluntary sector employing a panel of assessors who took evidence from 
more than 400 organisations and individuals .8 He also had early support 
from the NCSS. 
INThen Beveridge approached it for assistance in preparing his report, the Council's 
Executive Conunittee enthusiastically "agreed that every help possible should be given 
to Lord Beveridge on the place of voluntary initiative in the planned state". 9 The 
Executive Committee also appointed one of its members, George Mitchell, to liase with 
Beveridge's assessors. If the Council hoped that the enquiry would serve as a platform 
for putting across to Government its proposals on the future of voluntary social service, it 
was frustrated by Beveridge's pursuit of quite separate objectives. The publication of the 
Report did, however, create conditions in which it could advance its own ideas and 
improve its standing both with Government and in the voluntary sector. 
Beveridge's motive in undertaking the study was partly as a riposte to the Labour :M 
Government's rejection of his recommendation "that friendly societies should continue 
to play a major role in ýhumanising and personalising' the day-to-day management of 
national insurance. "10 This, and the fact that the study was financed by the National 
Deposit Friendly Society, a large mutual insurance company, meant that more than half 
of his Report was devoted to mutual aid. Disagreements between his collaborators, as 
well as the multifarious views put forward by voluntary organisations themselves, meant 
that the progress of the enquiry was neither as swift nor as smooth as Beveridge and his 
This has encouraged some free market opponents of state welfare to attempt, 
somewhat unconvincingly, to co-opt Beveridge to their cause. For an example see, 
David G. Green, Reinventing Civil Societ-y: The Rediscovery of Welfare Without 
Politics, IIEA Choice in Welfare series No. 17, (London: EEA Health and Welfare Unitý 
1993), 110 
8 Beveridge and Wells, Evidence, 317-27 
9 NCSS Finance and General RMoses Conunittee, 25 February 1947, 
LMA/4016/lS/01/048 (2) 
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backers had hoped. The report's final appearance in the middle of 1948 was too late for 
it to influence the Government's plans for the Welfare State. The complexities of the 
issues raised bj y the enquiry hardly troubled Beveridge, for in spite of "his insistence on 
accumulating a great mass of empirical evidence, there was little doubt from the outset 
that the eventual findings of the investigation were, in Beveridge's mind at any rate, 
largely a foregone conclusion. "11 
This was particularly true of the portion of the Report dealing with what he 
termed philanthropic voluntary organisations. Beveridge relied more upon his 
conception of a moral. economy than upon the evidence provided by voluntary 
organisations. Beveridge objected to what he saw as the waste and demoralisation that 
resulted from the form of property within which the resources of charity were encased. 
He felt that an undue respect for the donor had led to the entombment of large funds that 
ought to be put to more socially constructive uses. In this respect, Volunt4U Action bore 
the stamp of Gladstonian policy towards the voluntary sector for it depended on drawing 
the same moral distinction between voluntary associations of activists and charitable 
trusts espoused by Gladstone in his war on the tax privileges of the endowments. 
Beveridge saw the problem of endowments in terms of a wider problem of the 
unfýttered right of the owner of property to dispose of it as he or she wined. Beveridge 
argued not only that the "law ... made some 
bad charitable trusts possible", but that this 
"badness [was] part of the general evil of unrestricted testamentary disposition. " 12 There 
was also a further problem specific to the endowed trusts. These might last for centuries; 
bound to operate along the lines laid down by a long-dead founder. This "evil" of the 
ownerl s freedom to dispose of property as he or she willed, was compounded, in his 
view, by the privilege of exemption from the rule against perpetuities. The problem here 
was that legal machinery to preserve the charitable functions of property once it had been 
given for charity, was unable to take fully into account the needs of contemporary 
society. In order to change the charitable purposes to which an endowment could be 
applied two conditions had to be met. First, the general charitable purpose of the donor 
had to be established. Second, this general charitable intention had to be shown to be no 
longer capable of falfilment by the means specified by the founder owing to illegality, 
impossibility, or impractic ability. In order to preserve the donor' s charitable intent the 
11 Harris, Beveridge, 455 
12 Beveridge, Volunt4q Action, 198 
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Court of Chancery could then intervene to make a scheme replacing the defunct purpose 
by one that was capable of fulfilment. Out of respect for the donor's wishes, the transfer 
had to be made qy-pr6s: as close as possible, that is, to the means for the falfilment of the 
general charitable intent that the donor had originally specified. 13 
The rule that property given to support charity was bound forever to be applied to 
charity was not necess,, arily a problem in itself, as far as Beveridge was concerned. More 
important was that the rules governing the transfer of property from one charitable 
purpose to another made it difficult to take the property of a redundant charity and apply 
it to a more appropriate modem use. This, Beveridge believed, tied up valuable 
resources in deftmct or under-performing trusts. Beveridge argued that the Court did not 
exercise its jurisdiction over charitable trusts in accordance with "the needs of the time 
or with the views of living men. " Instead the Court's overriding priority was "to do the 
best they could to meet the wishes of the dead. ý, 14 Property held by defunct charities 
could be transferred to other charitable purposes, but the doctrine of a-pres required the 
Court had to take into account the founder's intention and make a scheme applying the 
funds to an object close to this intention. 'When it had to choose between "broadly 
similar purposes which appeared to meet specific and pressing needs within the 
community, and... a practicable mode of application which more closely matched the 
original purposes but was not of particular relevance to current needs" the Court was 
obliged "to choose the latter. " 15 As a result, charitable trusts, however beneficial the 
founder's original intention, atrophied with the passage of time and locked up resources 
of which better use could be made. 
Until 1860, the property held by defunct charities could be transferred to other 
charitable purposes only by means of a scheme approved by the Chancery Division of 
the High Court and observing the cy-pres doctrine. This was an expensive and time- 
consuming process, and the Court was inconsistent in its interpretation of the cy-pres 
doctrine. Beveridge himself cited an eighteenth century case where a bequest for the 
instruction of people in the Jewish religion was applied to a foundling hospital, 
commenting acidly that "the only apparent connection is that teaching Jewish religion 
13 Owen, Philanthropy 70 
14 Beveridge, VolunlAq Action, 190 
15 Chestennan, Charities, 69 
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gitim, L Ite 
46 and foundlings were at that time equally ille The Charitable Trusts Actl 1860 
vested in the Charity Commissioners the power to make schemes, subject to the same 
rules as were applied by the Court. Trustees retained the right to appeal to the Chancery 
Di-\, ision. Although appeals against Charity Commission schemes were unusual by the 
first half of the twentieth century, this was mainly the result of the extreme caution of the 
Commissioners in the exercise of their scheme making power, for they followed closely 
precedents established in the Court. 
The 1910 Weir Hospital case was the only example of any importance of the 
Court overturning a scheme drawn up by the Commissioners during this period and the 
issued on which it turned is instructive. The case hinged not on the new object to which 
the trust was to be applied but on whether the trust was in fact incapable of execution in 
the terms stipulated in the original bequest. In this case, the trustees had collaborated 
with the Commissioners in drawing up a scheme to combine a bequest, originally for the 
support of a cottage hospital, with a similar bequest in a nearby district in order to 
provide a home for nurses at the local district hospital. Local objections scuppered these 
plans. When the case reached the Court of4ppeal, the Master of the Rolls H. H. Cozens- 
Hardy rejected the arguments of the Conn-nissioners. He ruled the Court, and by 
extension the Commissioners, could not consider whether a testator's chosen objects and 
mode of achieving it were "wise or whether a more generally beneficial application of a 
testator's property might not be found. " There could "be no question of cy-pres until it is 
clearly established that the directions of the testator cannot be carried into effect. " 17 This 
outcome outraged G. W. Keeton, Professor of English Law at University College 
London. Keeton thought the case brought the operation of py-pres into disrepute for it is 
"scarcely open to question that if ... the scheme 
for the amalgamation of two 
inadequately- supported hospitals had been accepted, the problems of the trustees would 
have been diminished, and the public as a whole would have gained. " 18 
16 Beveridge, Volunt4g Action, 191 
17 CTCý 85; Owen, Philanthrqpy, 314; Chesterman, Charities, 69-70 
18 G. W. Keeton, Social Change in the Law of Trusts, (London: Pitman, 1958), 103 
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From voluntary social service to voluntary sector 
Echoing Gladstone, Beveridge contrasted the entropy inherent in the charitable trust 
form with what he proclaimed as the vibrant and responsive character of activist 
voluntary organisations. There was a marked opportunism in his approach to voluntary 
social service. Opportunism was evident even in the title of Beveridge's report. In the 
volume of evidence he later published in support of the main volume, provides an 
explanation of his desire to shift the debate from the terminology of 'charity' and 
ýphilanthropy' to 'voluntary action'. 
This substitution was necessary in order to shift the discussion away from the 
relationship between donors and recipient. Beveridge took his cue from a Mass 
Observation survey, specially commissioned for his enquiry. Mass Observation had found 
"in an earlier survey only one person in three had anything approving to say about 
charity or charities. " Popular antipathy to charity had actually increased in the 
meantime. Its new survey found that only one in four agreed with the proposition "that 
charity is a good thing". 19 The central objection raised by Mass Observation's 
respondents was to the demeaning character of the relationship between donor and 
recipient. On the other hand, nearly half of the new sample expressed a general approval 
of the voluntary organisation of social services. ý120 
One problem he faced in promoting the value of voluntary social service was that 
half a century of expanding state pro-vision of services had relegated voluntary organisations 
to the most peripheral areas of welfare provision. Whatever his reservations about the 
approach adopted by the Labour Government towards provision for the unemployed, or to 
Bevan's Health service, there was evidently little mileage in calling for the process to be 
reversed. Making a vu-tue of necessity he attempted to redefine what had been the outskirts 
of voluntary social work as the cutting edge of welfare provision. He stressed the 
supplementary and, especially, the pioneering role of voluntary action. 
Beveridge's stress on the pioneering role of voluntary social service contained 
ambiguity that he did not attempt to resolve. What was to happen once the path breaking 
had been accomplished? Was the function of voluntary organisations simply to develop 
19 Beveridge and Wells, Evidence, 56 
20 Beveridge and Wells, Evidence, 39 
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new services and bring them up to the level NNAiere they could hand them over to the 
management of the state? The Youngliusband report on social work at the end of the 
1950s drew out the consequences of this ambiguity. Younghusband had no doubt that 
the role of voluntan! organisations should be severely circumscribed and criticised the 
'teluctance on the part of some voluntary organisations to give up responsibility for a 
well-established service, even if there was obvious pioneering to be done .,, 
21 A second 
and immediate problem arising from Beveridge's stress on the pioneering role of 
voluntaxism was that it shifting the focus of attention onto the most marginal areas of 
social service. Be-\,, eridge's attempt to glamorise the residuum of voluntarism relied on 
his looking at conditions in the voluntary sector through spectacles so rose-tinted that 
they obscured many of its features. 
Beveridge made frequent reference to the particular value of voluntary action in 
providing personal services, especially to the elderly and infirm, over and above what the 
state could provide. Hot meals cooked elsewhere and delivered to the elderly and the 
invalid were an example of the help voluntary organisations could give to the elderly and 
ill in order to allow them a degree of independence. Help with housework was another. 
Beveridge gave a negative justification for encouraging voluntary organisations to 
provide these services: the inadequacy of state provision. Local authorities had powers 
to provide some of these services, but he feared that demand for them outstripped local 
authorities' capacity to supply. In any case, he argued, "local authorities have given 
preference to others than the old, confining their schemes to mothers with young 
children. " Here, then, was a field in which voluntary action could fulfil its mission. 
Beveridge felt that there were other, more positive, reasons why voluntary 
organisations should provide these services. Rooted in local communities, voluntary 
organisations could respond to local needs. They would also introduce an element of 
humanity into their contacts with those in need, which state services, he believed, could 
never do. "Meeting special needs", he argued, "calls for special interest and sympathy. " 
He concluded his survey of the needs that remained in a 'social service state', by quoting 
a report on the needs of blind people. He believed that the observations made on the 
" Ministry of Health/Department of Health for Scotland, Report of theWorking P 
,- 
Health and Welfare Services., Chaired by on Social Workers in the Local Authorifty 
Eileen L. Younghusband, (London: HMSO, 1959)., 299 
22 Beveridge, Voluniga Action, 231 
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needs of the blind applied with equal force to the elderly and other groups in need of 
special care. They needed 'Ifiendship and personal care such as cannot be rendered by 
any official however competent and kindhearted. " This kind of service could only be 
mobilised with success by "a societywhose whole motive is voluntary. " Beveridge 
celebrated, in other words, the traditional 'tea and sympathy' ethos of ý-, oluntarism. The 
state could satisfy material needs, voluntary action supplied an intangible extra. 23 
Bevefidge also nominated care of the elderly as an area for voluntary 
organisations to move into, not only at the prompting of voluntary organisations 
themselves, but also because the s-ame Mass Observation survey had suggested that 
voluntan7 services in this area commanded wide respect and were less tainted by the 
popular opprobrium which attached to charity. Beveridge hoped that recommending such 
schemes would prove popular. He also believed that redirection of voluntary social service 
along these channels had the potential to attract a Nvider membership for voluntary 
organisations. Beveridge's concentration on the competition between voluntary and state 
welfare services also obscured the much more important alternative welfare 
arrangements made available by families and local communities. Ten years later, Peter 
Townsend pointed to the relative insignificant contribution of dornicifiary services to the 
welfare of the elderly in Bethnal Green. Townsend concluded "the family has the care of 
a far larger number of the infirm aged and chronic sick than all our hospitals, residential 
Homes, and domiciliary services put together. " 24 
Beveridge's concentration on the impact of state welfare also blinded him to the 
effects of competition within the voluntary sector. He simply disregarded the evidence 
placed before his panel by the voluntary organisations themselves. In their evidence to 
Beveridge's enquiry the National Council for the Welfare of Old People, the Red Cross and 
the Women's Voluntary Service had all cited meals services to the elderly and cht-onically 
sick as an area they intended to work in the future. Z5 Beveridge was scarcely interested in 
the realities of the voluntary sector, however. This point was picked up by the 
sociologist T. H. Marshall who, in his review of Volunj4a Action, wryly congratulated 
23 Beveridge, Voluntga Action, 267 
24 Peter Townsend, The FAMily Life of Old People, (Iian-nondsworth: Penguin, 1963), 
216; see also Lowe, 'Moving Frontier' 
25 Beveridge and Wells, Evidence, 141 ff 
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Be-vreridge for refraining "from staking his reputation on the discovery of watertight 
definitions. " 26 
Beveridge's dispute with A. F. C. Bourdillon over the standing of the Women's 
Voluntary Service is particularly revealing of the overriding political imperatives which 
structured Be-veridge's Report. Bourdillon was the compiler of a Nuffield Foundation 
study of voluntarism published at the end of the war. Beveridge broadly endorsed 
Bourdillon's definition of voluntary social service, which defmed a voluntary 
organisation as one -initiated and governed by its own members without external 
control. "" Beveridge added a typical gloss on this, describing it as any "action not under 
the directions of any'authority wielding the power of the State. " 28 For Beveridge this 
independence from the state was voluntarism's peculiar virtue as well as its defining 
feature and this makes his point of disagreement with Bourdillon even more instructive. 
In order to emphasise the dualism between voluntarism and the state, which was 
central to his perspective, Beveridge was eager to follow Bourdillon in defining 
voluntarism in terms of its method of management. Control of business by voluntary 
management committees was, by the middle of the twentieth century, the only strictly 
voluntary aspect of most voluntary social services. It was the independence of their 
management structure rather than their reliance on labour time given free of charge that 
distinguished voluntary organisations from other welfare providers. Bourdillon 
appreciated that the changed character of voluntary organisations made it difficult any 
longer to characterise voluntal), organisations according to the absolute criterion of 
unpaid work. He noted, "many of the most active voluntary organisations are staffed 
entirely by highly trained and fairly well paid professional workers. " Bourdillon's 
solution was to regard the distinctiveness of voluntary organisations as "the productý not 
of the kind of workers they employ, but of their mode of birth and method of 
government". As a result, Bourdillon was inclined to exclude the Women's Voluntary 
Service, arguing that "although it uses the word 'voluntary' in its title, [it] is not and does 
not claim to be a voluntary organisation". Bourdillon regarded it rather as "a piece of 
26 T. H Marshall, 'Voluntary Action', Political Quarter , 
Vol. XX, No. 1, (1949)ý 25 
27 A. F. C. Bourdillon 'Introductory', A. F. C. Bourdillon (ed. ), Vo1jMj4U Social 
Services: Their Place in the Modem Statel, Nuffield College Social Reconstruction 
Survey Committee, (]London: Methuen, 1945), 3 
28 Beveridge, Volunt4ry Action, 8 
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administrative machinery which serves the statutory authority and enables the individual 
to Volunteer to do war service without pay. " The use of 'voluntary' in its title was of the 
word in "its old sense ... applying to the worker, not the organisation. , 
29 
Beveridge was no more attached than Bourdillon to the traditional definition of 
voluntarism in terms of its use of volunteer labour, but he cavilled at Bourdillon's 
exclusion of the WVS from the category of voluntary organisations. He reluctantly 
agreed that it could be argued that "the W. V. S. is not a voluntary agency" since it was 
"not independent of public authority in decidingvivhat it shall do and how", but, he 
continued, it could also be regarded as "more voluntary than most ... 
in the sense of 
having in relation to the whole a smaller paid staff than most. "'O Beveridge resorted to a 
traditionalist view in order to rescue the W)VS for the voluntary sector. His outlook was 
based on a set of dualisms, and the primary dualism was, as far as he was concemed,, that 
between the state welfare and voluntary social service. The definition of voluntarism in 
terms of its management structure served to emphasise this primary dualism, but 
Beveridge recoiled from some of the implications of this position. His dismissive 
approach to Bourdillon's point reveals that the finer points of conditions within the 
voluntarv sector were subsidiary to his grand project of exerting an itffluence on 
Government policy. 
As far as he recognised a division within the voluntary sector, it was the formal 
and moral distinction he drew between voluntary organisations and endowed charitable 
trusts. This had impeccable Victorian antecedents. He cited with approval "Hobhouse's 
doctrine that the command of resources should always be in the hands of a living and 
reasonable owner of property", and reproduced in an appendix examples of outdated 
charities drawn largely from Hobhouse's polemical assault on endowed charities The 
Dead Hand, published in 1880 and which drew heavily on his experience as a Charity 
Commissioner .31 Beveridge reasserted the 
Gladstonian distinction between charitable 
trusts and voluntary associations and he posed the question of charitable property in 
terms of a legitimacy in which ownership implied moral responsibility. This echoed his 
view, expressed in Full Eipployment in a Free Socie , that "if ... 
it should be shown by 
experience or argument that abolition of private property in the means of production was 
29 Bourdillon, 'Introductory, 3-4 
30 Beveridge, Volunl4a Action, 137 
31 Beveridge, Voluntga Action, 198; 356-70 
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necessary for full emplo-yment, this abolition would have to be undertaken. " He had 
diminished the revolutionary implications of this announcement, reassuring his readers 
that he personally believed that full employment was perfectly compatible with the 
continuation of private ownership of industry. 32 His point was that liberty in property as 
in other , areas was intimately connected to the responsible exercise of the freedoms 
concerned. . 33 For Beveridge the test of whether the moral claim on property ownership 
was being met was social utility. In his view, both the endowed trust as an institutional 
fon-n, and the law that oversaw it, failed this test. 
Beveridge did not go beyond calling for a review of the law in terms that implied 
that 'common sense' should be the guiding principle. Of more significance for the 
unfolding of the debate on voluntary social service was that he established a connection 
beM. -een reform of the law on endowed charitable trusts with a scheme for funding 
voluntary organisations. Beveridge's proposals for machinery to consummate a new 
partnership between state and voluntary organisations were no more than a sketch: he 
called for the appointment of a Royal Commission to work out the details. 34 One of the 
proposals contained in VolunjAU Action was for a conu-nittee to administer a central 
government grant to voluntary organisations for which, Beveridge argued, the Lord 
President of the Council should have responsibility. 
It was axiomatic to Beveridge that co-operation between state and voluntary 
organisations working in the same field was beneficial. The main weakness of the 
relationship as it existed in the 1940s was, according to Beveridge, that it fostered 
conservatism within the voluntary sector. The existing arrangements for Government 
support of voluntary social service tended to reinforce the conservatism Beveridge 
detected in patterns of private giving. "The general public, " he thought, "ha-ve shown 
themselves more ready to give for familiar humanitarian purposes than for new social 
experiments". In rewarding the orthodox, donations and subscriptions acted as a check 
on the social entrepreneur. Both the donating public and the grant awarding state were 
reluctant to back pioneers with novel ideas. The resources commanded by established 
and wefl-understood voluntary services grew at the expense of smaller, unfashionable 
32 William Beveridge, Full EMployment in a Free Society, (London: George Mlen and 
Unwin, 1944), 23 
33 Beveridge, Full Eipployme , 249-52 
34 Beveridge, Volunt4g Action, 310 
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and experimental prqJJects. Both public and private con ibutions combined to choke off tr 
the sources of spontaneity upon which voluntary social service depended. The funding 
regime inhibited innovation and undermined the voluntary sector's capacity to pioneer 
new services. It denied support to important voluntary services whose work was "of too 
general or too novel a character to attract the interest of any particular department. " 35 
Operating on departmental lines, the existing system favoured projects which had 
already gained public support and which reflected existing departmental priorities. 
This system was inadequate, therefore, because it failed to provide support for 
pioneering organisations. The inefficiency of both private giving and state funding made 
the case for "placing in the hands of some responsible central committee a grant ... to 
supplement the help given by the departments. " The state was less flexible in response 
to social change than individual and community initiative: Beveridge's solution was to 
create a body charged with fostering creativity. His 'eight point programme for the 
State', concluded that there was a need for "an independent corporation endowed by the 
36 
State for social advance by Voluntary Action". 
The idea of a state-fmanced foundation to distribute funds to the voluntary sector 
was not altogether new, but it did arise from Beveridge's analysis of existing state 
funding for voluntary social service. He did not see his 'grants committee' as an 
alternative to continued direct departmental funding of voluntary organisations, indeed 
he called for departmental grants to "be made available in increasing amounts in future. " 
The strength of the existing system was that it encouraged "direct contact between public 
authorities and voluntary agencies". What he proposed in addition to these existing 
contacts was an autonomous grant-awarding board as an antidote to the deficiencies and 
dangers he saw in existing methods of state funding for voluntary organisations . 
37 
Similar schemes had been floated for parts of the voluntary sector in the past. 
Beveridge himself cited the example of the University Grants Committee as a 
precedent . 
38 Proposals for a hospital grant's committee to finance voluntary hospitals 
along similar lines to the universities had gained currency in the 1930s. 
In 1938, 
Professor Ernest Barker, formerly of the King's Fund, suggested in The Times the 
Beveridge, Volunt4a Action, 317 
y 
36 Beveridge, Voluntary Action, 317 
37 Beveridge, Volunt4a Action, 316-17 
38 Beveridge, Volunt4a Action, 316 
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establishment of a committee to "receive an annual parliamentary grant which it then 
distributed to individual hospitals through regional hospital councils. " The writer and 
politician A. P. Herbert supported the idea, believing it would allow 6'state assistance 
without state control"' and without undermining voluntary contributions to the voluntary 
health services. 39 
Nod-ting came of this idea and it was rapidly overtaken by events as the war 
compelled radical intervention in medical provision, and the introduction of the NHS 
rendered it irrelevant. Its airing in the 1930s and the existence of the UGC did, however, 
offer a precedent for Beveridge's proposals. The main difference between Beveridge's 
proposals for voluntary social service and both the UGC and the hospitals' scheme, was 
that these latter were each confined to a single, relatively homogeneous field. The 
novelty of Beveridge's proposal was that he intended it to cover the whole range of 
voluntary social service. Beveridge anticipated some of the difficulties that might be 
encountered. He noted that the financial power of a central grant-making board might 
indirectly undermine the pluralism and innovation that he wanted to promote. The 
breadth of voluntary social service meant that any funding body for the whole of the 
voluntanr sector would have to- choose between very different purposes. The UGC on 
the other hand, had to support a single purpose - university education - and could use 
objective standards of performance to deten-nine how to distribute its funds. Beveridge 
admitted that so great was "the diversity of aims of philanthropic agencies ... as to make 
the question of how to distribute a grant voted for all of them a question of ends rather 
than means. " As resources were limited, choices were unavoidable and grants would be 
allocated selectively. Rather than choosing between similar services, Beveridge 
acknowledged that his committee would have to choose between different charitable 
objects in a way quite "different in character from anything undertaken by the University 
Grants Committee. , 40 
In spite of the danger that the voluntary sector would be steered into particular 
channels and might even become politicised in the process, Beveridge argued that a 
central funding committee should be established, at least as a short-term measure. In 
Volunt4a Actio he saw it as a transitional mechanism to facilitate the voluntary 
sector's adjustment to the new environment created by state welfare. The course of 
'9 Prochaska, Philanthropy, 128 
40 Beveridge, Volunt4U AcIllon, 316 
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events following publication of his report meant that Beveridge's thought on the 
character and possible implications of his 'Voluntary Sector Grants Committee' 
remained underdeveloped. Volunt4a Action was tentative on the exact form the 
committee might take, mentioning as possible models organisations already in existence, 
such zis the Pilgrim Trustand the NCSS. He was also vague on the possible source of 
the Committee's funds . 
41 Although Beveridge identified some possible objections to 
the scheme, the manner in which the proposal was taken up by Beveridge's allies and by 
the Govenu-nent meant that discussion converged on the technical question of how to 
secure funds for the Committee rather than on the broader issues of principle. 
Beveridge's report on voluntary action, in spite of his elaborate attempts to 
recreate the panoply of an official enquiry, was a polemical rather than a considered 
report. It failed to take full account of the dramatically altered social relations 
surrounding voluntarism in the late 1940s. Many voluntary organisations, for example, 
had experienced substantial growth during the war, but Beveridge uncritically accepted 
this growth as evidence of health rather than investigating its particulars. During the war 
income from both traditional voluntary sources and from government increased. 
Beveridge's binary opposition of state and'voluntary organisations had blinded him to 
the rapid integration of voluntary organisations into the civil defence programme. He 
had ignored the implications for the future of voluntary social service of the creation of 
new, government sponsorship of organisations like the Women's Voluntary Service, and 
the Citizens Advice Bureaux, accepting these uncritically as 'a good thing'. The 
voluntary sector larger, more complex and more organised than Beveridge acknowledged 
was also more closely coupled to the state than before. It was also poorly received by 
leading voluntarists. 
The government's response to Beveridge 
Although the National Council had been enthusiastic at the outset of Beveridge's 
enquiry, it was disappointed with the result. There were clearly affinities between 
Beveridge's view of the importance and future role of voluntary organisations and those 
of Haynes. Haynes had himself stressed that, whatever the scope of the welfare 
41 Beveridge, Volunt4a Actiog, 317 
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provision undertaken by the state, there would always be services that could only be, and 
should only be, undertaken by voluntary bodies. Nevertheless, the Council was 
dissatisfied with VoluntAry Action, although its critique was not made public. Astbury, a 
member of the NCSS Executive Committee, as well as General Secretary of the FWA, 
complained that Beveridge had exploited the plight of voluntary orgranisations to advance 
the case of the large national insurance companies, one of which had commissioned and 
financed his report. About half the report's length was taken up with Beveridge arguing 
that the friendly societies should have a role in the administration of social insurance. 
Beveridge's insistence that voluntanr social service was a bulwark against 
totalitarianism did not satisfýZ Nfitchell, who had acted as liaison between the NCSS and 
Beveridge's panel of assessors. Nfitchell had welcomed the publication of the report in a 
review for Social Service Quarter , the Council's house journal. 
42 In the privacy of the 
Committee room, however, he was more forthright. He objected especially to the 
technical tone of Beveridge's treatise, remarking that his "report did not give full 
recognition to the importance of voluntary organisations, in the realm of freedom of 
thought and opinion but only as agents for getting work done. "' Beveridge repeatedly 
stressed the importance of nurturing the "vigour and abundance of Voluntary Action" as 
16 the distinguishing marks of a free society. "44 In the light of this, Nfitchell's criticism 
seems rather odd. It reflected the Council's sense that Beveridge was no longer the 
power in the land that he had been three years earlier and their eagerness to find ways of 
distancing themselves from him. There was little to be gained from coat-tailing someone 
who was already widely seen as merely making a nuisance of himself 
The Council clearly wanted to distance itself from the anti-state tenor of 
Beveridge's account, for Nfitchell went on to criticise Beveridge's underestimation of the 
extent "of day-to-day consultation between voluntary organisations and the state". 
Reflecting the divorce between Beveridge's idealised version of the voluntary sectoriand 
the EC's own experience, Nfitchell regretted that the report had not been written from 
within the movement, and Haynes went so far as to suggest the commissioning of an 
alternative report. Far firom decrying the damage done to voluntarism by the Welfare 
42 George MitchelL 'The Third Beveridge Report', Social Service Quarter , XXII (3), 
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State,, Haymes expressed the Council's appreciation that the Acts founding the Welfare I 
State had sought to encourage co-operation between state and voluntary organisations 
and to find a role for voluntarism. in state welfare services. The problem, he argued was 
not the threat to voluntarism from the state, but inconsistency in the application of this 
encouragement for the various "authorities were interpreting their powers in different 
ways. "45 There were clearly areas of overlap between the Council's and Beveridge's 
vision of voluntarism, but Beveridge himself was regarded as out of touch with the 
realities of contemporary voluntarism, just as the language in which he talked about 
citizenship and the state "was increasingly remote from the currents of popular 
culture. , 
46 
Whatever their reservations about Beveridge's report, the NCSS found itself 
working within the framework he had outlined. His proposal for a central funding 
committee for the voluntary sector proved his most important and lasting contribution to 
the terms of the debate. Beveridge had sought to downplay the question of 
accountability of voluntary organisations for any ftmding they received. His assumption 
of the dichotomy of state and voluntarism meant that he regarded the independence from 
political control of any sort was the essence of voluntary social service. He was 
concerned, however, by the absence of any formal voice in politics for the voluntary 
sector, and this led him to propose, again on the analogy of the University Grants 
Committee, that the Lord President of the Council be appointed 'Minister Guardian' for 
the voluntary sector. Beveridge saw the role of the Minister Guardian as that of an 
advocate for the voluntary sector within government, providing a link between the 
political administration and voluntary organisations without imposing central control. A 
key function of the Minister Guardian would be the appointment of members of the 
grants conn-nittee. 47 
Beveridge's proposal invited the attention of the Lord President's Office where 
Beveridge's report received detailed scrutiny from officials. This was largely 
sympathetic to the broad questions he had raised about the future of the voluntary sector 
- an indication that the Government was eager to 
have something positive to say about 
voluntary social service. The main obstacle to ministers and officials accepting the 
45 NCSS Executive Committee, 20 January 1949, LMA/4016/IS/01/32 (2) 
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report's recomrnendations was reluctance to contemplate any radical departures in 
policy. I A. R. Pimlott, Morrison's private secretary undertook the review of 
Beveridge's report. Pimlott was himself an active voluntarist, a member of the Council 
of Toynbee Hall and author of the settlement's official history published 1935 to mark its 
48 50th anniversary . 
Though he had some reservations, Pimlott thought Beveridge's report had raised 
an -important but neglected aspect of public administration", and felt that "a review of 
the role of the voluntary agencies would be timely and valuable. " 'What mainly told 
against Beveridge's proposals in the eyes of Monison's officials was that they were not 
fully worked out. Pimlott found them "so hedged around with doubts that it is difficult 
to know how to take them. " He was scathing about the proposed grants committee 
foreseeing a number of difficulties. First, the new corporation would be in competition 
with existing organisations. He thought it was "to say the least unlikely that it would be 
welcome to such orgganisations as the National Council of Social Service and the WVS; 
both of which come very near to being the type of body he seems to envisage. " A more 
critical issue was that the proposal amounted to a call for increased public spending, and 
Pimlott thought it was "doubtful whether this is the time for the State to embark on 
additional expenditure even of the magnitude required for the new State- subsidised 
corporation. " Pimlott's decisive criticism was that Beveridge's proposals would simply 
create an additional layer of bureaucracy. He saw no role for the corporation other than 
"to hand out public money to other voluntary agencies -a proposition of doubtful 
wisdom. " Pimlott also saw no reason why the Lord President should assume 
responsibility for the body if it were set up, arguing that there was "a strong case for 
responsibility resting with the Treasury". Beveridge's proposal, as it stood, would 
merely extend the lines of bureaucracy for it "would mean the Treasury paying the Lord 
President large sums for him to pay to a public corporation which in turn would make the 
actual payments to the voluntary societies. , 49 
Morrison had already been made aware of strong Treasury opposition to 
Beveridge's scheme: a briefing on the proposals forwarded to his department had 
48 Who Was Who, vol. VI, (London: Adain and Charles Black, 1972), 898; J. A. R. 
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restated Treasury orthodoxy on govenu-nent accountability to Parliament for spending 
public money. 'O Treasury officials highlighted the lack of public accountability inherent 
in Beveridge's conception of a grants committee which would, Treasury officials pointed 
out, spend public money but would be free from state control. This would make it "a 
responsible agent" free to "decide without taking instructions from a Government 
Departrnent, or having to account for his actions to anyone, whether a person is entitled 
to a payment from public funds. " Adopting the Treasury's traditional attitude, the 
, authors of the briefing ruled such an arrangement "out of the question". 51 
In spite of the National Council's misgivings at the poor quality of Beveridge's 
report, and the resistance of Government's advisors to its main recommendations, the 
report did offer both a way of discussing the future of voluntarism in terms other than the 
antagonism between voluntarism and the state which had dominated during the previous 
fluee years. Beveridge's recapitulation of his Gladstonian theme of the distinction 
between voluntary organisations and endowed trusts also attracted the political support 
of the leader of the Liberal group in the House of Lords, Herbert Samuel. Samuel 
initiated a debate in the House of Lords a year after the report's publication, in the course 
of which the distinction between voluntary organisations and endowed trusts gained a 
still higher profile. 
50 Stafford Cripps to Herbert Morrisorý 29 January 1949, CAB 124/136 
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Chapter 5: The Lords Debate Voluntary Social Service 
The result of Beveridge's restatement of the Gladstonian critique of endowed charity was 
that the debate on the future of voluntary social service came increasingly to revolve 
around the distinction between endowed charities and voluntary organisations. The 
prominence given to this formal classification of voluntarism facilitated the reduction of 
the issues to the merely technical question of methods of funding voluntary 
organisations. It, did so by shifting attention away from the rhetorically and emotionally 
charged issue of relations between the state and voluntary organisations and by investing 
the opposition of endowed charity to activist voluntary organisation with an equivalent 
rhetorical and moral charge. The debate on voluntary action in the House of Lords took 
this process a stage further. 
Beveridge's report on voluntary action touched off a discussion in Government 
circles and, whatever shortcomings they saw in it, this presented Haynes and the NCSS 
Executive with a valuable opportunity to press their case for more Government funding. 
Pressure on the Government grew when the former Home Secretary Herbert Samuel, 
now Liberal leader in the upper house, raised the issue in the House of Lords. The 
debate on Samuel's motion calling for greater encouragement of voluntary social service 
took place on 22 June 1949, about a year after the publication of Beveridge's report. ' 
Morrison and his officials had already given Beveridge's proposals detailed 
consideration, so the Goverm-nent was well prepared to deal with the issues raised during 
the debate. At the same time, the Government's emphasis on its financial objections to 
Beveridge's proposals, left Beveridge and his allies with the impression that there existed 
no opposition in principle to the idea of a grants committee for the voluntary sector 
. xrovided some satisfactory source of 
ftmding, other than the public purse, could be 
found. This impression, combined with Samuel's further elaboration of Beverid, (=Fe's 
original idea for a new funding organisation for the voluntary sector, led supporters). 
modernisation of the voluntary sector to focus their attention on finding a source of 
funding for a new national grant awarding body. 
I House of Lords Debates, vol. 163,22 June 1949, cols. 75-136 
-104- 
Samuel's contribution 
Like Beveridge and the other peers who spoke in the debate, Samuel sought to reconcile 
the vast expansion of the state to vestigial libertarian idealism. As a politician he 
accepted that an increased role for the state in social welfare as inevitable but, like many 
in the voluntary sector, he remained emotionally attached to voluntarism in social 
service. Opening the debate, Samuel located voluntary organisations within a 
quadripartite structure. This incorporated the individual and the state into a continuum 
of mediating institutions. In addition to the state and the individual, two other pillars of 
society only become apparent upon close examination. These were the family and 
"volunt. ary organisations of many kinds". Samuel concurred with Beveridge in 
associating voluntarý-, organisations with the family. Like Beveridge, he was inclined to 
avoid quantifying the relative contribution of voluntary social services to welfare 
provision. The material contribution made by voluntary organisations to social service 
provision was not the main point as far as Samuel was concerned. In yoking together 
these two distinct sources of welfare, he hoped to implicate voluntarism in the affective 
bonds present in family and friendship networks. Voluntary organisations in the 
abstractý whatever specific services they provided, figured as a reagent in the great 
welfare experiment: their continued existence within the welfare state manifested an 
underlying social health because they played an "essential part in the structure of our 
modem civilised society. ý, 2 
Samuel considered himself something of a philosopher and had published a 
number of books and articles on philosophical subjects. He could claim to be 
representative of the mainstream of British philosophy at this time. He was elected 
President of the British (later Royal) Institute of Philosophy in 193 1.3 He was also 
invited to contribute a volume to the popular 'Home University Library'. 4 The success 
of this volume led in 1937 to a more wide-ranging volume Belief and Action. Samuel's 
2 House of Lords Debates, vol. 163,22 June 1949, col. 76 
3 Bernard Wasserstein, Herbert Samuel a Political Life, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1992), 372 
4 Viscount Samuel, Practical Ethics, Home University Library no 255, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1935) (Serxices Reprint 1945) 
-1.05- 
philosophy was hardly innovative. Belief and Action was subtitled, without apparent 
irony, 'An Everyday Philosophy', a promise it met in full. One reviewer of Popular 
Ethics, recommended it as an example of "the English or common-sense school of 
philosophy so sturdily vindicating its right to hearing. ,5 Ffis later output included a 
celebrated correspondence with Albert Einstein in which he took issue with modem 
physics' undermining of the common-sense notion of 'realiq'. Against the threatening 
relativism of thermodynamics, Samuel simply trusted his intuition. 6 
In his articles and books, Samuel expressed an ethical approach that, 
unsurprisingly for a Liberal, stressed the importance of balance. He rejected the idea 
"that morality consists in self-sacrifice". He thought "egoism ... the measure for 
altruism". "Both, " he argued, "in proper degree and balance must be elements in 
morality. " Conn-non sense, Englistmess, and balance were keynotes of his approach. 
This was his contribution to the decontesting of voluntary social service. The function 
and value of voluntarism was a given. He pushed to the fore formal distinctions be een tw 
types of voluntary organisations and focussed attention on devising a mechanism to 
encourage the growth of the preferred fon-n of organisation. As a result, the Oebate 
amounted to little more than an exercise in mutual agreement on the value of voluntarism 
and support for increased funding. Where Beveridge had cavilled at Bourdillon's 
specification of voluntary management as a defining component of voluntary 
organisations, Samuel eased the discussion of finance along the same agnostic path. In 
so doing, Samuel discarded one of the most important tenets of charity, organised as well 
as emotional, namely that the gift was merely a token that gave effect to an underlying 
moral relationship between donor and object. The provenance of the money was central 
to the moral character of a charitable act. Samuel's approach to financing implied a 
loosening of voluntarism from its traditional value system. This de-coupling of funding 
from the core meaning of charity marked a further step in the ideological decontesting of 
voluntarism. Samuel was merely articulating a way of thinking that was implicit in 
conditions within the voluntary sector itself. 
Samuel shared Beveridge's diagnosis of the problems of the voluntary sector and 
of its continuing value in modern society. He was also optimistic about the future and 
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his optimism turned on an ethical equiation. Like Beveridge, Samuel was concerned 
about the growth of affluence and increased leisure among all classes. He saw the 
problem of voluntary social service as intimately "linked with another feature of modem 
communities ... the increase in the amount of leisure available to the population". The 
problem of the voluntary sector was a problem of ethical political economy. On the one 
hand, people with time on their hands were one of the factors of production of voluntary 
action. Shorter working hours and longer holidays meant that people had "more spare 
time to give to social services of one kind or another. " Leisure itself might also be an 
object of voluntary activity, providing its raw material, as it were. Samuel's solution was 
to bring these two factors of production together. 
The new leisure society, therefore, posed a problem but it also contained the 
material for its solution. The problem leisure posed was how to ensure that the 
population made constructive use of its increased free time and it was "exceedingly 
important ... that there should 
be adequate opportunities for the right use of leisure. " 
Confident that his audience would share his interpretation of what were appropriate ways 
for the masses to spend their free time, Samuel felt no obligation to dwell on or to define 
4right' in this context. He mentioned in passing the "youth movements active throughout 
the country" and "the efforts ... 
being made to provide facilities for recreation and for the 
amenities of every kind. " Mobilising mass support for and involvement in these 
endeavours was partly a matter of public education, he thought. It was primarily a 
cultural question, depending as it did "upon the spirit of the people and the number of 
those who are willing to give the sacrifice. " 
Having conducted this brief rhetorical tour of the value of voluntary social 
services, Samuel moved briskly forward to the main point of his speech: obtaining 
financial support for voluntary organisations. The future of voluntary social services, 
according to Samuel, depended crucially on "the problem of finance, which is becoming 
more and more difficult every year. " Many voluntary organisations were finding it hard 
to meet an expanding demand for their services as "the difficulties which face their work 
on the financial side are also growing, owing to higher costs. " Samuel intoned a familiar 
catalogue of voluntary organisations' woes. They had to cope with "higher salaries and 
also greater charges of every kind in administration. " They also encountered problems 
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in "securing acconu-nodation; it is harder to find and more expensive when it is found. " 
Voluntary organisations, Samuel asserted, were trapped between rising demand, rising 
costs and declining revenue: "at the very time when expansion is necessary all over this 
great field ... [and] the burdens of expenditure are increasing, the sources of revenue are 
drying up. " Samuel attributed the decline in voluntary organisations' income to rising 
taxation, partly to meet the requirements of increased state welfare progranu-nes. In the 
past voluntary organisations could rely on "the patronage of wealthy people or upon 
voluntary subscriptions. " These sources of income had been closed off, for "with the 
present burden of taxation both patronage and subscriptions have become more and more 
difficult. " 10 
Like Beveridge, Samuel believed that the problems facing voluntary 
organisations were primarily financial and largely an effect of the increased role of the 
state in welfare provision. Since it was the cause of the problems, the state was also the 
best instrument for resolving them. The creation of the welfare state had badly 
undermined the voluntary sector: state support could help to stabilise it. Samuel believed 
that voluntary social services were restrained by lack of resources rather than lack of 
commitment on the part of voluntary organisations or lack of demand for certain 
services. The state, he argued, had a responsibility to intervene to make good this 
deficiency. The irony of state assistance to voluntary action whose principal ethical 
quality was conceived of in terms of its independence from the state, was not lost on 
Samuel, however, and this led him to cast around for some method of disengaging the 
apparatus of the state from the funding it was to provide. Flis proposal for national and 
local Common Good Funds to distribute funds to voluntary organisations was intended 
to overcome the objection that state funding would lead to state control of voluntary 
organisations. 
Opening the Lords' debate on voluntary action, Samuel gave wann support to 
Beveridge's proposal for a central grant awarding body for the voluntary sector. He also 
extended Beveridge's original conception of the Common Good Fund, calling on the 
Government to introduce "legislation... pro-viding for the establishment of Common 
Good Funds nationally in Scotland, England and Wales" as well as a supplementary 
network of local funds. Samuel shared Beveridge's vision that the Common 
Good Funds 
would be self-financing in the end. He hoped that they would attract voluntary 
10 House of Lords Debates, vol. 163,2,2 June 1949, col. 78 
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contributions, not only donations and subscriptions, but also that "a Common Good 
system of this kind, once established and having gained public confidence ... would 
attract gi gifts and bequests ... and in the end ... might be the administrator of very large 
funds indeed". " TI-fis implied a substantial diversion of traditional voluntary 
contributions towards the Common Good Funds. It is significant that Samuel did not 
dwell on the possible effects on existing fund-raising in the voluntary sector of any large- 
scale displacement of donations. We have already seen that Beveridge was willing to 
discard the requirement that the management of voluntary organisations was entirely 
independent of the state. Samuel's promotion of the Common Good Fund marked a 
demotion of voluntary fund raising from its traditional position in the definition of 
voluntary social service. 
Samuel recognised thatý in the interim, any such scheme would require the 
financial backing of the state and he suggested certain resources currently under the 
control of the state that could be assigned to support Common Goods. Samuel's main 
contribution to the elaboration of Beveridge's idea, therefore, was to give it greater 
concreteness by bringing forward methods of providing the new institution with the start- 
up funding it needed, thereby making it appear more practicable. He also argued that 
this could be achieved relatively painlessly and without drawing down even greater state 
expenditure. Samuel called for the creation of an endowment for the National Funds 
from "derelict moneys which lie without owners - in banks, in the Court of Chancery 
and in various charities scattered throughout the country. " Samuel "estimated that 
unclaimed funds in Chancery amount to a sum of about 13,000,000, and dormant and 
derelict deposits in the banks ... amount to at 
least L20,000,00O. " Invoking a familiar 
Liberal and Fabian rhetoric of efficiency he thought there "could be no moral objection 
to all these moneys being put to some good purpose instead of, as now, being for all 
effective purposes wasted and lying in the banks and other funds imply as dormant 
entries. 712 
Samuel recognised that some safeguards would have to be included against the 
possibility that legitimate claims on some of these sums might arise in the future, 
however belatedly they might appear. He stressed, however, that since the money was 
currently sitting in bank vaults and serving no useful purpose its application to 
11 House of Lords Debates, vol. 163,22 June 1949, col. 80-1 
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supporting voluntary social sei-vice by means of Common Good Funds would achieve a 
valuable social objective at no additional cost to the state or the taxpayer. Samuel made 
the same point when adding to his shopping list of 'free' assets the so-called bona 
vacantia, or property without an owner. These had hitherto accrued to the Exchequer 
under an historic airangement with the Crown. Samuel suggested that the "estates of 
people who have no near relatives who die intestate and whose estates fell into the 
Exchequer" should instead be handed over to the Common Good Funds. He reported to 
the House that, according to figures he had recently come across, these amounted on 
average to around 115 0,000 a year, suggesting a likely product of around 11,000,000 
every seven years. Samuel argued that since the bona vacantia were not Budget revenues 
but fell to the Exchequer as windfalls and were "not due to taxation imposed by 
Parliament", it would be quite proper to annex them to the support of voluntary social 
service. 13 
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Broadening the appeal by narrowing the focus 
Samuel's advocacy of voluntarism had to appeal to a broad audience in the Lords in 
order to push the Government to act. This meant playing to both Labour and 
Conservative galleries. The narrowing of the focus of the debate onto technical matters 
of finance was, therefore, a tactical necessity. In a canny appeal to the Labour benches, 
he cited the example of Sweden, "where all such moneys go to purposes of social 
welfare" and where they had "contributed to the very high standard of social life in 
Sweden ... which places that countnýý in the very forefront of civilisation. " 
14 Sweden, 
occupied an iconic status among leading Labour politicians during this period for it had 
pioneered extensive state welfare structures in the 1930s. Consequently, many on the 
social democratic left in 1940s Britain regarded it as embodying the ideal standard of 
welfare provision to which they themselves aspired. 15 In citing the example of how 
Sweden dealt with its bona vacantia the Liberal Samuel sought to invest his proposals 
with a Social Democratic legitimacy in keeping with the times. 
Samuel's intervention with its implication of a cost free social benefit gave a 
depth to the idea of the Common Good Funds that Beveridge's original proposals lacked. 
In Voluntq_U Actiop, Beveridge had considered only the don-nant balances held in the 
name of defunct charities: resources that already existed within the voluntary sector. 
Samuel added substance to the scheme, at the same time underlining its Liberal pedigree 
by invoking traditional Progressive Liberal themes - attacking wasteful parasitism in 
economic life and the promotion of the 'efficient' use of resources for the benefit of 
society. Clearly, the two men had prepared their tactics in the debate in advance, for 
Beveridge enthusiastically approved Samuel's proposal. Beveridge further underlined 
the Progressive lineage of Samuel's scheme, linking it to the "criticism of the rentier", 
which had been a central tenet of the New Liberalism in which both he and Samuel had 
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been schooled, and "the least defensible kind of rentier", he added, was "the donnant 
balance. " 16 
The Labour benches were receptive to this sort of language and Sainuel sought to 
neutralise any lingering antipathy to charity they harboured by emphasising that his plan 
to rescue -voluntary orgranisations would allow them to supplement existing state social 
services provision, not supplant them. Samuel's tactics ensured that the scheme obtained 
a warm reception from Labour peers, thus putting pressure on the Government to 
respond positively to his and Beveridge's proposals. More significant in terms of 
developing the consensus on voluntarism was the fact that the proposals also received 
fulsome support from the Conservative benches. The Conservative peers' support for 
voluntarism was to be expected; what was significant was the extent to which senior 
Conservatives went along with Samuel and Beveridge's diagnosis of the problem of the 
voluntary sector and their recommendations for its solution. The consensus pushed what 
were substantial differences of outlook between the government and opposition benches 
to the background. The cross-party support for Beveridge and Samuel further enhanced 
the tactical position of the two Liberal peers but it also revealed the central elements of 
the concept of voluntarism that underpinned the emerging consensus. 
Beveridge had linked voluntary social service with resistance to totalitarianism in 
Volunt4U Action. This was the main burden of his own contribution to the debate in the 
Lords, asserting that jw]e shall reach the last stage of totalitarianism when all our use of 
leisure is dictated to us by the state. " 17 Beveridge demonstrated that his main interest 
was with the mutuals, expatiating at length on their virtues and criticising their "raw deal 
from the state", he called on the Government to reconsider its attitude to the friendly 
societies and make amends for their recent treatment. 18 Nevertheless, his emphasis on 
the libertarian argument for voluntarism created an affinity between his and Samuel's 
position and that of the Conservative benches. 
Conservatives generally defended voluntary social services as an expression of 
individual liberty. Accordingly, the threat posed by the Welfare State to the autonomy of 
voluntary action and the destructive social consequences of its decline loomed large in 
Conservative contributions to the debate, often couched in florid language. The 
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ConserxTati, \, v Leader in the Lords, the Earl of Selkirk, for example, feared that if 
society's "dynamic personalities" were unable to "find legitimate channels as an outlet 
for their creative and vigorous powers of initiative they will find criminal channels. " 19 
Selkirk's dramatic phrasing echoed Keynes's sardonic endorsement of the market as a 
safety vat\, ýe for certain "dangerous human proclivities". Capitalism allowed these urges 
to "be canalised into comparatively harmless channels by the existence of opportunities 
for money-making and private wealth, which, if they cannot be satisfied in this way, may 
find their outlet in cruelty, the reckless pursuit of personal power and authority, and other 
forms of self aggrandisement. " Keynes thought it preferable "that a man should 
,7 20 tyrannise over his bank balance than over his fellow citizens . Selkirk proposed 
orglanising a committee as a viable alternative outlet for these irrepressible urges . 
21 
Selkirk aligned himself with the libertarian approach to voluntarism by linking it 
with important democratic right - freedom of association. He argued that it was 
"fundamentally an element of our liberty that we should be able to associate freely for 
limited purposes. "22 Selkirk's deployment of the rhetorical device of synecdoche 
reduced the broad right to fi-eedom of association to the particular freedom to associate 
for the purpose of providing welfare services. Freedom of association is certainly an 
important democratic right; but Selkirk narrowed this basic democratic right in order to 
suggest that the government's assumption of responsibility for social welfare added up to 
an attack on it. The implication was that state welfare provision implicitly threatened 
19 House of Lords Debates, vol. 163,22 June 1949, col. 85 
20 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theojy of Employmept, Interest and Mon 
(London: Macmillan, 1936), 374 
21 Green uses much the same terminology when he argues that by excluding citizen 
involvement the welfare state has "suppressed those institutions which served as proving 
grounds for men and women of good character and which provided outlets for idealism, 
service and achievement. " Green, Reinventing, 4. Prochaska's admiration for the 
spontaneity of voluntary action also depends on the assumption of an effervescent human 
nature. 
22 House of Lords Debates, vol. 163,22 June 1949, col. 83 
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freedom of association ýa welfare state", he concluded echoing Beveridge, "can in fact 
be only, a tyranny. 
iý 23 
The Conservative attachment to voluntarism also contained a fiscal dimension. 
As we have seen, voluntarism had failed to fulfil the role envisaged for it in the 
Gladstonian economic system, but there were those on the Conservative benches who 
believed that it could still play a part in limiting the financial commitments of the state. 
Selkirk argued that increased state welfare provision had itself stimulated new demands 
that the public purse simply could not satisfý. Welfare was, he argued, "too big and 
complex a subject ever to be dealt with entirely by the State". There also remained "a 
big field where the government have responsibilities but are unable to fill their 
obligations. " He cited"the Chancellor of the Exchequer's indication that there must be 
economies in the National Health Services" to demonstrate that there was "a limit to the 
scope to which the state can go. " 24 He stressed the importance of voluntary 
organisations in supplementing state welfare provision, and in reducing the financial 
demands on the Treasury bridging the gap between the state's obligations and the 
shortage of resources available to meet them. It was no surprise that Selkirk stressed the 
financial benefits to the state of voluntary welfare provision. Of greater significance was 
that he explicitly accepted the supplementary character of the voluntary sector's 
contribution. The Conservative's acceptance of the junior role of voluntary social 
service was an essential step in the construction of a bi-partisan consensus. 
2' House of Lords Debates, vol. 163,22 June 1949, col. 89. Freedom, of course, had to 
be protected from itself. Selkirk's mention of the 'limited purposes' for which freedom 
of association is legitimate makes it clear that his was a rather circumscribed 
libertarianism. The Conservative Party is apt to rediscover liberty when it is out of 
office, but the attachment to freedom has to be reconciled with an underlying 
authoritarianism, which demands respect for existing institutions and social relations. A 
'middle way' thinker like Karl Mannheim expressed the dualism inherent in the 
Conservative approach to democracy when he argued that democracies had to limit 
"unbridled criticism of the form of freedom and democracy". See Karl Mannheim, 
Diagnosis of Our Time: Wartime Essqys of a sociologist (3rd Edition), (London: Kegan 
Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1945), 10 
24 House of Lords Debates, vol. 163,22 June 1949, col. 85-7 
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Selkirk articulated a libertarian position on voluntarism but charity organisation 
also appealed to theauthoritarian instincts of other Conservatives, further cementing the 
bi-pat-tisan convergence around Samuel and Beveridge's proposals. Delivering his 
maiden speech Lord Ellenborough, demonstrated how the rationalist approach to 
voluntarism could meet the libertarian on questions of finance. He picked up Selkirk's 
theme of the rising costs of the welfare state and the advantages of voluntary provision in 
reducing costs. Ellenborough also saw voluntary social service as a panacea for the ills 
of the nation in a speech reminiscent of the ideas on the character forming function of 
social service put forward by the Charity Organisation Society three-quarters of a 
century earlier. Ellenborough believed that voluntary work was character building while 
state welfare services had an opposite, demoralising effect on both the individual 
recipient and, ultimately, on society as a whole. He felt that the country was gripped by 
materialism, selfishness, and lack of courtesy, which he attributed to "numbing of the 
national mind of Britain [in] the aftermath of the war". The most unforgivable 
discourtesy was, no doubtý the election of a Labour Government. The demoralisation of 
the nation was a result of the fact that the expansion of state welfare services had "been 
brought about before we can really afford it. " He compared the costs of state welfare 
with the costs of state industries, finding "in particular in connection with the Health 
Service ... a certain extravagance 
in administration, and ... the same absence of accurate 
financial calculations in balancing the question of cost against benefits. " This was 
inevitable, according to Ellenborough, because state provision held up "a distorting 
mirror which ... says to everybody: 'Come along; 
it is all free. You can use it as much 
as you like and hang the consequences. "' 25 The implication of Ellenborough's remarks 
was that state provision, by enshrining an entitlement to benefit, unavoidably drove up 
the costs of welfare. Voluntary organisations, on the other hand, since they had to 
balance need against cost, made better use of their limited resources. 
In the aftermath of election defeat, the Conservatives were naturally eager to find 
issues on which they could castigate the new government. Asserting the decline of 
voluntarism was a stick to beat the new government, and lining up behind Samuel and 
Beveridge in the debate was no more than was to be expected, as far as Parliamentary 
tactics were concerned. After making due allowance for the flamboyance of their 
rhetoric, Ellenborough's and Selkirk's remarks nevertheless reveal an underlying affinity 
25 House of Lords Debates, vol. 163,22 June 1949, col. 108-9 
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with the notions of voluntary social service being put forward by the two Liberal peers. 
TI-tis rhetorical convergence extended beyond the opposition benches, however. On the 
Labour side of the House, Lord Nathan echoed the theme of the potential for tyranny in 
state welfare. Nathan heartily agreed that voluntary action "underpinned many of our 
democratic organisations. " Nathan rose to Samuel's bait, connecting the use of the bona 
yacantia with the exemplar of Sweden. He even generously inflated Samuel's figures for 
these funds, estimating that --very large surns of money amounting to between 
120,000,000 and 130,000,000 lie in the various accounts forming this great corpus of 
don-nant balances. " Echoing the themes invoked by Beveridge and Samuel, Nathan 
expressly identified their Gladstonian origins, quoting the 'great statesman' who had 
"said the best place for money was in the pockets of the people where it should be left to 
fructify. " Nathan argued that it would -never fructify as a dormant balance, but it might 
well fructify in the expansionand support of those social services which do not lend 
themsel-ves to support from public funds. " 26 
The government's response 
The unanimous support for voluntary social service expressed during the debate put 
pressure on the Government to do something. Lord Pak-enham replied to the debate on 
the Government's behalf, to set out its approach. The Government was determined to 
separate the issue of voluntary social service from the question of the friendly societies 
and Pak-enham concentrated on voluntary organisations. Towards the end of his speech, 
he made some dismissive comments on Beveridge's criticisms of Goverru-nent policy 
pointing out that the Goverm-nent had increased the amount of the societies' earnings that 
were exempt from income tax in 1948. Although he mentioned the possibility of a 
review of the position of the friendly societies, perhaps permitting them a wider field of 
operation, he warned that he could not hold out "the prospect that the Government are 
likely to add to the taxation concession which was made only last year. " 
27 
Pakenham's reception of the arguments put fonvard on behalf of the voluntary 
organisations was altogether warraer. He repudiated at the outset the notion of a welfare 
Z6 House of Lords Debates, vol. 163,22 June 1949, col. 89-90 
27 House of Lords Debates, vol. 163,22 June 1949, col. 129 
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state '-in which all welfare is to be provided by the state itself and reasserted the 
Government's view that "the voluntary spirit is the very lifeblood of democracy. " 
Indeed, he argued, "in the view of the Govenu-nent, democracy without voluntary 
exertion and voluntary idealism loses its soul. " Thus, he drew close to the libertarian 
position on voluntarism, even going so far as to assert that voluntarism and socialism had 
a special affinity. 28 He declared the Government ýs determination that "expansion of 
statutorv services must on no account be allowed to result in the drying up of voluntary 
effort" and committed it to "strengthening and encouraging the voluntary effort wherever 
possible. , 29 
Pakenham's rhetorical support for voluntarism was not matched by the 
announcement of any immediate practical measures to assist voluntary organisations. 
The Government rqjected Beveridge's proposal for a Royal Commission into charitable 
trusts on the grounds of the very urgency that Samuel, Beveridge -Ind other peers had 
stressed. A Royal Commission, Pakenham declared, "would take far too long to deal 
with what ... 
is a pressing problem". 30 He assured the House that the Government shared 
the concerns raised by Beveridge, Samuel and others regarding endowed trusts, and 
promised that it would "undertake to inquire forthwith into the steps appropriate and 
necessary to remedy the situation, that is admitted on all sides to contain elements of 
waste, anachronism and anomaly. " He also offered to look into the question of setting 
up of Common Good Funds, though he thought that the Local Government Act, 1933, 
already conferr ed the necessary powers on local authorities to establish local funds, and 
31 invited Samuel to furnish the government with detailed proposals. Pakenham's 
conciliatory speech shifted the focus of the debate away from Beveridge's proposal to 
divert the bona vacantia and defunct accounts into the Common Good Funds. Pak-enham 
28 House of Lords Debates, vol. 163,22 June 1949, col. 119 
29 House of Lords Debates, vol. 163,22 June 1949, col. 12-7 
30 cf. Harris, Beveridge, 460. Commenting on the reception of Volunt4U Action, she 
states "except for the setting-up of a Royal Commission on charitable trusts - its 
recommendations were largely ignored by government. " This is the opposite of what 
took place: the call for a Royal Conn-nission was rejected outright, but some of 
Beveridge's other proposals on charity were taken quite seriously by the Goveim-nent, 
though none were implemented exactly as he had envisaged. 
31 House of Lords Debates, vol. 163,22 June 1949, col. 130 
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matched his willingness to consider the principle of the Common Good Funds with 
agnosticism on the various methods suggested to finance them. Flis invitation to Samuel 
to participate in further discussions on the specific issue of the Common Good Funds 
helped to detach the Liberal leader from Beveridge, who some in Government circles 
regarded as an irritant. 3-1 
Samuel was in any case determined to make the most of his role in initiating the 
debate in the Lords, and that his suggestions on how to fmance a new central funding 
body for voluntary social service should gain a hearing outside political circles. Samuel 
acted quickly to widen the debate before this momentum was lost and public interest in 
the issue dissipated. Fortunately for Samuel, the press was receptive, as cuttings 
collected by the Cabinet Office staff showed. The Times devoted several columns on its 
inside front page to coverage of the debate. Beveridge and Samuel's speeches were 
reported at length, and their proposals treated sympathetically. The coverage indicated 
that the editor gauged that readers still entertained an active interest in the issues 
surrounding the establishment of the Welfare State. On the Sunday following the Lords' 
debate, readers of The News of the World were treated to a demonstration of Samuel's 
aptitude for sensationalist journalism, when he expatiated on the 120 million haul to be 
had from raiding the dormant balances under the headline "Here is the Key to a Treasure 
House of Forgotten Milhons". 33 
Sainuel also sought to influence opinion within the voluntary sector. 
Confounding Pimlott's prediction that the National Council would resent the 
establishment of a new national body for voluntary organisations, the NCSS co-operated 
closely with Samuel's campaign, providing him with a platfon-n to promote his views on 
the future of voluntary social service. The National Council convened a conference of 
voluntary organisations at Church House on 6 October 1949, three months after the 
debate, at which Samuel was the principal speaker. 34 Representatives of 180 national 
voluntary organisations attended and elected a delegation, headed by Haynes and 
Samuel, to lobby Morrison on the setting up of Common Good Funds. The delegation 
32 Hanis, Beveridge, 433; Nicholas Tinunins, The Five Giants: A Biogr4phy of the 
Welfare State, (London: Fontana, 1996), 17-18 
33 Cuttings file, CAB 124/136 
34 Haynes to Herbert Morrison, 27 October 1949, CAB 124/137; see also Brasnett, 
Volunt4g, 170 
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was further strengthened by the presence of the Treasurer of the National Association for 
Mental Health, Sir Otto Niemeyer, the former Treasury and Bank of En'gland official 
whose well known comrnitment to financial orthodoxy made the fmancial aspect of the 
proposals appear unimpeachable. 
Sainuel's sponsorship of the cause of voluntary social service put pressure on 
Morrison. -and his officials to formulate a political response beyond the holding operation 
carried out by Pakenham during the debate. Haynes was also anxious that the pressure 
on the Government should not lose its head of steam. In a briefing on the meeting to 
Morrison, informing him of its decision to appoint a deputation to the Deputy Prime 
N-finister, Haynes rehearsed his themes of cooperation between voluntary and state social 
services and, especialli y the need to support the administrative structure of voluntary 
organisations. While it was determined to squeeze whatever advantage it could from the 
support of Samuel, the NCSS clearly had its own agenda. The Common Good Funds 
were an interesting possibility, but the Council's officers preferred a more tangible and 
immediate source of funding. Emphasising the readiness of voluntary organisations to 
collaborate with the authorities in developing the social services, Haynes pleaded for the 
extension of existing schemes of government grants in aid to voluntary bodies. He 
underlined that secure funding for voluntary organisations was essential to meet "the 
need ... 
for the small but essential nuclei of paid staff'. 35 
The need to separate the issue of Common Good Funds from the precise method 
of fmancing them became increasingly urgent. The Lord President's staff noted 
Samuel's article in the News of the World and the voluntary organisations' conference. 
Pirnlott warned Morrison that "a good deal was ... said at the meeting about 
don-nant 
funds and no doubt this would loom large" in any meeting with the delegation. 
36 
Haynes's note to Morrison had mentioned that the delegates to the conference had 
expressed considerable interest in "the possibility of releasing for the support of 
voluntary action the various dormant funds referred to by Lord Samuel in the House of 
Lords debate. " 37 
35 t NCSS Briefing for a Deputation to Herbert Morrison: Voluntary Action for Social 
Progress', 25 November 1949, CAB 124/137 
36 Pimlott to Morrison 1 November 1949, CAB 124/137 
37 Briefing for Morrison, 25 November 1949, CAB 124/137 
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Lobbied by Samuel and Haynes, officials turned their attention to a more detailed 
consideration of the question of the dormant balances. Morrison himself was eager to 
reach some accommodation with Samuel and his voluntarist allies but his scope for 
making concessions was limited by the Treasury. Treasury officials were determined to 
exclude financial issues from any review of voluntary organisations. Financial Secretary 
to the Treasury, W. G. Hall, acknowledged to Morrison's concern "that Lord Samuel's 
suggestions should be looked at as sympathetically as possible" but remained adamant 
that in his -view, 66shared by the official Treasury ... the ten-ns, of reference of the inquiry 
into charitable trusts should not include the possibility of the use of dormant funds. " 38 
Morrison was not convinced by the Treasury's argument that Samuel's scheme 
would have inflationary, consequenceS. 39 He urged Hall to agree to refer "the question of 
dormant funds to an enquiry. -40 Hall was determined to avoid this and was obliged to go 
into the Treasuij7's ot1jections in some detail. This he did in a lengthy correspondence 
with Morrison in the weeks following the debate. Hall thought that the plan was 
misconceived from the start. He held "that the question whether the State should take 
over any class of dormant funds is really quite separate from the question whether it 
should increase its assistance to voluntary agencies. " These funds were, in any case, 
nowhere near the L20 million mentioned by Samuel. A Treasury survey in 1919 had 
produced an estimate of 12.8 million. 41 
The smallness of the funds tended to undermine the anti-inflationary case 
previously put up by the Treasury, but Hall had stronger arguments. He pointed out that 
the dormant balances were not "shut up in some mysterious box which only needs to be 
raided for the benefit of the voluntary societies. " The Rmds identified by Samuel and his 
supporters was "either invested in Government securities or... in cash held by the 
National Debt Commissioners and lent to the Exchequer on ways and means. " The 
cupboard was bare: these balances were not don-nant at all but already employed in the 
administration of government finances. It was not a technical question of devising a 
means to release unused money, but rather that if this money "were to be paid away to 
38 W Glenvill Hall to Morrison, 29/7/49, CAB 124/201 
39 Pimlott to Morrison, 26 September 1949, CAB124/201 
40 Morrison to Hall, 4 August 1949, CAB 124/201 
41 Hall to Morrison, 30 August 1949, CAB 124/201 
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voluntary agencies, fit] would have to be raised. " Hall spelled out in lurid detail what 
this would entail: 
... where the money is invested in Government securities, those securities 
would have to be sold and the money would come out of the liquid balances 
held by the people who bought the securities. Money lent to the Exchequer 
would have to be replaced by fresh borrowing. If the Clearing Banks had to pay 
over their dormant balances they would have to realise one or other of their 
assets and the money would therefore be raised either on the Stock Exchange by 
sale of investments or, in the money market, or conceivably by calling in a loan 
to the Exchequer which would then have to be replaced by fresh Government 
borrowing. 42 
Hall painted a picture of the hannfal effect of these transactions on both inflation and 
government finances. Ironically, Hall was defending the reality of the Gladstonian 
system against its ideals: the funds must be allowed to continue to "fructify in the deposit 
vaults of the National Debt Commissioners. , 43 
Morrison produced a paper setting out the Govermnent's position on 26 June 
1949, just four days after the debate, and the matter was discussed in the Lord 
President's Committee a few weeks later, on 15 jul Y. 44 One inexpensive way of heading 
off criticism was, as Pimlott observed, to set up an enquil _Y. 45 By the end of the year, 
preparations for a Committee of Enquiry were well advanced. Lord Nathan had readily 
accepted the invitation to chair the proposed departmental committee, and invitations had 
been sent to prospective members. As a resultwhen Morrison met Samuel's deputation 
on 25 November 1949 he was in a position to say "much more ... than 
is non-nally the 
46 
case when ministers receive deputations". He announced to the deputation the 
establishment of the committee and its proposed chair, as well as its provisional terms of 
reference. 47) 
42 Hall to Morrison, 30 August 1949, CAB 124/201 
43 1\/fatthew, Gladstone, 117 
44 Referred to in MRB to A. MacDonald, 28 November 1949, CAB 124/137 
45 Pimlott to Morrison 30 December 1948, CAB 124/136 
46 Pimlott to Morrison, 1 November 1949, CAB124/137 
47 Voluntary Action for Social Progress: NCSS Delegation, Office of Lord President', 
I December 1949, CAB124/137 
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Haynes's r)bte had given the Government an indication of the strength of feeling 
within the voluntat- ae ni hat y sector that Samuel's intervention had, rous d. Mo son hoped t 
the committee would head off pressure on the question of dormant balances, but as he 
prepared to meet the delegation, he warned Attlee to expect "a good deal of pressure 
from the voluntary orgi-canisations. . ý, 48 He and his officials were determined to exclude the 
question of dormant balances from the committee's terms of reference as it "raised 
questions of general fmancial and economy policy". 49 By empowering the Conunittee to 
consider the fmances of the voluntary sector, including the Connnon Good Funds, 
though in very general terms, Morrison hoped to appease at least the NCSS members of 
the deputation. In drafting a press release to follow his meeting of the deputation both he 
and Pimlott were anxious that the NCSS should be allowed to take "take the credit which 
would come to them from the fact the appointment of the Committee was associated with 
their deputation. "50 To further appease the voluntarists Morrison urged Attlee to appoint 
the committee himself, in the hope that this "would be regarded by the voluntary 
organisations as evidence that the Government really means business, and you are 
personally interested. ý51 
Samuel, who had been kept informed of the Treasury's concerns, made one last 
effort to win government support by scaling down his proposal. When his deputation 
met Morrison and Hall, he and Niemeyer insisted that all they intended was that the 
income fi-om. dormant balances should be earmarked for voluntary organisations, leaving 
the capital untouched. 52 Although this retreat came as a surprise to Morrison and Hall, it 
was too late for the Government to concede more than an internal enquiry on the 
question of dormant balances. Hall objected to even this. He could see no value in "an 
inquiry which could lead to no practical result unless there were a considerable change in 
policy". 53 In the event, official foot dragging, the intervention of the 1950 election and 
then the Conservative victory in 1951 ensured that the internal inquiry petered out. 
48 Morrison to Attlee, 2 November 1949, CAB 124/137 
49 Pimlott to Morrison, 23 November 1949, CAB 124/13 7 
50 Morrison to Atlee, 21 November 1949, CAB 124/137 
51 Morrison to Attlee 2 November 1949, CAB 124/137 
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Official objections to Samuel's plan for an endowment for the voluntary sector 
could have been mobilised with equal validity against any scheme to stimulate voluntary 
orga ,L nisations. 
Releasing funds already held within the sector, if they were indeed 
unused, would have the same inflationary consequences as the appropriation of funds 
apparently free but employed in the management of the national debt. Their unlocking 
also raised many of the same issues, as did the dormant balances; indeed the funds of 
redundant trusts were themselves a component of the dormant balances. This was not 
really the point, however. By appointing a committee to investigate charitable trusts, the 
Governi-nent gained credit with voluntary organisations. This forestalled the possibility 
that voluntary organisations as a whole would adopt an anti-govemment stance, and that 
their case would become linked with that of the insurance companies, as Beveridge had 
intended. Friendly societies were specifically excluded from the Committee's remit in 
order to prevent any chance of "a re-opening of the controversy about the relative 
suitability of the state and friendly societies as instruments for the administration of 
national insurance. " Morrison was determined that any such discussion should be 
"conducted within the Government machine. " 54 
The terms of reference of the Charitable Trusts Comr-nittee succeeded in severing 
the connection between voluntarism and mutualism. This partly explains Beveridge's 
sourness towards the Committee. He rapidly lost interest in the issue and when the 
Committee later invited him to give evidence, he referred it to Volunt4u ActiQLi, 
pleading that pressure of work prevented him drafting a new submission or attending in 
person. 55 The Government had less success in its second important objective. 
Morrison's intention was to divert the debate away from sensitive financial matters, 
which intruded on wider areas of Government policy. Given the importance attached to 
the financial condition of voluntary organisations in the debate, it was hard to see how 
the Committee could have avoided the issue entirely. Nevertheless, the Committee's 
terms of reference confined it to looking at resources within the voluntary sector itself 
rather than allowing it to range more widely over questions of finance. 
It was clear both from the negotiations that preceded the establishment of the 
Committee and from its terms of reference that the government shared Beveridge's and 
Samuel's concern about the inefficiency of charitable trusts. Making charitable trusts the 
54 Morrison to Attlee, 2 November 1949, CAB 124/137 
55 Beveridge to Lidderdale, 13 October 1950, CAB 124/147 
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focus of the Conn-nittee's work also ensured that it was directed away from controversial 
areas of Governi-nent policy such as charitable covenants and surtax or the role of the 
ffiendly societies. The Committee's remit confined it to examining the law on charitable 
trusts, rather than the voluntan y sector as whole, and this orientation was underscored in 
the course of Nathan's discussions with Ministers about the Cominittee's terms of 
56 
reference. Nathan requested that these be broadened to take in voluntary organisations. 
MorTison, who thought that the law on trusts would give the Committee quite "enough to 
tackle" and regarded this as an abstract legalism, resisted this. Passing over the detailed 
attention already given by his department to Samuel's other proposals, he argued that it 
was -around the charitable trusts that "most of the discussion leading up to its 
appointment has turned". 57 
Nathan also suggested to Attlee that the Committee's brief be extended to allow 
consideration of the law and practice relating to charitable trUStS. 
58 Morrison was 
suspicious that Nathan's suggestion was intended to prolong the Committee's work and 
"lead [it] ... 
into a detailed investigation of the administration of charitable trusts". 59 
Lord Chancellor Jowitt adopted a more relaxed approach, overriding Morrison's 
oklections on this point. This enlargement of the Committee's remit had the effect of 
pointing it even more clearly in the direction of reform of qy-pr6s doctrine. Jowitt 
argued that legal practice, at least, should be included within the Committee's brief, 
pointing out that it was widely held "that the difficulty in getting approval for an 
alteration of a scheme results not so much in the inadequacy of the law as from the 
inordinate delay which is experienced and the number of forms, etc., that have to be 
filled Up.,, 60 
Beveridge's revival of a traditional Liberal critique of the endowed charitable 
trusts had bom fruit in the Committee's ten-ns of reference. In directing the Committee 
towards an examination of the endowed trusts, the Government ensured that his 
articulation of the collective claim on this form of private property was carried over into 
the work of the Conu-nittee. Its terms of reference instructed the Committee to consider 
56 Attlee to Morrison, 18 November 1949, CAB 124ý/137 
57 Morrison to Attlee, 23 November 1949, CAB 124/137 
58 Attlee to Morrison, 18 November 1949, CAB 124/137 
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60 Jowitt to Morrison, 1 December 1949, CAB 124/137 
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reform of a,, -pres doctrine within the specific context of efficiency. The Comn-tittee was 
called on to reconunend changes to the law on charitable trusts "to enable the maximum 
benefit to the community to be derived from them. " 61 Although the Committee 
addressed other changes in the law, they regarded the relaxation of the rules on 
remodelling charitable trusts as the key to the modemisation the voluntary sector. 
Morin of gy-pres doctrine was, according to Nathan and Lidderdale in their later 
Comment, ary on the Act "the outstanding problem calling for reform". 62 
Although the National Council had its own separate objectives, the main 
institutions of the voluntary sector and their supporters as well as the political 
establishment were in broad agreement on the way forward. Because of the way 
Beveridge had first raised the issue and because of the way in which Samuel had taken 
this up, a broad political consensus had emerged. This consensus rested on two main 
pillars. First, all the main political parties expressed rhetorical support for voluntary 
social service and it was generally agreed that the main the main challenge facing the 
voluntary sector was financial. Second, that voluntary organisations were morally 
superior to charitable trusts. What had commenced, therefore as a discussion on the 
future of voluntary organisations in the context of the expansion of the state had 
transformed itself into a discussion of the moral superiority of voluntary organisations 
compared to charitable trusts. This process was taken even further by the Charitable 
Trusts Committee. 
61 CTCý 1 
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Chapter 6: The Charitable Trusts Committee 
The preceding chapters have explained how, in the course of the debate in the 1940s, the 
emphasis shifted from the conventional opposition of voluntary organisations to the state 
towards a renewed interest in the opposition between voluntary organisations and 
charitable trusts. The ascendancy of the opposition of voluntary organisation to 
charitable trust attained its fullest expression in the Report of the Charitable Trusts 
Comn-tittee. The Committee, influenced by the strongly held views of its Chairman, 
Lord Nathan, proposed a highly interventionist approach, calling for the winding up of 
defunct trusts and the redistribution of their resources to worthier causes. Nathan and the 
majority of the Committee presented this as primarily an administrative exercise, but the 
echoes of the traditional Liberal hostility to endowed trusts that underpinned their 
proposals are inescapable. 
This chapter examines the first sequel to the debate on voluntary social service: 
the Report of the Charitable Trusts Committee. The Report fused the issues of funding 
for voluntary organisations and reform of the gy-pres doctrine into what amounted to a 
programme to modernise the voluntary sector. Beveridge had aired the need to reform 
the mechanism for changing the purposes of an endowmentý but he had connected this 
with the need for stable and independent source of funding for voluntary organisations 
only in the most general terms. He did not link it directly to his proposals for Common 
Good Funds. During the debate in the Lords, both Samuel and Beveridge had put 
forward reform of gy-pres as part of a package of measures to release idle or underused 
resources to refurbish the voluntary sector. The Government's rejection of the 
possibility of using the proceed0defanct bank accounts or the bona vacantia focussed 
attention more clearly on reform of gy-pres. The supporters of voluntary social service 
were forced to concentrate on identifying resources within the voluntary sector that were 
not being used to full effect. The result was, in effect, a programme for the voluntary 
sector that united Liberal dislike of endowed charitable trusts with a mechanism to meet 
the financial needs of the supposedly dynamic voluntary sector. 
The NCSS had a direct influence on the Committee deliberations and its report. 
The Committee's programme for the voluntary sector endorsed the new voluntarism. that 
the NCSS had espoused since its inauguration. In the event, the Committee's 
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programme for the voluntary sector was not enacted in the form that it envisaged and 
chapter seven compares the provisions of the Charities Act, 1960, with the Committee's 
recommendations. The significance of the Report of the Charitable Trusts Committee 
does not lie in the contribution it made to the Charities Act but in its development of the 
moral distinction between the inert form of the charitable trust and the activist voluntary 
society. This distinction, which had animated discussions of charity reform since the 
early nineteenth century, became the starting point for a programme to regenerate 
voluntary organisations. The committee's emphasis on this formal and tecl-mical 
distinction drew attention away from an equally deep-seated opposition bet-vVeen 
emotionalism and rationalism within the voluntary sector. 
The constitution of the Committee 
Attlee fmalised the appointments to the Committee of Enquiry towards the end of 1949, 
a few months after the Lords' debate. Nathan was a natural choice to chair the 
Committee, though Pak-enham favoured the Earl of Derby. ' A practising solicitor and a 
former Liberal MP, Nathan was also an active voluntaristý working with the Brady Street 
Boys Club in'%Ihitechapel in the 1920s. In 1948, he became Chairman of the 
Westminster Hospital where he had served on the board of governors since 1935. 
During the 1920s, he helped found the Liberal Candidates Association, and worked with 
Lloyd George on Liberal policy statements such as the 'Yellow Book' on industrial 
problems and We Can Conquer UneMployme . As Liberal 
M. P. for Bethnal Green 
from 1929-35, Harry Nathan had at first supported Samuel, breaking with him in 
February 1932 over the Samuelite Liberals' support for the National Government's 
policy of Imperial preference. He took the Labour whip some 18 months later. Losing 
his Bethnal Green seat by just over 500 votes in the 193 5 general election, Nath-an 
returned to the Commons after a close-run by-election of Central Wandsworth in 
February 1937. Labour organisation in this traditionally Liberal constituency was 
rudimentary, and his victory was assisted by the public endorsement of both Megan and 
1 Pimlott to Morrison, I November 1949, CAB 124/137 
-127- 
Daxiid Lloyd George. 2 As noted above, Nathan had spoken in support of voluntary 
social service in the Lords debate on voluntary action. Like Samuel and Beveridge 
Nathan was part of the Lib-Lab elite and he remained on good terms with leading 
Liberals. Attlee had used him as a go-between when he wanted to offer Beveridge a 
.3 His Liberal origins ,i peerage 
in 1941 and his broadly Liberal political outlook made him 
a suitable Chairman for the Committee in the eyes of Samuel and Beveridge, and his 
active involvement in voluntary work enhanced his appeal to the leaders of the voluntary 
sector. 
The other Appointments to the Committee reflected the Government's eagerness 
to involve the voluntary organisations in the process. They included two close 
colleagues of Haynes: Benjamin Astbury, Secretary of the Charity Organisation Society 
since 1938, and Donald Allen, Clerk to the City Parochial Foundation since 1930. 
Astbury was also a member of the NCSS's Executive Committee and had served as vice- 
chair of its Finance and General Purposes Committee during the war. 4 Astbury was 
professionally ambitious and widely regarded within the voluntary sector as something 
of an ýempire builder'. 5 Nevertheless, he enjoyed a close relationship with Haynes and 
was sympathetic to the National Council's approach. Allen too had served as a member 
of the NCSS Executive. A prominent Lancashire voluntarist, Mrs M. M. C. Kemball 
chaired the National Board of Catholic Women, which Morrison noted, was "said to be 
the most important body of its kind. " She was also a Conservative member of Eccles 
Borough Council and chair of the Old Peoples Welfare Conn-ftittee in the County of 
Lancashire .6 As such, she played a 
leading part in the NCSS's local organisation. 
The remaining members of the Committee hailed from backgrounds in local and 
national government, business, and the legal profession. They included Mrs K. W. Jones- 
Roberts was a Welsh Labour Councillor; S. K. Ruck, a welfare officer of the London 
2 H. Montgomery Hyde, Strong for Service: the Life of Lord Nathan of Churt, 
(London: W. H. Allen, 1968), 110-14,126-8,166, '226 
3 Harris, Beveridge, 362-3 
4 NCSS Executive Committee, 26 October 1939, LMA/4016/1S/01/031(l); CTC, ii 
A -Y 
5 Madeleine Rooff., One Hundred Years of Family Welfare: A Stud, of the Famil 
Welfare Association (fo erly Charity, Organisation Socie1y) 1869-1969, (London: 
Michael Joseph, 1972), 172 
6 Memo to Morrison, 21 October 1949, CAB 124/137 
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County Counci w th. -an expertise in the welfare of the elderly, and Sir John Maude, an 
official at the Ministry of Health. Eileen Younghusband, a leading social worker and 
head of the department of social science at the London School of Economics was 
included as "an up and coming youngish woman with good experience of social work 
and child welfare question. " The representatives of business on the Committee included, 
at different times, L. J. Cadbur. \yr, scion of the Birmingham business and philanthropic 
family, J. E. Cori* E. Whitley-Jones, J. Newsome, and Sir Sidney Harris. The lawyer 
Henry Salt QC, who challenged the consensual atmosphere of the Committee and 
produced a dissenting minority report on the reforrn of the py-pr6s doctrine, rounded off 
the membership of the Committee. A/fiss Jane Lidderdale, who had worked on the 
preparations for the Festival of Britain, provided secretarial support and drafted the final 
report. 7 
Opening the first meeting of the Committee at the end of January 1950, Nathan 
stressed the urgency of the Cornmittee's work and expressed his optimism that it would 
report by the end of the year. 8 In the event, the comnfittee passed its report to the Prime 
Minister in May 1952, and the Report was not finally published until the end of the year. 
The Cotnmittee's progress was thus much slower than Nathan had envisaged. It suffered 
from a number of desertions at an early stage of its work. Sir William Brockington, a 
former Director of Education in the Midlands and Sir John Maude replaced Harris and 
Newsome both of whom resigned within a few months of the Conn-nittee starting its 
work. Apart from the lack of continuity that these changes in personnel occasioned, the 
Committee faced other problems in carrying out its work. Although the Conservative 
leadership in the Lords had endorsed Samuel and Beveridge's call for an enquiry, the 
Party as a whole was less than wholehearted in its support for the Comi-nittee. Following 
the Conservatives' victory in the 1951 General Election, Churchill agreed to the 
Committee continuing with its work, though evidently without enthusiasm. Samuel later 
complained that the Committee had not been given sufficient resources to carry out its 
work, and had been "somewhat disorganised, owing to part of their staff being taken 
away". 9 Nor was the new Government satisfied with the product. After some foot- 
7 Memo to Morrison, 21 October 1949, CAB 124/137; Owen, Pbilanthrop , 577 
'CT(50) Ist Meeting, 2 February 1950, Minutes of Nfeeting 27, January 1950', 
CAB124/138 
9 House of Lords Debates, vol. 183,22 July 1953, col. 755 
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dragging, the Go-verm-nent finally published the Committee's Report at the end of 1952.10 
The Government's response to the Report followed in a 'White Paper two and a half years 
later in 1955 and gave only lukewarm support to the Committee's proposals. " Edward 
Pla)-fair, the Treasury official who chaired the committee of civil servants charged with 
preparing the Govenu-nent's response to the Committee's proposals, blamed the delay on 
the poor quality of the Report itself. "In spite of all that has been publicly said to the 
contrary", he lamented when forwarding his report to the Lord President's office, "the 
Nathan Report is a wretched piece of work. " 12 
Insufficient resources contributed to the Committee's slow progress and the 
quality of the Report, but a more important factor was the personality of its Chairman. 
The ebullient Nathzui seriously underestimated the difficulties involved. Like Beveridge, 
he had clear views on the nature of the Report he wanted to produce and overrode 
oklections from other committee members. Playfair was scathing in his criticism of 
Nathan whom he accused of bullying witnesses and Committee members into agreeing 
ServiC 13 with his own preconceived views on voluntary social 'e. 
The NCSS's proposals 
Naturally, the Council was keen to influence the Coim-nittee's work and, given the 
composition of the Committee, Haynes could expect that it would be receptive to the 
Council's views on the future development of policy towards the voluntary sector. 
Nathan's overbearing and partisan chairmanship benefited the NCSS. His desire to 
report made him susceptible to the Council's influence. Nathan readily agreed with 
Lidderdale's suggestion that they should solicit the help of the NCSS to filter the views 
of voluntary organisations and expedite the Committee's deliberations. Nathan and 
Lidderdale feared that this was the only way to avoid the Committee "being inundated 
10 House of Lords Debates, vol. 179,16 December 1952, col. 998; Owen, 
Philanthrop 
, 290-1 
11 Government Policy on Charitable Trusts in England and Wales, cmd. 9538, 
(London: HMSO, 1955); Owen, PhilantluQpy, 591; Nathan et al., Charities Act 13-15 
12 E. W. Playfair to Couzens, 21 December 1953, CAB 124/200 
13 Playfair to Couzens, 21 December 1953, CAB124/200 
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with written evidence from innumerable charities who ha-\,, e really little more to say than 
that they are short of money. " 14 Soon after the Committee began its work-, an 
opportunity arose to make clear to the voluntary organisations that it regarded the NCSS 
as representative of the voluntary organisation as a whole. The NCSS had convened a 
second national conference of voluntary organisations on 14thMarch 1950 to discuss the 
setting up of the Committee. Nathan sent a message of support to the conference 
stressing the important role that the Council had played in the establishment of the 
Committee and urging the conference to mandate the Council to act on behalf of all 
voluntary organisa-tions. " 
In spite of its disappointment with Beveridge's report, therefore, Haynes and the 
National Council had good reason to be satisfied with developments following its 
publication. The debate in the House of Lords and Sarnuel's high profile support for 
reform had provided the Council with a platform for asserting its leadership of the 
voluntary sector. Morison's reception of the delegation led by the NCSS was a signal of 
the Labour Government's willingness to continue the partnership between state and 
voluntary organisations that had been the core of the Council's strategy since its 
foundation. Now, the Charitable Trusts Committee presented the Council with a further 
opportunity to increase its influence on government. Haynes, assisted by his deputy 
Richard Clements, grasped the opportunity to influence national policy and to advance 
the interests of the Council. They were well rewarded: the Committee's report contained 
a blueprint for overhauling the financing of voluntary social service that fitted closely 
with the Council's own objectives. So pleased was the Council with the results that 
Haynes and the Council took an active role in promoting the Report following its 
publication. 
14 Lidderdale to Nathan, 24 January 1950, CAB124/171. In fact, Nathan did not 
entirely get his own way on this. Numerous voluntary organisations submitted evidence 
without waiting to be asked. Protocol ensured that institutions such as the major 
Christian churches were invited to give evidence as was the Jewish Board of Guardians. 
The universities as well as the leading public schools, all of which derived substantial 
income from endowments, also submitted written evidence. CTC, 178-3 
15 4 Message from Lord Nathan to the N. C. S. S. for the Conference of National 
Voluntary Organisations to be held on 14 th March, 1950', CAB124/171 
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Following its consultations with representatives of other voluntary organisations 
the Council submitted written evidence to the Committee in a report penned by Haynes. 
This was a general survey of the character and work of the NCSS. It included a formal 
summary of the points made by the voluntary organisations at the 1949 conference but, 
in setting out the position of the voluntary organisations at the conference, Haynes also 
advanced the views of the NCSS. Haynes's submission covered five main areas: the 
definition of charit3.,, the registration of charities, the role of the Charity Commission, the 
variation of trusts, and the establishment of Common Good Funds. 16 He confined his 
comments on the Charity Commission to the observation that its jurisdiction was too 
vaguely defined and should be clarified. He worked remaining four elements into a 
broad strategy for reform of the law and the re-shaping of the voluntary sector. 
Hay nes began by explaining how charity law, especially the legal definition of 
charity, impinged on all voluntary organisations, though only endowed trusts fell 
properly within its jurisdiction. Financial considerations encouraged voluntary 
organisations to conform to the definition of charity handed down by the courts. In order 
to appeal to donors and to obtain the fiscal benefits charitable status voluntary 
organisations were obliged to "frame their constitutions on charitable lines in 
anticipation either of gifts, legacies or grants or of relief from taxation or other public 
burdens. " As a result, although the Committee's remit was to consider the law regarding 
endowed charitable trusts, any changes it proposed to the definition of charity would 
"also directly affect many thousands of educational and social set-vice agencies which 
hold no endowments and very little property of any kind. "' This was a none too subtle 
invitation to the Committee to widen its brief and consider the wider voluntary sector 
rather than confining itself solely to the consideration of charitable trusts. 
The central problem, according to Haynes was that the complexity of the legal 
definition of charity made it more often a barrier than a gateway to the financial benefits 
charitable status. The problem with the existing definition was that it was often 
difficult 
to determine whether an organisation qualified for charitable status and its attendant 
financial benefits, without resorting to the courts. The obscurity of the definition was 
16 Haynes, 'Conunittee on the Law of Chafitable Trusts Paper Submitted by the 
National Council of Social Service Incorporated', 10 Februaly 1950, CAB 124/171 
(hereafter Haynes to CTC) 
17 Haynes to CTC, 1 
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compounded by the complicated and expensive legal processes an organisation had to 
undergo in order to discover whether it eqjoyed charitable status. The problem was all 
the worse because an objection to an organisation's charitable status was usually "raised 
by the Inland Revenue Department which has a long purse where litigation is 
concerned. " 18 Haynes, therefore, called for the repeal of the existing statutory basis of 
the legal definition of charity: these were the Preamble to the Elizabethan Charitable 
Uses Act and the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act of 1888. Haynes argued that the 
definition based on these statutes was out of date and their repeal would allow the 
Committee "to define a charitable purpose in modern terrns. " 19 
As these comments make clear, Haynes was explicitly inviting the Committee to 
stray beyond its remit. As his submission suggested, reform of the legal defulition of 
charity trespassed into the area of taxation, a subject the government had expressly 
forbidden the Colm-nittee from considering. 2() Haynes's comments also indicated the 
extent of the NCSS's willingness to accommodate voluntarism to the needs of the state. 
It is notable that Haynes offered no suggestions as to the shape of the new definition. 
Clearly that could be left in the capable hands of the Committee. In return for a clear 
path to the financial advantages of charitable status, the Council was willing to accept in 
the state's right to determine the types of work in which voluntary organisations might 
engage and this included, as Haynes made clear, the right to rule out "certain undesirable 
oklects". 2' Haynes advocated, in effect, a voluntary sector,,, vhose areas of operation 
were set down by the state. Superficially, this merely acknowledged the position as it 
was since voluntary organisations had always operated in the penumbra of the state and 
depended on its goodwill. What was significant was the extent of Haynes's 
acquiescence. In the past, the rhetoric of independence, or at least of mutual 
interdependence had generally reigned in discussing relations between the voluntary 
sector and the state. In calling for a more proactive role for the state in deten-nining the 
character of the voluntary sector, Haynes gave the NCSS's consent to the voluntary 
sector's position as the 'junior partner in the welfare firm ,. 
2Z 
18 Haynes to CTC, 2 
19 Haynes to CTC, 3 
20 CTCý 1 
')l Haynes to CTC, 3 
22 The phrase is Owen's 
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As a quid pro quo aynes sought financial security for those voluntary 
orgzinisations that conformed to the modernised defmition. Haynes was not simply 
concerned to simplify the path to benefits of charitable status. The proposal to clarify the 
definition of charity was part of a wider scheme to redistribute the existing resources of 
the charitable sector to those organisations whose objectives satisfied the criteria to be 
laid out in the new defmition. Modernising the definition of charity was simply the first 
step towards re-modelling the entire voluntary sector: it was intended to "facilitate some 
of the reforms" that he proceeded to place before the Committee. 23 
The first of these further reforms was a call for the registration of charities. 
Haynes noted that certain charities were already obliged to register with local authorities, 
but the absence of a general obligation to register meant that many charities escaped 
effective supervision and trustees were "often ignorant of, or indifferent to their legal 
obligations. " He referred to the difficulty of getting information on the activities or even 
the existence of certain charities and stressed the interdependence of the components of 
his reform package. The remodelling of the definition was necessary to ensure that 
registration was effective. He warned that refon-n would "require some system of 
registration and that registration will be much easier if there is a clearer definition of 
charitable purpose. " 24 
Haynes sought to reassure the Committee that the introduction of a register would 
simply institutionalise an informal system of registration, which had taken root in the 
voluntary sector because of the tax advantages available to charities. This informal 
system embraced even relatively small organisations. Smaller organisation, though they 
were "never likely to be chargeable to tax ... apply 
for exemption". Being able to quote 
the exemption of the Wand Revenue demonstrated the bona fides of an organisation to 
potential donors and subscribers. In order to make certain that they were not acting ultra 
vires, many grant-awarding trusts (including the NCSS), made "it a condition of grant 
that the [Wand Revenue] Department's letter granting exemption should be produced as 
evidence of charitable status. , 2' The pursuit of charitable status had proliferated in an 
uncontrolled way and produced a haphazard unofficial registration of charities by the tax 
authorities. 
23 Haynes to CTC, 3 
24 Haynes to CTC, 3 
25 Haynes to CTC, 3 
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There was, Rcýynes felt, a case for government intervention to regularise and 
systematise this informal system of registration, but his proposals went further than 
simpty fon-nalising the existing situation. Haynes's register had a function that went 
beyond simply corroborating charitable status and it was closely related to what he 
regarded as the urgent need for greater flexibility in revising the objects of trusts. In 
discussing the reform of the cy-pres rules Haynes found himself in something of a 
quandary. He maintained that the power to vary trusts should remain a judicial function 
to safeguard against abuse by the central authorities, but he also wanted wider powers for 
the state to intervene to alter trusts that could "no longer be carried out or [were] contrary 
to public policy. " Haynes was aware that this might inhibit the experimental character of 
voluntary social service by restricting it to areas of work on which consensus existed and 
he warned "that 'public policy' should not be regarded as synonymous with current 
popular or official opinion". He suggested that his proposal for "a new definition of 
charitable purpose would ... serve to indicate more clearly what is at present considered 
desirable. " Haynes acknowledged that the enactment of a new definition of charity 
would result in the liquidation of many existing trusts, but was content "that the living 
community would be adequately honouring its obligation to the dead by giving effect to 
the general intention of charity" though notý of course, in the precise fon-n that they had 
envisaged. '16 This could be achieved by transferring the resources of the liquidated trusts 
to the Common Good Funds which would then redistribute them to active voluntary 
organisations. 
Preserving the general charitable intention perfort-ned an essential legitimising 
function in the existing legal procedures for the alteration of trusts and Haynes was 
anxious to extend it in the service of the Common Good Funds advocated by Beveridge 
and Samuel. Haynes allocated the two parts of the legal definition of charity to separate 
conceptual categories. The law distinguished between the general charitable intention of 
the donor and its specific form of expression. Haynes wanted to give precedence to the 
general charitable intention at the expense of its practical expression. Haynes was aware 
that putting forward the Conn-non Good Funds as a instrument for abstracting the general 
charitable intent from the specificity of its manifestation might excite opposition from 
some voluntarists. Both the rationalist and the emotionalist wings of the voluntary sector 
attached great importance to the concrete personal character of the relationship between 
26 Haynes to CTC, 4-5 
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donor and oklect embodied in voluntary social service. The disagreement that existed 
was the correct fon-ti that this relationship should take and the criteria to be applied in the 
selection of the object. Animated by a more highly wrought social theory, the 'charity 
organisers' were apt to feel that when the emotionalist let the side down they were 
entitled to call on the superior power of the state to bring order to the charity scene. 
Their obJJective was to encourage what was, in their lights, a more conscious variety of 
the social connectedness expressed in the emotionalist approach. Haynes, naturally, was 
anxious not to offend either wing: the national council depended on the support of both. 
He therefore sought to accommodate the sensitivities of those who attached more weight 
to the personal proclivities of the donor than he did. 
HkNmes's submission to the Committee had placed the registration of all charities 
and voluntary organisations at the top of an agenda to modernise the voluntary sector. 
He linked the register to the modernisation of the definition of charity, the reform of the 
c-y-prýs doctrine and the creation of Common Good Funds. The Committee's 
recommendations differed from the NCSS's proposals in two important respect - it 
failed to elaborate a new definition of charity and it departed from Haynes in its position 
on a register of charities. The Committee's approach on the latter question is indicative 
of its broader attitude to the voluntary sector. The Committee, or at least its chairman, 
took the distinction between the general charitable intent of the donor and its concrete 
manifestation that Haynes had asserted, and applied it to the formal distinction between ý- ")a '- 
endowed charitable trust and the active voluntary organisation. A distinction that 
Haynes had studiously avoided articulating. An important omission considering its 
prominence in the discussions leading up to Committee's appointment. 
The Committee's programme 
The ten-ns of reference agreed between Morrison and Attlee directed the Committee to 
review the law in order to ascertain how charitable trusts could be made to provide 
"maximum benefit to the community". 27 The Conn-nittee interpreted this brief as 
meaning to find ways to halt the "waste of energy and resources". Following Beveridge, 
the Committee believed waste to be endemic among endowed charitable trusts and to 
Z7 CTC, I 
L 
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impro-ve the effecti-veness of trusts by making clear to trustees their obligations for good 
stewardship. The Conu-nittee interpreted its task as being il technical one. It aimed to 
66 
shorten and simplify the law of charitable trusts" in order to make "it much easier ... for 
trustees to discover ... what obligations they have to observe ... what exact procedures 
have to be gone through and Wjl),,., ý28 
The Coim-nittee's determination to pursue technical refon-ns made it hesitate to 
attempt to draft a new legal definition of charity. It accepted that the existing position 
was unsatisfactory as the courts were obliged to determine charitable status by reference 
to the 300-year-old 'Preamble' to an Elizabethan statute. The Committee pointed out the 
risks inherent in any attempt to clarifNy the defmition of charity. Any such attempt would 
be liable to omissions and too specific a definition risked making the law less flexible in 
adapting to change. It concluded that -to defme the meaning of charity exhaustively ... 
would be both impracticable and wrong in principle". Whatever the imperfections in the 
existing position, it had at least proved capable of encompassing a wide range of new 
services and charitable oklects. The Committee suggested that some modernisation of 
the definition could be achieved by incorporating into statute Macnaghten's 
29 
classification of the four heads of chariq, . 
Rather than allow itself be deflected from what it saw at its main task by straying 
into a complex area, the Committee left the question of modernisMg the definition of 
charity aside. It preferred to concentrate on procedural matters. The Coim-nittee's 
programme for restructuring the voluntary sector came down to two interlocking 
reforms. It proposed to simplify and modernise the rules governing changes in the 
oklects of endowments and it coupled this to a register of charitable trusts. Like the 
NCSS, it saw these two reforms as a means of financing Common Good Funds. 
Although the Conn-nittee addressed other changes in the law, it regarded the relaxation of 
28 CTC) 168 
29 CTCI 34-6. The Committee was certainly wise to avoid being drawn into an attempt 
to define charity by cataloguing appropriate charitable objects. The NCSS-funded 
enquiry chaired by Lord Goodman in the 1970s attempted to draft a modem definition 
based on the Macnaghten heads. It produced an unwieldy document containing 26 
clauses with numerous sub-clauses. NCSS Committee of Enquiry into the Effect of 
Charity Law and Practice on Voluntary Organisations, Charity Law and Voluntary 
Organisations, (London: Bedford Square Press, 1976), 123-5 
I' '- 
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the rules on remodelling charitable trusts as key to the modernisation the voluntary 
sector. 
x 
y 
Refonn of gy-pres doctrine was, according to Nathan and Lidderdale in a later 
commentary on the 1960 Actý "the outstanding problem calling for reform". 30 Two main 
areas needed attention, according to the Nathan Committee. The conditions for the 
failure of trusts and the rules under which new objects were selected both required 
revision. The test of impracticability demanded by the law before changing the object 
of a trust was too stringent and permitted the existence of "a vast number of trusts ... 
which zwe by no means useless but are not serving the community as they might". 31 The 
Committee was not concerned with large well- administered trusts. It had in mind small 
local trusts with an annual income of a few pounds. As well as being more vulnerable to 
falling into disuse as trustees died and were not replaced, these smaller trusts often 
lacked the administrative resources to fulfil their obligations. The Committee also 
believed these small trusts constituted a large proportion of the total number of 
endowments: it estimated that between one-third and two-thirds of all trusts, or at least 
35,000 individual trusts, had an income of less than 125 a year. 32 
Amalgamation of these smaller trusts offered potential savings on the costs of 
administration but local rivalries between groups of trustees combined with the 
bureaucratic inertia of the Charity Commission often obstructed this solution. The 
Commissioners explained that they used informal approaches to trustees to promote 
amalgamations and greater administrative efficiency. The Committee noted that the 
Charity Commission agreed with this objective and already devoted a great deal of effort 
to "trying to bring a group of charities in one area under one body of trustees because if 
they are not under one body of trustees in practice you find they will not employ the 
same clerk. 03 This fell short of amalgamation and as the Commissioners had no formal 
powers to intervene in this way; its success in improving the administration of local 
trusts depended entirely on the goodwill of trustees. To neutralise the power of local 
trustees to obstruct amalgamation the Committee wanted to replace the strict 
requirements of the py-pres doctrine with what it regarded as a more commonsense 
30 CTCý 28; Nathan et al., Charities Act, 73 
31 CTC) 27 
32 CTCI 99 
33 4 CT(50) 4th Meeting O. E. 1 (fmal)', 19, CAB 124/13 8 
-138- 
approach. The Committee recoimnended that the rules should be "so relaxed as to admit 
of trust instruments being altered, even though the carrying out of their objects has not 
become impracticable. " 34 
Although the Committee cited the amalgamation of smaller trusts in the interests 
of administrative efficiency as a justification for modernising the procedures for the 
alteration of trusts, this was not its sole objective in recommending this reform. It 
proposed powers to reform of the otjects of many trusts that went going beyond merely 
encouraging cooperation between trustees. It believed intervention on this scale was 
necessary for the voluntary sector to realise its full potential. The Committee hesitated to 
endorse the picture of a "Charities' Chamber of Hoffors" which Beveridge had presented 
in his volume, and refused to "conjure up a lurid picture of hundreds of freakish or 
archaic trusts crying out for reform". Yet, it suggested there was scope for improved 
efficiency in the use of the resources of charitable trusts and that "hundreds, perhaps 
thousands, of trusts need revision to an extent that goes beyond anything that could be 
achieved under the present gy-Pres doctrine. " The case for change was, it declared, 
urgent. 35 
The Committee believed that the restrictions observed by the Court when laying 
down new objects for a trust, in particular the regard paid to the original donor's wishes, 
inhibited consideration of the wider public interest. This led to inefficient use of 
resources. Where, for example, the donor had expressed a charitable intention towards a 
particular locality, the Court of Chancery generally sought to retain this in its scheme- 
making. The Committee felt that this policy badly served the public interest and saw 
"great advantages to be obtained by the judicious merging of trusts. " 36 The observance 
of the donor's wishes in respect of the particular objects of their charity resulted in 
schemes that failed to make the best use of the resources of defunct charities. The 
Committee acknowledged the "special regard" that scheme-making had to pay "the spirit 
and intention of the founders",, particularly in respect of the "interest of the locality to 
which the endowment belongs. " 37 It wanted future scheme making to take into account 
"the public interest", "existing conditions" and, most notably, "the possibility of 
34 CTC) 174 
35 CTCý 27 
36 CTCý 177 
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effecting economý in administration by grouping, amalgamating or combining two or 
more endowments. " 
'8 
The Committee, therefore, recommended a relaxation of the conditions that had 
to be satisfied for an application to vary the oklects of a trust. It also recommended that 
the scheme-making body be released from its primary obligation to consider the 
founder's intention and empowered to consider the wider social context. 39 These points 
were not especially contentious and the Committee was able to cite as a precedent of the 
Endowed Schools Act, 1869. This had relaxed the cy-pres rules for educational 
charities. It was widely accepted to have worked well in practice . 
40 The machinery the 
Committee proposed to oversee the new procedures proved more problematic. This 
machinery made the relaxation of the gy-pres doctrine seem less like a minor 
administrative reform and more like a programme for radical intervention in the 
voluntary sector. 
The radical element of the Conn-nittee's programme was its proposal to extend to 
two other institutions the power of trustees to invoke the new scheme-making power. 
These were the Charity Commission and certain local authorities. Previously, to vary a 
trust its trustees had to act. The Committee wanted to preserve and extend the right of 
trustees in this area. It suggested that if trustees requested a scheme to vary a trust and 
this was rejected by the scheme-making authorities, they should have the light to a public 
enquiry to investigate their proposal . 
41 It also recommended that the government 
augmented the role of the Charity Commissioners by empowering them to initiate 
schemes. This was in addition to their existing power to make schemes subject to the 
supervision of the CourtS. 42 This proposal flowed logically from its analysis that there 
existed a number decayed trusts. It also flowed from the wider liberal prejudice against 
38 CTCý 78 
39 CTCI 92 
40 A more recent precedent was the Education (Scotland) Act, 1946, which had 
refort-ned Scottish law along broadly the same lines as the Endowed Schools Act. The 
Committee also drew an analogy with the Cjjy of London Parochial Charities Act 1883, 
which had pooled the resources of a multitude of small London trusts under a new board 
of trustees. CTC, 71-5 
41 CTC, 81-2 
42 CTC7 82-4 
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endowed trusts that informed the Committee's approach. This assumed that by their 
very nature endowed trusts had an inherent tendency to fall into decay. Although the 
new procedures created the pre-conditions for trustees to take a more active line, the 
inertia it held to be intrinsic to the form meant that matters could not be left trustees if 
reform, was to proceed -, it the pace required by the Committee. 
The Committee saw the Charitv Commissioners as the obvious instrument for 
supervising the reform of under performing endowments. The Committee also argued 
that in the exercise of its wider scheme-making power the Charity Commission should 
act in an administrative rather than a quasi-judicial capacity. The Chancery Division of 
the Ili& Court should retain its scheme-making powers but the Commissioners could 
deal with the mtýlority of cases since, the Comt-nittee believed, most raised no issue of 
legal principle . 
43 The Commissioners should develop scheme-making policies and 
procedures derived from existing precedents rather than attempting to anticipate the 
position that the courts would adopt in a particular case. This suggestion implied the 
primacy of the Commissioners in reforming trusts and the relegation of the Chancery 
Division to a supervisory and purely appellate function. 44 
The precedents for the Committee's proposal to resuscitate the Charity 
Commission were not propitious. The seventeenth century Charitable Uses Act had first 
provided for the appointment of peripatetic commissioners to investigate abuses. The 
provision had achieved little and, in spite of periodic and usually half-hearted attempts to 
revive it, the office of Charity Commissioner remained in abeyance until the Charitable 
Trusts Act, 1853, established the Commission in a modem form. 45 In the 1940s, the 
Charity Commission was a muddled and hidebound institution. The Commissioners' 
powers were limited and, where their functions overlapped, subordinate to the Court of 
43 CTC, 845 90-1 
44 This was the substance of Henry Salt's dissenting minority report. Salt argued that 
the range of private and public interests aggregated in charitable trusts meant that some 
conflict was inevitable. He argued, therefore, that the primailZ role of the Court of 
Chancery should be preserved and that the variation of trusts should remain primarily a 
judicial function. He had no dispute with the Committee's general proposal to reform 
the a-pres doctrine but rejected the accelerated procedures for its implementation. 
'Minority Report', CTC, 22 10-242. 
45 Owerý 202-3 
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Chancery. Its main duties were the registration of new endowments and monitoring the 
accounts of existing charitable trusts. Its jurisdiction was ambiguous. The 1853 Act had 
included investments within its definition of funds held on trust and in 1894 the Court of 
Appeal had held that this included moneys invested by collecting charities. This wide 
definition of an endowed trust meant th, -cit if a collecting charity invested, as the 
Conu-nittee observed, "any accumulated subscriptions or donations in order ... to achieve 
some long term otliective, or against a rainy day ... it immediately ceases to be "wholly 
maintained by voluntary contributions" and [became] subject to the jurisdiction". 46 In 
practice, however, the Charity Commissioners did not treat such organisations as falling 
within its jurisdiction. Many institutions did not rely solely on a perpetual endowment. 
Some were able, under the terms of their endowment, to use capital as well as income in 
the discharge of their trust. Another category of mixed trusts comprised voluntary 
organisations that depended for their day-to-day activities largely on income from 
donations and subscriptions but, because they received legacies and other gifts, often 
also managed endowments. 
The reluctance of the Commission to widen its operations was partly a matter of 
resources. The Commission was badly under-staffed, even for carrying out the tasks that 
were clearly within its competence. The Board itself consisted of one MP and two civil 
service lawyers. It employed 11 executive and clerical officers out of 21 full-time staff, 
and had fewer senior staff in 1950 than it had in 1860. The number of trusts within the 
Commissioners' jurisdiction had meanwhile more doubled during the same period, rising 
from 32,000 to an estimated 80,000. The Commission's archaic administrative 
structures were overwhelmed by the increased workload and, with only two Assistant 
Commissioners available for making on-the-spot investigations, the business of the 
Commission consisted mainly of routine correspondence with known trustees. 
Inevitably its work proceeded slowly; it could take a year or longer for trustees to secure 
an alteration of a trust document using the Commission's channels. It was a remote 
body, distant even from the cone erns of thos e trusts nominally within its jurisdiction. 47 
Naturally then, the Committee recommended the strengthening of the Charity 
Commission. It called for the reconstitution of the Commission under at least ff-ve 
Commissioners all with experience of the voluntary sector and improved administrative 
46 CTCI 112 
47 CTC, 48; 98-9; 194 
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support. It also recommended the appointment of a Minister with responsibility for the 
Commission, suggesting as candidates either the Lord Chancellor or the Lord President 
48 
of the Council. The renewal of the Charity Commission was necessary if the 
Commissioners were to be charged with the maintenance of the register and if the 
register was to be employed in the way the Conu-nittee had in mind. More revealing than 
the Committee's recommendations on the reconstitution of the Charity Commission was 
the way in which the Committee sought to re-define the Commissioners' jurisdiction. 
The Comnfittee went to considerable lengths to avoid bringing voluntary organisations 
within the scope of the new administrative arrangements. 
The Committee viewed the revival of the Charity Commission as an important 
part of its overall machinery for reform of the voluntary sector. It assigned responsibility 
for reforming redundant trusts to the Commissioners in the context of a relaxed cy-Pres 
doctrine. The nei-, 
Zharity Commission envisaged by the Conu-nittee was to provide a 
fast track for the transfer of the resources of endowed trusts. Given its history the 
Charity Conunission could not be relied on, even it this modernised form, to exercise the 
role envisaged by the Committee without some assistance. The Committee, therefore, 
reconnnended an enhanced role for local authorities. It proposed that any county and 
county borough council (including the City of London, the London County Council and 
the metropolitan borough councils) should share the Commission's "power to make 
proposals regarding any trust operating it its area. " 49 
The Committee's plans to revitalise the Charity Commission taken together with 
its recommendations on the registration of charities demonstrate that what the Committee 
sought to devise was a legal machinery to facilitate the transfer of resources from what it 
regarded as under performing trusts to voluntary organisations. The purpose of the new 
powers was evident in the character of the register of charities that the Committee put 
forward. 
48 CTCý 96-7 
49 CTC, 92 
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The planners' register 
The establishment of a register of charities was an essential component of the Nathan 
Committee's ambition to reforrn the voluntary sector. Registration was meant to aid the 
identification of under performing trusts enabling their resources to be redirected to more 
oklects that had more social utility. The purpose of reform was ensure that the property 
given to charities served the public good, thereby renewing legitimacy of the privileged 
legal and fiscal treatment of charities. The Connnittee had conceived the reinforcement 
of the public interest in charity solely in relation specifically to the endowed trusts, 
however. It went to great lengths to exclude voluntary organisations from the obligation 
to register. The decision to boost legal supervision of endowed trusts while isolating 
voluntary organisations from these controls r fl cted tlie different moral attributes the ee 
Cominittee assigned to the two forrns of philanthropy in its strategy for reform. 
The Committee's programme for the voluntary sector built on the distinction it 
A.. 
drew between endowed and plain trusts. The latter were those trusts that were able to 
use both capital and income in the pursuit of their objectives. The term, as far as the 
Committee was concerned, encompassed all collecting charities and therefore included 
most voluntary organisations. The distinction was fundamental to the programme of 
reform contained in the Committee's report. This was partly the result of the 
Committee's terms of reference, which confined its attentions to the law on charitable 
trusts, and existing law concerned itself with endowed trusts. The Corntifittee elaborated 
the distinction between 'plain' and 'endowed' trusts in order to 'clarifv' the jurisdiction 
of charity law over charitable endowments. 50 The Committee sought to exclude 'plain 
trusts' from the jurisdiction of the Charity Commission, as this was the legal forrn of 
endowed trust most analogous to the voluntary organisation. Ironically, the Committee 
endorsed the concept of ýtrustworthy unaccounta-bilityl for voluntary organisations at the 
same time as it sought to deny it to charitable endowments. The Committee was 
detennined to maintain the distinction between endowed trusts and plain trusts because 
the purpose of its register was more than an exercise in infonnation gathering. 
50 The Connnittee defined 'plain trusts' as "a charity having assets, NOiether invested 
or otherwise, all of which may be spent. " This was not quite in line with the prevailing 
legal defmition but it had the merit of allowing the Committee to treat 'plain trusts' as 
the equivalent of voluntary organisations. CTC, 113 
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The Committee's couched its reconnnendations in tenns of the value of the 
information that the registration of trusts would yield. It was hard for it to deny that 
information on local voluntary bodies, whether they were endowed trusts of not, might 
be valuable to local authorities, governinent departments, voluntary social workers and 
the public. The Comnfittee acknowledged, ý, -that comprehensive classified and up-to- 
date local and central records of all charities are needed", but justified the exclusion of 
voluntary organisations from its proposed register because of the extra burden this would 
impose upon the Charity Commissioners. The Committee wished "to avoid burdening 
them with the extra work and the Exchequer with the extra cost of such an enterprise. " 
The Conu-nittee evidently believed that the Commissioners would have their hands full 
dealing with registration of charitable endowments. The Committee did not preclude 
some form of registration for voluntary organisations, but preferred to leave the 
recording of voluntary orgianisations in the hands of the voluntary organisations 
themselves. It hoped that the recording of voluntary bodies "might be undertaken by the 
voluntary movement itself and that the big charitable trusts might consider giving 
financial support. " 
51 
The Conu-nittee was being disingenuous in citing the increased administrative 
burden entailed in the widening of the register to include voluntary organisations and 
plain trusts. Its desire to exclude plain trusts from the register was grounded in the moral 
distinction it drew between voluntary organisations and endowed trusts. The Committee 
was satisfied with the existing machinery for the supervision of some collecting 
org, -, inisations. The most emotive appeals, such as those for war veterans and those with 
disabilities, were already accountable to some degree through the various statutes 
governing war charities and collections for the blind. 52 
The Committee maintained the distinction between voluntary organisations and 
charitable endowments because the register was part of its wider plans to facilitate the 
51 CTCI 116 
52 The Committee had in mind collections for war veterans, which were covered by the 
gul War Charities Act, 1940, and charities for the blind, which were governed by reg ations 
incorporated into the National Assistance Act 1948. There were also laws regulating 
house to house and street collections under the Police Factories (etc. ) (x/fiscellaneous 
Provisions) Ac , 1916, and under 
the House to House Collections Act, 1939. CTC, 114- 
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transfer property fi-om endowed trusts to voluntary organisations. Its 'clarification' of 
existing legislation aimed to confine the jurisdiction of charity law to endowed trust 
alone. The Committee was adamant that the duty of registration should fall on endowed 
trusts. Adhering to the moral distinction they drew between endowments and activist 
volunt, ary organisations, the Committee appeared equally adamant that voluntary 
organisations should not be suklect even to these undemanding stipulations. According 
to the model of the charitable sector that underlay the Committee's proposals there were 
essentially two kinds of trusts: plain and endowed trusts. Endowed trusts that discharged 
their duties using solely the income from an endowment were the Committee's main 
target. The problem for the Comi-nittee was that the reality of the voluntary sector was 
more complicated than this: there was no simple division between endowed trusts and 
plain trusts. To bring all endowments with the ambit of the register the Committee found 
that it had to go beyond registration of endowed trusts alone. 
The Conn-nittee had to deal with the perplexing problem of 'mixed trusts', whose 
funding derived from a mixture of sources, including some income from an endowed 
trust or trusts. These the Committee proposed to bring these completely within the 
jurisdiction of charitv law. It discounted the idea that "a body of subscribers ... might 
be 
relied upon to watch over the endowments also. " It also rejected the alternative of 
bringing such bodies within the jurisdiction according to the proportion of their income 
derived from endowments. As this proportion might fluctuate over time, this raised the 
prospect of "trusts floating in and out of the jurisdiction making nonsense of any control 
over them. " The only way to avoid this, the Committee believed, was that once captured 
within the jurisdiction a mixed trust should remain permanently within it. Mixed trusts 
had to be either wholly within the jurisdiction or wholly outside it. The Committee 
feared that if a proportional approach was adopted, where the trust's obligation to 
register depended on the value of its endowments relative to its total income, its status 
might change from one year to the next according to the success of its fund raising. It 
preferred not to "abandon an endowment to the fluctuating fortunes of appeals to the 
public by the mixed charity of which it is part. " It recommended, "that once ... a plain 
charity acquires an endowed trust, it should come within and remain within the 
jurisdiction". 53 
53 CTC, 116-17 
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The Committee's overriding concern was to ensure that all endowments became 
subjJect to public supervision but if the Committee's recommendation on this point had 
41 
it' 
been implemented it would have imposed an obligation to register on almost all the 
major national voluntaiy organisations, including the NCSS. After barely a quarter of a 
century in existence, the NCSS managed around 100 endowed trusts by the late 1940s. 54 
The Committee's proposal would probably also have imposed a duty of registration on 
an unk-noNNun number of relatively small local and regional voluntary organisations. 
Many organisations, if they were successful in finding even moderately well off 
supporters, found themselves managing small endowments soon after they were first set 
up. The Conunittee's attempt to draw a line between voluntary organisations and 
endowed trusts made little sense in the context of the voluntary sector of the 1940s and 
1950s. 
Nevertheless, the Committee resisted full-blown state registration of voluntary 
societies. It proposed a hybrid system of self-regulation with a statutory foundation, 
backed up with a general power of enquiry for the Commissioners. 55 It is hard to see 
how this was a practical proposition and shows the gap between the Committee's view of 
the voluntary sector and the reality. There was only one serious candidate for the role of 
regulator in the 1940s, the NCSS. The FWA had long since abandoned the ambitions to 
regulate the voluntary sector that it had espoused in its original incarnation as the Charity 
Organisation Society. The problem for the NCSS was that if it took up the quasi- 
statutory role proposed by the Committee, it risked forfeiting the goodwill of other 
voluntary organisations. It already attracted suspicions of a conflict of interest 
in its role 
as the voice of the voluntary sector. It was itself a provider of services to secondary 
consumers and so competed directly with other voluntary organisations 
for funds. The 
suspicions that the NCSS had used its role in the administration of grants 
for work 
among the unemployed during the 1930s to advance its own interests 
have already been 
noted. Had it assumed the position of regulator proposed by the Conm-tittee, the 
suspicions would have been reinforced. 
54 NCSS Annual Repo 1935-60 
55 CTCI 115 
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An engine for reform 
N 
The reform of the gy-pres doctrine, the resurrection of Charity Commission and the 
creation of a register of charitable trusts would have created the machinery for a 
thorough overhaul of the voluntaiI7 sector. The fact that the piincipal targets of its 
reforms were the endowed trusts meant that the Committee anticipated some opposition 
from trustees. It, therefore, sought to play down the breadth of its proposals presenting 
them as merely the tidying up of existing legislation rather than as a dramatic new 
departure. The report reassured its readers that its proposals "should be regarded as 
being a logical and important development of, rather than a radical change from" the 
existing law on charitable trusts. 56 In an effort to deflect the expected opposition, the 
committee also made an appeal to the self-interest of trustees. The waste and 
inefficiency identified by the Committee arose not from any base inclination on the part 
of trustees but from the complexity and ambiguity of the law. Trustees were as much 
victims in all this as the public interest. The law's lack of clarity left trustees in a parlous 
position as mere "lay-men giving their service and their time voluntarily and without 
ready access to skilled professional assistance. " 57 
The Committee admitted that its proposals entailed imposing new obligations on 
trustees but held that these were "not onerous". They consisted of the obligation "to 
record particulars of their trust; to have their trust accounts audited; and to vest their 
endowments in official custodians. , 58 Of course, the process of clarifying or 
streamlining existing law was not a neutral process. Tnprovementl entailed disturbance 
of the delicate ambiguities that had emerged from earlier encounters between trustees 
and the state. The Committee's focus on efficiency threatened to upset the delicate 
balance of public interest and private purpose in charity. 
Aware of this, the Committee proposed a number of safeguards to ensure that 
local interests were not neglected and that the founders' intention was not simply ignored 
56 CTCý 101 
57 CTC7 168 
58 CTCý 101 
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in the application of the re-cast cy-pres doctrine . 
59 The most important of these 
safeguards was that trustees would have a general right of appeal to the Chancery 
Division of the Ffigh Court against any scheme made by the Charity Commissioners. 
This right was qualified by being subject to the approval of the Attorney General in the 
case of trusts with a gross income of less than k50 a year . 
60 The Committee, in order to 
allay the fear of potential donors that their carefully thought out legacy might be revised 
by the state before they were cold in their coffims, proposed a limitation on the power to 
-vary trusts. It reconnnended "alterations of trusts ... should not be made within thirty- 
five years of the foundation of the trust without the consent of the trustees and of the 
founder ... if li-ving. " 
61 The danger in laying down a minimum period of protection was 
that this might soon come to be seen as the maximum period during which an 
endowment might operate unmolested. This point would not have been lost on donors, 
trustees or their legal advisers. 
The Committee also recommended that charities should not be charged for 
registering. This was partly because the Committee was anxious to avoid the accusation 
that the register amounted to an indirect tax on charities. In this, it followed established 
precedents. The option of charging trusts for the services of the Charity Commission had 
previously been considered during recent periods of retrenchment in public spending. 
The Geddes Committee had rqjected it in 192 1 
., 
and it had been rqj ected again during the 
depression of the 1930s. The Charitable Trusts Committee agreed with Geddes that 
"such fees would be difficult to collect". More significantly, they also accepted the 
Geddes Committee's argument that "as the work was connected with charitable trusts, an 
exception might properly be made to the general principle that the cost of government 
services rendered should be met by fees. ý, 62 The new register and the reconstituted 
59 Religious endowments were given particular mention. These trusts were often 
denominational in character there was a risk that the new rules would allow flMds to be 
diverted to objects directly contrary to the donor's wishes and to the benefit of rival 
religious bodies. The Committee advised that variations of trusts in these cases should 
be undertaken only in consultation with representatives of the denominations concerned. 
CTC5 79 
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Charity Comt-nission, which was to maintain it, were as a result to be supported from 
general taxation. The exceptional status of charity, in tax law was extended in its 
emancipation from general principles governing the provision of services by the state. 
Although the duty of registration asserted the public interest in the operations of a 
charity, this interest could not be allowed to assume the form of a direct charge on 
charitable property. 
In spite of its invocation of these safeguards, the majority of the Committee made 
no secret of the fact that the recording of charitable trusts was part of a wider strategy to 
secure the more efficient use of funds administered by charities and to re-launch the 
voluntary sector. On public platforms, members of the Committee reiterated the 
relationship between recording of charitable trusts and the scheme-making powers the 
Committee proposed to confer on the Charity Commissioners. Mrs K. W. Jones-Roberts 
addressed a conference convened by the Welsh Council of Social Service in February 
1953, two month's after the Report's publication. She argued that registration was 
essential "to provide trustees and other authorities with information they must have if the 
,, 63 M benefit of the community is to be obtained from the new scheme-making powers . 
The register was essential if the Charity Commission was to play the role the Committee 
envisaged in overhauling the voluntary sector. Aside from the general principle that the 
public needed "to have readily accessible records", the Committee held that the 
Commissioners required "classified records for the purpose of their scheme-making 
powers. "64 Registration was a preliminary step on the road to employing the broader 
powers to be granted to the Commissioners to alter trusts under a new, looser 
interpretation of the OL-pres doctrine advanced by the Committee. 
Lidderdale stressed the connection between registration and the Conunittee's 
wider plans for the voluntary sector a few days later. On 16 February, at a national 
conference of voluntary organisations in Church House Westminster or, 4, y,, -, tnised by the 
National Council of Social Service, Lidderdale stood in for Lord Nathan who had fallen 
from his horse a few days earlier. She argued that the circumstances that beset the 
voluntary sector forced the "conclusion that comprehensive, classified, central and 
local 
records of trusts are essential. " Compilation of these records was merely the 
first step in 
a programme to stimulate the revival of voluntarism. They were needed "to provide the 
63 4 Draft brief for speech by IvIrs Jones-Roberts', 4 February 1953,51 C. AB124/138 
64 CTCI 43 
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voluntary movement as a whole with the basic information it must have if it is to marshal 
its resources ... and if it is to work out a coherent policy in relation to the changing needs 
of the country". 65 
Lidderdale made the point even more forcefully in an article she drafted to 
appear, under the Chairman's signature, in the Quarterly Journal of National Council of 
Social Service. The draft stressed the "need for comprehensive, classified and up-to-date 
records, not only to serve the public but to provide the basis for the new scheme-making 
powers. "66 Registration was the keystone of the Conu-nittee's plan to modernise the 
voluntary sector. 
Although the Committee was -mxious to distance itself from Beveridge's extreme 
version of decay among charitable trusts, it was willing to deploy a more restrained 
version in order to drive home the distinction between the excellence of voluntary action 
and the inefficiency of endowed trusts. Its proposals sought to impose greater scrutiny 
and regulation on endowed trusts, as it believed these were more likely to fall into disuse. 
The Cornmittee's attitude to endowments was coloured by the Liberal prejudices of its 
Chair. NN-That was striking about the report was the determination with which it 
maintained the moral distinction between voluntary organisations and endowed trusts. 
There was no sense in the Committee's report of any divergence of interest between the 
state and the voluntary sector as a whole. The state, in the form of a revived Charity 
Commission., was presented throughout as a benevolent force for progressive change in 
the voluntary sector. The Charities Act, the legislative sequel to the Committee's report, 
brought the state back in, but retained this mood of benign partnership. 
65 4 Speech by Miss J. H. Lidderdale at the NCSS conference on l6th Februan7 1953', 
85 CAB124/171 
66 4 Draft article for the Quarterly Journal of the National Council of Social Services', 
4ý CAB 124/171 
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Chapter 7: Registration: the Art of Control 
The Charitable Trusts Committee conceived a register of charities as an instrument for 
identifying under-perfoiining trusts in order to facilitate the transfer of their funds to 
activist voluntary organisations. The Charities Act did establish a register. It was its 
most impor-tz-ant provision. Its purpose was quite different, however. The main 
difference was that while the Committee had recommended reinforcing the register of 
endowed charitable trusts established by earlier statutes, the 1960 act extended the 
register to include voluntary organisations as well as endowed trusts. What had been 
devised as a means to assist in stripping the assets of decayed trusts, became instead an 
instrument for regulating the intended beneficiaries of this process: the voluntary 
organisations. Though this shows the distance of the act from the programme for 
voluntarisin set out by the Charitable Trusts Committee, the register was important as it 
formed the comerstone of the de-contesting and depoliticising of charity and 
voluntarism. This Chapter seeks to draw out some of the implications of the Charities 
Act for voluntary organisations, particularly of the register introduced by the Act. 
The 'consensus' on the Charities Act 
The Charities Act was the most important of a series of measures enacted in the course 
of thel. 950s. The first of these, the Charitable Trusts alidation) Act, 1954, was 
designed to deal with the problem of defective trusts arising out of poorly drafted wills 
that had been exposed by the Diplock's will case. Section 8 of the Rating and Valuation 
(Nfiscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, also set out to deal with an immediate practical 
problem. The Act protected the customary right to rate relief 
for charities, which had 
been threatened by the transfer of responsibility for valuation from local authorities to 
the Board of the Inland Revenue. 
' The Recreational Charifies Act, 19 5 8, sought to 
clarify the status of recreational and leisure facilities. 
Again, it was prompted by 
I Owen, PWIantbrop , 344-5 
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immediate problems caused by the courts' fmding that schemes to provide leisure 
fiacilities for people in a particular industry were not accessible to a sufficiently large 
group to be described as providing a public benefit. 2 
These measures indicate that the Conservative government was not inactive on 
issue of charity law in the 1950s. There were other indications of Conservative interest 
in the voluntary sector. lain McLeod, Minister of Health from May 1952, promised to 
remove -trifling, petty restrictions" on the work of voluntary organisations in the NHS. 
McLeod met with initial success as he watched over a rapid expansion of the Hospital 
Leagues of Friends. The number of leagues grew from 261 to 360 in the first nine 
months of 1953 alone .3 The Conservatives approach to legislation in this area was 
cautious, however. The reforms outlined above were piecemeal measures in response to 
specific problems in the operation of charity law and the government enjoyed cross-party 
support in getting each of them onto the statute book. 
The Charities Act was a different matter. It aimed to deal with charity law as a 
whole. It was, therefore, more programmatic in character than the earlier measures. It 
was a programme implemented by a Conservative government that had been in power 
4 for almost a decade and had ruminated on the Committee's report for seven years. The 
sense that the Act was a bi-partisan measure remained strong: Nathan certainly regarded 
the Charities Act as the completion of the work of the Committee. 5 In a letter to the 
Home Secretary, R. A. Butler, after the Act had received the Royal Assent in July 1960, 
Nathan spoke warmly of Butler's willingness to consult him on the content of Act. He 
expressed his "gratification ... to 
have been in some degree associated with you in all 
2 D. G. Cracknell, Law Relating to Charities, (London: Oyez, 1973), 33-36 
3 Robert Shepherd, lain McLeod, (London: Pimlico, 1994), 89 
4 Owen puts down the delay to technical difficulties in drafting the new law given the 
wide ramifications of charity law. This is clearly not the whole explanation for Owen 
admits that "combing the statute book for acts and clauses which the new bill would 
repeal or 'consequentially amend' was a labor of months" - not years. Owen, 
Philanthropy, 592 
5 His biographer and personal friend, the egregious Montgomery Hyde, described the 
Act as Nathan's "one outstanding contribution to English law reform. " Ryde, Strong 
for 
Senice, 230 
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this"' and registered his appreciation of -the confidence and good will you have shown to 
me in discussing at various stages the problems requiring solution. ý, 6 
A comparison of the terms of the Charities Act with the recommendations of the 
Charitable Trusts Committee complicates the picture of political consensus that Nathan's 
comments imply. The rhetoric of consensus obscured the fact that the Charities Act 
diverged markedly Committee's report in spirit and in its political thrust. Although the 
government acted on all of the Committee's main recommendations, the manner in 
which they were implemented added up to a different programme for the voluntarN7 
sector. An underlying reason for the difference was a changed political climate. 
Between the appointment of the Committee and its report faith in state intervention had 
waned and-Vlanning had gone somewhat out of fashion". While the "Committee had 
held that a touch of planning would improve the charity world. " The Conservative 
Government had other ideas, inclining "toward less comprehensive PoliCieS, %7 
Butler, opening the debate, drew attention to the basis of such consensus as did 
exist in 1960 on the questions involved. He noted "a convenient summary of the 
principles enunciated in the Nathan Report in paragraph 723, which the government 
wholeheartedly adopt. " What is striking about this paragraph is the generality of the 
principles enunciated by the committee. It stated four principle: the duty of trustees to 
make good use of the resources at their disposal; the freedom of trustees to decide how 
best to achieve a trusts' objectives; once given to charity resources should remain within 
the voluntary sector, and voluntary organisations were the pioneers of new services. 9 
This was the extent of consensus. Butler went on to warn that he differed from the 
Committee "in the application of these principles". 10 
The changed political climate had come about because the Conservatives, 
traditionally less interventionist than Labour, were in power. The Conservatives also 
brought a different party political approach to the voluntary sector, coloured by its 
traditional resistance to state regulation of charities. McLeod's encouragement of the 
Hospital Leagues of Friends, for example, suggests that the Conservatives wanted to 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Quoted by Hyde, Strong for Service, 236 
Oweiý, Philanthropy, 591 
House of Coiranons Debates, vol. 622,28 April 1960, col. 411 
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revert to the relationship between the state and voluntary organisations that had obtained 
dining the 1930s. 
There were also more iinmediate reasons for the Conservatives taking a different 
line on the voluntary sector to that adopted by the Committee. In the first place, there 
was the fact that the Committee was simply wrong in its analysis of the problems of the 
endowed trusts. The Committee had received evidence that the existing regulatory 
regime was as much to blame for the poor performance of endowed trusts as any inherent 
deficiency in the trust form. This confined trustee investments to narrow range of stocks 
and prescribed caution in the management of invested funds rather than risk-taking and 
high returns. 
The range of trustee investments had been defined in the Trustee Acý 1925 and 
Nathan asked the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales to look into 
the workings of the Act. In their evidence the Institute ýs 1\/Ir. Braithewaite and Mr 
Touche, contmented that as a consolidating Act the range of investments it permitted was 
already out of date and reflected "an assessment of risks appropriate to the nineteenth 
century. " 11 A number of approved investments no longer existed by the 1940s, and there 
were other anomalies. Investment in trading companies was prohibited with the 
exception of some of the older types of utilities: it was possible for trust funds to be 
invested in gas and water, but not in electricity. The only kind of stocks trustees were 
permitted to hold were money stocks which confýrred a fixed money income and a fixed 
capital sum on redemption. As a resultý income from this source had become 
increasingly disengaged fi-om the real economy. 
This had a number of consequences. The currency inýtion of the inter-war 
years had cut the value of the income generated, with the result that "restrictions, which 
were intended as a safeguard, have become a source of danger. " Controls that were 
intended to protect funds from losses had "caused great rigidity ... and introduced a 
pattern of investment which a prudent business man would be unlikely to adopt in 
handling his own affairs. " The Institute regarded the inclusion of equity stocks and 
shares in the range of investments available to trustees in order to restore the link with 
the real economy. This sort of stock, Braithwaite and Touche contended, gave investors 
"the right ... to a share 
in the companies' profits and assets and are thus ultimately 
11 'Memorandum for the Nathan Committee on Charitable Trusts Submitted on behalf 
of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales', (hereafter ICA to 
CTC), 1; CAB124/153 
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associated with real values and not with money values. " They also contained an inherent 
potential for capital growth "owing to the practice adopted by most companies of 
retaining in the business a considerable part of the profits and so adding to the value of 
the equitY. -ýý 12 As matters stood, voluntaq organisations were prevented from taking 
advantage of economic growth, and could only add to their income from investments by 
adding to their capital from their own resources. 
The Institute did recognise the need for safeguards. It suggested restricting the 
proportion of total funds that could be held in equity stocks. It also proposed their 
limitation to companies with an eight to ten year record of paying a dividend of at least 
four per cent., and to companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange with a nominal 
share value of at least il, 000,000. This was necessary to ensure flexibility in the 
management of funds, for it guaranteed, "a reasonable market would be available to 
permit the ready realisation of the investment. " 13 "Ultimately", the Institute's 
representatives thought, 16 the only true protection is the honesty and competence of the 
trustee. " Though in case either of these qualities were lacking, the accountants 
reminded the Committee that the Institute's policy was "that there should be an 
independent -audit by a professionally qualified accountant where the management of 
funds is divorced from ownership. " This, they felt, applied a fortiori "in the case of a 
charitable trust, where the beneficial owners are no defuiite persons. " 14 
Fafling revenues from investment were symptomatic of the inhibitions imposed 
on charity investments rather than of a decline in public generosity. In the context of a 
regulatory regime that contrived to instil a spirit of risk aversion in charity investments, 
maintaining income from this source depended on the continuous addition to the 
society's assets made possible by a steady stream of surplus income from subscriptions 
and donations or from legacies. The government were more inclined than the 
Committee to see this as the main problem facing trustees and the Trustee Investments 
Act 1961, which broadened the range of investments available to trustees and which the 
govemment regarded as part of the same legislative package as the Charities Act, 
provided its remedy to this problem. 
15 
12 ICA to CTC, 3 
13 ICA to CTC, 2 
14 ICA to CTC, 4 
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The government had a further reason for hesitating to proceed on the basis of the 
Committee, s proposals. This was Salt's disagreement with the other members of the 
Committee on whether variation of trusts should remain primarily a judicial function. 
Although Salt made no effort to pursue it once the Committee's report had been 
published, the evidence of disagreement was enough to give the government pause to 
consider the question. Of greater significance, however, was the existence of vocal 
opposition from some quarters within the voluntary sector. 
This opposition manifested itself at an early stage. Lidderdale's speech to the 
Church House conference on 16 February 1953 was not well received. The barracking 
that Lidderdale had to endure was led by 1. M. Horobin who could hardly contain his 
outrage at the proposals. As soon as the discussion was opened to the floor, he 'Jumped 
up" and proceeded "in no uncertain manner" to attack the Committee's 
recommendations. Alluding to the fate of the voluntary hospitals, Horobin denounced 
the report as "a dreadful interference with trusts and the net effect would be to bring 
them. under Government control". Horobin's onslaught was somewhat unexpectedý for 
he was a long-standing supporter of the NCSS. As warden of the Mansfield House 
Settlement in Canning Town during the 1930s, he had been an active proponent of 
greater professionalism in social work contributing to the Council's Advisory Committee 
on Recruitment and Training of Social Workers. 16 He feared that the effect of the 
proposals would be the "abandonment of the administration of trusts by the ordinary run 
of trustees and their transfer to large holding and managing trustees capable of enduring 
the impositions of the new jurisdiction! " 17 He singled out the plan to bring mixed trusts 
within the jurisdiction for particular censure and predicted that "one result would be that 
no plain charity would accept an endowment if it could be helped - it would rather 
refuse money than find itself a mixed charity and so brought within the jurisdiction. " 18 
The issue united disparate strands within the voluntary movement. A number of 
delegates rushed to join Horobin's onslaught on the Committee's proposals. Among 
those who sided with him were Nlr Potter, representing Bamardo's, and Xlh- Colbom, the 
delegate from the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings. Indeed, only the 
16 'Report of a meeting of Secretaries 9 December 1937', LT\, l,. k'4016/IS`/01 (108) 
17 Lidderdale to Nathan, 17 February 1953, CAB 124/171 
18 Lidderdale to Nathan, 'Report of conference NCSS, 15 February 1953% 
CAB124/171 
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est of honour, Lord Samuel spoke unequivocally in favour of the Committee's 
recommendations. Lidderdale reported that Haynes was particularly disappointed by the 
reaction of the delegates. He agreed with Lidderdale to suppress a reference to it in the 
NCSS's official report of the discussion "since it was so one-sided". They could not so 
easib, suppress the opposition itself. Ominously for the Conn-nittee and Haynes, Horobin 
claimed political support for his opposition, announcing that "his information was that 
the Government was likely to rqJect the report and", he thought, "a good thing too! " 19 
Considering the strength of the opposition,, even within the ranks of voluntary 
organis,, ations affiliated to the NCSS, it was hardly surprising that the Conservative 
government showed no eagerness to move ahead with legislation. The Charities Act 
actually went much further than the Committee had proposed on the issue of registration 
of trusts, however. It seems, therefore, theat although the government may have 
welcomed the breathing space afforded by the opposition to the Committee's report, it 
did not accept its premises. Indeed its decision to press ahead with reform of charity law 
was prompted by matters outside the sphere of charity and voluntary action altogether. 
Introducing the Charities Bill in the House of Commons, Butler indicated that a more 
important motivation for the legislations was to dispose of the restrictions on 
corporations owning landed property imposed by the antique law of mortmain. Butler 
commented that it had "not been possible hitherto to get rid of this anachronism in the 
law of property without the legislative adjustment of charity law". 
20 
Given this background, it was not surprising that the Act took a different 
approach to the issues that had arisen in the course of the debate in the late 1940s and 
that had formed the core of the Committee's proposals. Conu-non Good Funds, the 
reform of the py-pr&s doctrine, and the registration of charities all appeared in the Act. 
They appeared in a different form, however. The differences broke the linkages 
between 
these elements that the Committee had created. It was clear that the Conservative 
government did not share the Committee's enthusiasm for a m4l: or overhaul of the 
voluntary sector. 
19 Lidderdale to Nathan, 17 Februan7 1953, CAB 124/171 
20 House of Commons Debates, vol. 622,28 April 1960, col. 410 
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The Conservative reforms 
The government was even more cautious that the Committee on the question 
modernisation of the definition of charit3r. The Act, in this respect, marked no new 
departure as it simpty re-enacted the Preamble to the Charitable Uses Act, 1601 . 
21 On 
the question of reform of the c-v-pres doctrine, there was a semblance of more agreement 
between the go'verranent and the Committee. The Committee's belief that it ought to be 
easier to change the oklects of a charitable trust was shared by the govenunent. It was 
willing to widen the conditions under which charitable property could be transferred to 
other functions. Accordingly, the Act extended the circumstances largely along the lines 
recornmended by the Corm-nittee. It was no longer necessary for the charity to have 
failed. The transfer could now be effected on the grounds that the original purpose was 
already adequately provided for or could no longer be carried out as the donor had 
directed. Transfers were also allowed where the only part of the resources could be 
applied. The goverru-nent recognised the value of amalgamating small charities to 
improve their efficiency, as the Committee had recommended. The Act provided for 
amalgamations and empowered the courts to take into account changes in local 
government boundaries and demographic changes when making schemes. The Act also 
contained a catchall heading to enable schemes where a trust had "ceased in an), other 
way to provide a suitable and effective method of using the property available ... regard 
being had to the Spirit of the gffl. 7722 
The Act's main departure from the reformers' agenda was in the creation of 
machinery for invoking the new powers to alter trusts. The govennnent re ected the 
Committee's proposal to give local authorities a power to initiate the alteration of trusts. 
Playfair's official review of the Committee's report had highlighted this 
recommendation. He had objected strongly to the proposal to create "wider powers of 
intervention for local authorities". Believing that there was 6'an undying war between 
charitable trustees and local authorities", he predicted that any attempt "to increase the 
21 
22 
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powers of the latter over the f 23 onner" would provoke a backlash from trustees. Lord 
President of the Council Salisbury was more sympathetic than the officials were to the 
Committee's overall analysis of the condition of many charitable trusts. He regretted 
that "the present position regarding these trusts is so rigid that much money and effort is 
being largely wasted". As Salisbury's comments indicate, the Conservative government 
N was willing to countenance reform of the py-pres doctrine: it was the Committee's 
proposals for wider reforrn of the administrative machinery it found hard to accept. 
Salisbury shared PlaNfair's concern about the Committee's proposal to grant local 
izovemment new powers of initiative in winding up defunct trusts and was anxious to C) 
keep "the local authorities right out of this 7ý. 
24 Accordingly, the Act pennitted county, 
! 40 district and London borough councils review the operation of charities within their 
boundaries only with consent of local trustees. They were expressly forbidden to 
review the working oý charities providing services similar to those provided by the je 
council. 25 
The Govein-ment's reluctance to enhance the role of local authorities in 
supervising and modernising charitable trusts removed the most obvious mechanism for 
identifying and taking action against redundant trusts at a local level. Without some 
external mechanism to prompt the refon-n of trusts, the Committee's programme was 
effectively neutralised. Giving local authorities powers to adopt an active and 
interventionist approach towards charitable trusts would, the Committee had hoped, 
create a dynamic for reform. The Act proposed no alternative source of such a dynamic. 
Although the Act adopted the Committee's recommendations on the reconstitution of the 
Charity Commission, it offered no enhancement of the supervisory powers of the central 
authorities. The Act merely granted the Commissioners the duty to promote efficiency 
by "encouraging the development of better methods of administrationý by giving charity 
WO. Pla3. fair was 23 Mayfair to Couzens, 21 December 1953, CAB 124/1 ý' not alone in his 
opinion. The suggestion of greater powers for local authorities received such a drubbing 
in the Lords debate on the Report that Nathan agreed to withdraw it. House of Lords 
Debates, vol. 183,22 July 1953, col. 784 
24 Salisbury's Handwritten comment on Quirk to Salisbury, 29 December1953, 
CAB124/200 
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trustees information and adNice ... and by investigatingand checking abuses. " The Act 
specifically denied the Commissioners the power to initiate the alteration of trusts. " 
It is true that the Act granted the Commission general powers of enquiry and a 
requirement on trustees to return annual accounts. 27, These powers were designed to 
allow the Conn-nission to ensure that trustees were properly discharging their 
responsibilities. These powers undoubtedly entailed closer monitoring of the behaviour 
of trustees, but they conferred on the Commissioners no power to interfere with the 
purposes of a trust. The circumstances in which the Commissioners could invoke their 
scheme-making powers were restricted. In the case of small charities, namely those with 
an income of less than k50 a year, the Commissioners could make as scheme at the 
request of one of the charities trustees or any person interested in the charity or at the 
request of the Attorney General. This wider power to deal with smaller charities 
acknowledged the concern that the Charitable Trusts Committee had expressed about the 
existence of many decayed small endowments. The power of the Commissioners to act 
in the case of larger charities was more limited. In order for the Commissioners to make 
a scheme, they had to await a request from the trustees or the High Court. The Court, 
having determined that alteration of a trust was required, could refer the detailed drafting 
to the Charity Commissioners. The Act laid down a procedure to be followed in cases 
where the Commissioners believed "that the charity trustees ought in the interests of the 
charity to apply for a scheme, but have unreasonably refused or neglected to do so". In 
such cases, the Commissioners had to apply to the Home Secretaij! to have the matter 
referred to them. 28 The Act gave little encouragement to those who had hoped that the 
re-founded Charity Commission would play an interventionist role in modernising trusts. 
The relaxation of the cy-pres rules in the Charities Act was not accompanied by 
the creation of machinery to push reform along the lines the Charitable Trusts Committee 
had proposed. The highly circumscribed role of the Charity Commission in initiating 
schemes meant that the initiative for modernisation of trusts remained fmnly in the hands 
of trustees. 
The fate of the idea of Common Good Funds was symbolic of the defeat of the 
reformers. Considering the interest that the subject had aroused in the earlier 
debate, the 
26 Charities Acý Section 1 
27 Charities Act, Sections 6-9 
28 Charities Act, Sections 18 
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Act's terse reference to the question was an anticlimax. The Act forbade the use of the 
phrase 'common good' in the title of any body established in England and Wales without 
the consent of the Charity Commissioners. The penalty for misuse of the term was a 
maximum fine of 150 . 
29 The Government gave no indication that it intended to 
establish national common good fimds and made no statutory provision for their 
financing. The Conservative government's jettisoning of the idea of Common Good 
Funds was the most explicit expression of its departure from the programme outlined by 
the Committee. The Conn-nittee had conceived of the Funds as a central mechanism for 
collecting and redistributing the resources of redundant charitable trusts. The Comniittee 
had envisaged that the registration of endowed charities trusts would reveal under 
pelforming assets in the voluntary sector. The relaxation of the gy-pres doctrine would 
make it easier to release the resources held in these defunct trusts for new applications. 
The Common Good Funds represented the third stage in this process, accumulating 
holding these resources and distributing them to voluntary organisations. The 
neutralising of this element of the Committee's programme sent a clear signal that the 
government did not intend to create such machinery. This was confmned by the Act's 
approach to the other main component of the Conunittee's programme: the register of 
charities. 
29 Charities Act Section 31 
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The administrators' register 
The disappearance of the Conn-non Good Funds was the symbol of the reformers' defeat, 
but, for the later development of the voluntary sector, the Act's most significant 
departure from the Committee's proposals was the creation of register of charities and 
the role the register assumed in the funding of voluntary organisations. The 
implementation of a record of charitable trusts after two centuries of resistance by 
trustees represented the most obvious of the apparent continuities was clearly an historic 
step. Yet, the character of the register reveals the differences between the objectives of 
the Committee and the Charities Act. Registration is never an abstraction, "like the 
railways, [it] may be adapted to serve diametrically different regimes. "'O 
Encompassing voluntary organisations as well as endowments, the register finally 
introduced by the Charities Act went beyond the proposals of the Charitable Trusts 
Committee. On the other hand, it seemed to favour Haynes's approach. Haynes had 
argued for universal registration of all voluntary bodies and this point was restated in a 
second NCSS submission to the Committee by Richard Clements, Haynes's deputy and 
leader of the London Council of Social Service. Clements made the same case for 
tidying up the existing informal that Haynes had put before the Committee, arguing "it 
would make for simplicity and certainty if all bodies established for charitable purposes 
only were required by law to be registered. 01 
As the refonners had hoped, the Charities Act established a national register of 
charities to be compiled and overseen by the Charity Comn-dssion. It also imposed a 
duty to register on trustees. Trustees were thus obliged to claim charitable status and to 
support their claim by providing the Commission with facsimile evidence of the 
founding documents specifying the objects and method of work of the organisation 
concerned. Trustees were also obliged to keep the Commission infon-ned of any 
30 Offer, Prope ,33 
31 4 Supplementary Paper Submitted by the National Council of Social Service 
(Incorporated)' 20 June 1950, CAB124/171 
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changeS. 32 Using its powers under the Act, the Charity Commission ruled that 
registration was to apply inu-nediately to charities founded on or after lst January 1961 
but it pro', vided for a rolling process of registering existing charities by means of statutory 
instruments laid by the Home Secretary . 
33 
The register introduced in 1960 peiformed a different function from that which 
had been envisaged by the Charitable Trusts Committee and its supporters in the late 
1940s. The register established by the Act was much wider in scope than had been 
advocated by the Conn-nittee and this reflected a difference in function. The Committee 
had sought a register of endowed charitable trusts only. The connection between 
registration and the funding of voluntan y organisations contained in the Act also reflected 
different priorities. The Committee had seen registration of trusts, as a tool for 
identifying the idle resources that they were convinced existed within the voluntary 
sector. The Committee saw the register as a tool to help the Charity Commission and 
local authorities, armed with increased powers of investigation and initiative to 
compensate for the inertia of trustees, to identify the resources held by defunct or 
moribund trusts as a preliminary step to transferring these resources to activist voluntary 
organisations. As a result, the Committee called only for the registration of endowed 
trusts. The Actý in contrast, obliged all charities to register, whatever their form. 
On the face of it this was simply the administration of charity catching up with 
the legal and fiscal status of voluntary organisations following House of Lords' 
judgement in Pemsel's case in 1891. Registration completed the process begun by the 
judgement, which had made charitable status a gateway to the benefit of tax exemption 
whether the charity was a voluntary organisation or a charitable trust. The register 
created by the Charities Act went further than simply recognising the position post 
Pernsal, however. Registration became a warrant of charitable status. The act stated 
32 There were significant exceptions to the obligation to register. The category of 
4 exempt charities' comprised historic corporations such as the 
Church of England and 
the ancient universities, as well as other institutions 
founded by act of Parliament or by 
Royal Charter. These were not obliged to register and were excluded from the 
Commission's jurisdiction. Verv small voluntary organisations were also relieved of the 
obligation to register. Charities. _, _kct, 
Section 4 
33 Nathan et al., Charities Acý 151 
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that any institution included in the register was "'conclusively presumed to be ... a 34 
charit-y".. ' 
By means of this presumption, -voluntary organisations obtained a much simpler 
and clearer method of securing charitable status and the benefits it conferred. Inclusion 
on the register became a gateway to the tax advantages of charitable status. This had 
been a concern of the Board Inland Revenue. NA-1hen the Charitable Trusts Conunittee 
considered the question of a register of charities, Lidderdale had written to the Board for 
its views on the issue. The Board was not sympathetic to the Committee's proposals for 
register of charities. It feared that this would confer an implicit charitable status on those 
registered, or at the very least would be so interpreted by those registered. The Board's 
A. J. N. N/filler began by reminding Lidderdale that the Committee's terms of reference 
prevented it from considering the taxation of charities. He went on to explain in some 
detail the Inland Revenue's fear that registration with the Charit-y Commissioners might 
come "to be regarded by taxpayers as tantamount to an admission of the validity of their 
title to Income Tax relief, which might not be beyond dispute from the Revenue angle. " 
X-filler believed that a central register would "involve extra trouble for the Revenue. " 35 
The specific provision in Charities Act that registration carried the presumption 
of charitable status marked the end of the Inland Revenue's role in the determining the 
extent of charitable status. This clause was as important as the requirement to register 
itself. The problem of the 'public' character of charity and voluntary organisations was 
reduced to the quality of being recorded by a public body. Though tWs created the 
possibility of greater supervision, it was united with the promise of an easy route to 
charitable status. 
The new route to charitable status opened by the Charities Act meant that the 
failure of the Charitable Trust Committee's grandiose schemes for remodelling the 
voluntary sector was not fatal for the ambitions of the NCSS. The universal system of 
registration combined with the inducement to register contained in section five 
conformed closely to the interests of the NCSS as an institution. It particularly appealed 
to the senior managers of the NCSS and other major voluntary organisations. 
Notwithstanding the opposition expressed in some quarters, for the exponents of 
y sector, the register introduced in 1960 was a major modernisation within the voluntan 
34 Charities Act, Section 5 
35 A. J. N. NWIer to Lidderdale, 28 June 1950, CAB 124/159 
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boost. To understand why this was so, it is necessaiy to examine conditions in the 
voluntary sector and the influence these had on the development of the thinking of 
leading voluntarists. 
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Chapter 8: Amoral Bountýv: the Financial 'Crisis' of Voluntarism' 
The previous chapters have sketched the discussions on the future of voluntary 
organis,, ations in the immediate post-war period and the subsequent resolution of this 
discourse in the Charities Act of 1960. They have sought to highlight the disparity 
between the pro-visions of the Act and the terms of the debate that preceded it. The next 
two chapters look at some of the broader contours of the voluntary sector in the 1940s 
and 1950s. The aim is to show that, in spite of the disparities in the official discourse, 
there existed an underlying continuity in the attitude of leading voluntarists towards the 
public discussion of the future of voluntary social ser\,, ice. These continuities allowed 
them to support both the Charitable Trust Committee's recommendations and the 
provisions of the Charities Act. 
As the previous chapters have shown, the theme of a financial crisis of 
voluntarism dominated the early stages of the debate in the 1940s. The leaders of 
voluntary organisations and the politicians who spoke in their support generally agreed 
on the financial character of the crisis. They also argued that the upheaval in relations 
between the state and voluntary organisations had worsened the financial crisis. This 
was a position articulated most forcefully by Beveridge. Samuel and the leaders of 
voluntary organisations, were more muted in their comments on the impact of the state. 
The reasons underlying this difference in emphasis are the subject of this chapter. It re- 
examines the evidence for a crisis of voluntarism. in the 1940s and argues that the 
financial crisis was a temporary phenomenon and the main force of its impact was 
confined to specific categories of voluntary organisation. The limited character of the 
'crisis of voluntarism' was key to the decontestation of the relationship between the state 
and the voluntary sector. A further feature of the crisis was that leading figures within 
the voluntary sector entertained an interpretation of the character of the financial crisis 
that was markedly different from that held by the government and many of the 
politicians who participated in the debate. These differences in interpretation facilitated 
rather than hindered the coalescence of both sides around the ideological opposition of 
voluntary organisations to charitable trusts. This convergence, however, obscured a 
more fundamental and more widespread opposition within the voluntary sector: the 
competition between voluntary organisations. 
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The aim of this chapter is not to prove that reports of the demise of voluntarism 
were without foundation. That would be perverse. Some voluntary organisations 
certainly experienced problems in raising money from traditional sources in the late 
1940s, but the evidence for a more general financial crisis afflicting the whole voluntary 
sector is not easy to discover. There were also wide variations in the experience of 
individual voluntary, organisations. 
Permanent crisis? 
Voluntaiists' invocation of falling receipts was a propaganda device. Financial 'crisis' is 
something of a rhetorical constant in voluntary social service and the 1940s was not 
unique in this respect. Beveridge, Samuel and Nathan, who relied on the representatives 
of voluntary organisations for their information about conditions in the voluntary sector, 
simply reproduced this rhetorical device in their speeches. They were not alone in this. 
Acceptance of the rhetoric of financial crisis was a point on which critics of voluntarism 
often agreed with its exponents. Left wing critics of voluntarism have, as often as its 
supporters, taken at face value the pleading of voluntary organisations, for cash, seeing 
this as proof of the inefficiency of this method of welfare distribution. Yet, this is to 
misunderstand the context of these appeals. Voluntary oro.; anisations depend, at least in 
paM on contributions from the public. This provides an incentive to exaggerate their 
financial difficulties. Calling on the public to contribute to full coffers is not a Aliable 
strategy for raising money. The tactics of the voluntary hospitals in the years before the 
war provide a good example. Although charitable contributions to the hospitals held up 
well during the depression, the hospitals' finance officers "often spoke in terms of crisis 
because it was an effective way of extracting contributions. " 
I 
Voluntary organisations occasionally resorted to sleight of hand to disguise their 
resources. The Charitable Trusts Committee drew attention to one stratagem employed 
by some voluntary agencies engaged by local authorities to provide personal social 
services for the elderly and the invalid. A number of these organisations, the committee 
noted, preferred to set their charges to the local authorities at rates 
"lower than the actual 
cost of the service" in order to "address their appeals to the charitable public 
in very much 
I Prochaska, Philanthr! ppy, 129-30 
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the same terms as they did before". The Conn-nittee deprecated this subterfuge, although it 
acknox, v, ledg-ed that these organisations ran the risk of losing public support if their reliance 
on state funding became too apparent. If they admitted the extent to which their serxices 
were subsidised by the local council they might be seen as "little more than an agent of the 
authorities ... and may thus irretrievably forfeit the interest and enthusiasm of its 
subsciibers. 
The Comi-nittee was sympathetic to the predicament of established voluntary 
organisations that had built up a base of support and wanted "to keep their organisation 
intact and, as far as may be, unfettered, and ... to keep their subscription list undiminished. " 
The Conunittee believed that voluntary organisations had a duty to infon-n subscribers 
about these arrangements for, it was imperative '! hat those among them who would be 
reluctant to continue their generosity towards olijects for which, as members of the general 
public, the-y are already making substantial payments, may decide in the full knowledge of 
the facts whether or not to continue to support the charity. 0 The Committee took the view 
that the gap between fees charged to local authorities and the actual cost of a service was an 
artificial wa- y, of maintaining an element of voluntarism, but this practice also underlines the 
association between voluntarism and financial deficit. This was so ingrained that voluntary 
organisations could not even contemplate a surplus. It underlines the tenacity of the link 
between voluntary social service and financial deficit. 4 
The incentives that existed for voluntary organisations to disguise their financial 
condition are one reason for treading carefully in analysing the financial crisis of 
voluntarism, in the 1940s. A further reason that it is extremely difficult to gauge the 
extent of the financial problems of voluntary organisations during this period is that the 
2 CTCý 163 
3 CTC, 163 
4 Other interpretations of this stratagem are, of course, possible. On the one hand, by 
drawing on voluntary contributions to defray part of their costs, voluntary organisations 
allowed local authorities to discharge their responsibilities (including some statutory 
responsibilities) at a lower cost. Second, local authority budgets were fixed annually, 
their contracting out of services to a -voluntary organisation was thus uncertain from year 
to year. This was particularly the true in care of the elderly where a number of 
alternative service providers existed. In light of this, it was sensible for voluntan., 
organisations to do all that they could to maintain their voluntary fundraising. 
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v. oluntaiy sector was an unimportant component of the British economy. An index of the 
economic insignificance of the voluntary sector is its weight as an employer. One 
estimate suggests that social welfare as a whole employed no more than 245000 women 
and men in the late as the 1950s. -"' Even if all of these were employed in voluntary 
organis-ations, this would have constituted less than a tenth of one per cent of the total 
United Kingdom labour force and, in fact, local authorities employed a growing tD 
6 
proportion of social workers. Compared with around eight millions employed in 
manufacturing, or three millions in the distributive trades, the voluntary sector's 
importance as an employer was slight. 
. 4. VO ks a result, of its diminutive economic importance, the voluntary sector attracted 
little attention from government departments or their statisticians and few reliable 
statistical studies exist. The voluntary sector's importance was ideological rather than 
economic and as a result, in spite of the focus on the sector's finances, the evidence 
adduced during the debate was mostly impressionistic. In the absence of reliable 
national statistics, the assertions of the voluntarists and their political supporters went 
unchallenged. The political importance attached by all parties to the ideal that the 
8 
voluntary organisations embodied lent them significance beyond their economic weight . 
Guy Routk Oceppation. and P4y in Great Britaým, 1906-60, (London: Macnifflan, 
1980), 17 
6 See, for example, Ministry of Health, Social Workers, 3 
There were occasional individual attempts to provide statistical data on the income 
of voluntary organisations. D'Aeth's report on the finances of Liverpool's charities has 
been mentioned in chapter two. Some Council's of Social Service and branches of the 
FWA also produced regular series of financial data for their localities. These local series 
provide no real guide to the overall national picture, however. In 1934, Constance 
Braithwaite made a brave attempt to extrapolate from her study of the income of 
voluntary organisations in Liverpool, London and Manchester, and estimated that, 
excluding the endowed charities and religious and political groups, "the total receipts of 
all charitable organizations in 1934 were probably between, 05 million and 150 
million. " Constance Braithwaite, The Volunt4g Citizen: An Enquiry into the Place of 
Philanthropy in the Communi , (London: 
Methuen, 1938), 163 
8 Geoffrey Finlayson, 'A Moving Frontier: Voluntarism and the State in British Social 
Welfare 1911-1949', Twentieth CepWU British Hist Vol. 1 No. 2, (1990), 184 
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The political discourse on voluntarism had to acconnnodate the changes in the 
relationship between voluntary organisations and state social services: voluntary sector 
finance provided a convenient vocabulary for this discursive adjustment. 
A further problem with the idea of a crisis of voluntarism is that what 
contemporary advocates saw as the decline of the voluntary ethos in the post-war years 
drew heavily on examples from the health sector. This creates a number of problems. 
First, this focus on the impact of the state on a particular sector of voluntary endeavour 
ignored the real character of the voluntary hospitals and underestimated the extent of 
state support for them before 1948. It also underestimated the extent to which the NHS 
(in common with other parts of the welfare state) continued to rely on voluntary 
participation in support of its day-to-day work. The role of hospital visitors and bodies 
devoted to providing supplementan7 services was often overlooked. In the late 1950s, 
Richard Titmuss thought that this voluntary contribution to the health services alone 
might reflect "a much larger investment of time and energy than that given before 1948 
by those serving on voluntary hospital committees. " 9 
Contemporaries' fixation on the health services is understandable: the hospitals 
were the largest and most important British voluntaq institutions before war, and the 
impact of the welfare state in the form of the National Health Service was, in their case, 
brutally decisive: they were simply nationalised. This focus has produced a one-sided 
picture, however, by eliding the distinction between philanthropic and mutual forms of 
voluntarism. The dependence of those who held the view that the late 1940s represented 
a crisis of voluntarism, depended on an imprecise definition of voluntary social service. 
It depended on an overstatement of the strictly philanthropic work of the voluntary 
hospitals. In the Edwardian period welfare provision in was marked by a trend "towards 
an exclusive risk pool, towards contractual entitlement, and towards a self-financing 
system of intra-personal redistribution. " 10 This tendency was apparent in the hospital 
sector. Developments in their financing compromised the voluntary character of the 
voluntary hospitals. Increasingly in the pre-war period, services to patients were paid 
for 
9 Richard Titmuss, Ess4ys on the Welfare State, (London: George Allen and UnNvin, 
1958), 145; National Council of Social Service, Voluntanr Service and the State, 
(London: NCSS, 1952), 65 
" Paul Johnson, 'Risk, redistribution and social welfare in Britain from the Poor Law 
to Beveridge', Daunton (ed. ), Ch _, 
246 
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by "hospital charges, requiring pre-insurance provision or direct payments from a 
widening social clientele". " The middle-classes and better-off workers found in the 
voluntary hospitals an economic and acceptable source of acute health care. For the poor 
and the chronically sick, who could not afford the necessary insurance cover, the route to 
care led to the work-house or to the local authoritýZ hospitals, which were hardly better. 12 
The mutual and commercial aspects of voluntary hospital provision were so difficult to 
ignore by the 1920s t1tat the sociologist Brian Abel Smith remarked, "no distinguishing 
charactefistic of a voluntan, ý hospital could be found". 13 
This focus on the hospital sector led to an exaggerated impression of the financial 
impact of the welfare state on the voluntary sector. The nationalisation of the hospitals 
in 1948 did appear to reduce the financial resources of the voluntary sector, but the 
impact of this change should be kept in perspective. Some idea of the scale of the 
change may be gleaned from transactions of the Official Trustee in transferring the 
stocks and securities it held on behalf of voluntary hospitals. During 1950, for example, 
the Official Trustee transferred some 14,117,892 of stocks and other securities to the 
Nifinistry of Health, to the boards of governors of teaching hospitals and the governing 
bodies of medical schools. A further 089,086 of stocks and securities were transferred 
in the following year. By the end of 1951 this process was largely completed and the 
Commissioners reported that the total value of assets transferred to these bodies 
amounted to L10,837,259. This was a large sum, but it amounted to less than 10 per cent 
of the total value of the securities still held on behalf of endowed charities by the Official 
Trustee in 195 1.14 The proportion of the property of all endowed charities administered 
by the Official Trustee in the 1940s is unknown and it is not possible to establish the 
distribution of its holdings across different sectors of voluntary activity. It is therefore 
possible that the published figures underestimate both the scale and the proportional 
impact on the voluntary sector of the transfer of the hospitals to the NHS. Individual 
voluntary hospitals may have transferred a much larger sum directly to NHS and this, 
may have represented a much larger proportion of the resources of the voluntary sector. 
On the other hand, the pattern of increasing state intervention in medical affairs during 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Cherm 'Before', 307 
Cherry, 'Before', 306,322-3 
Quoted by Cherry, 'Before', 307 
,y Commission 
Report 1952,6 mmission _Lt Charity 
Co ii Report, 1950,8; Chgn 
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the preceding half century, it seems likely that the Official Trustees were more likely to 
manage the funds of voluntary hospitals than those of other kinds of some other types of 
voluntary oiýganisation. 
Two aspects of the transfer of the hospitals to the NHS were positively 
advantageous to certain voluntary organisations. One was the creation of a new state 
funded body able to purchase services from voluntary organisations. Another was a shift 
in the balance of power within the voluntary sector. Voluntary organisations that were 
not included in the new state health system and that had hitherto existed in the shadow of 
the voluntary hospitals acquired a greater relative weiglit within the voluntary sector. 
They, were also relieved of a mzýjor competitor for public contributions to charity. The 
amputation of the voluntary hospitals from the voluntary sector bestowed upon the larger 
national organisations, including the NCSS, a platform to set a new agenda for the 
voluntar-y sector but it also threatened a new phase of competition for donations from the 
public. The NCSS was eager to grasp the opportunity to reformulate the goals of 
voluntarism. The problem for the NCSS and other forward looking voluntary 
organisations was that the opportunity presented itself at the same time as a fmancial 
crisis that was qualitative as well as quantitative. The quantitative aspects are discussed 
in the next. section while the qualitative problem is outlined in the following two 
sections. 
Was there a financial crisis? 
Bearing in mind the caveats mentioned above, it is now worth looking at some of the 
evidence that suggests that voluntary organisations experienced a fall in revenues In the 
aftermath of the establishment of the welfare state. For reasons that have already 
been 
mentioned there is a dearth of official statistics relating to voluntary sector 
finance. 
Because of the special tax status of voluntary organisations, the Inland Revenue was one 
government department that did have an interest in the finances of the voluntary sector. 
The figures provided by the Inland Revenue on the income of charities seen], at 
first 
sight, to support the thesis that the voluntary sector experienced a prolonged recession 
in 
the 1940s and 1950s. 
The Commissioners of the Inland Revenue published an annual estimate of the 
aggregate income of "charities, colleges, hospitals, schools, 
friendly societies etc. " 
- 173- 
covering the whole of the United Kingdom. These figures were analysed under the three 
main categories of income from land (Schedule A), income from investments (Schedule 
C), and profits from business activities (Schedule D). Table 8.1 shows the 
Conu-nissioners' estimates for the period 1935-60. According to the Commissioners, the 
income of voluntary organisations from all three sources went into a steep decline during 
the 1940s and 1950s. Total income fell by almost 50 per cent in real terms and by almost 
60 per cent from its peak in 1938 to its lowest level in 1955, apparently confirming 
conventional wisdom that the 1940s and 1950s were years of recession for the voluntary 
sector. 
There are a number of reasons for not taking the narrative represented in these 
figures at face value. First, the broad definition employed by the Inland Revenue 
includes friendly societies and other organisations with a high mutual component in their 
finances such as the hospitals, as well as those such as the public schools which qualified 
for charitable status but which can hardly. be regarded as social service organisations. 
Second, because they were compiled for the purposes of the central government's tax 
collecting the charities included in the figures were predominantly endowed trusts. The 
figures provide data on income that would otherwise have been subject to tax; they do 
not refer to the most important index of the condition of voluntanr organisations - the 
'renewable' sources of income represented by donations and subscriptions. These direct 
contributions by members of the public were drawn from the income of the donors after 
tax and were therefore of no interest to the Inland Revenue. 
, ures, they might still 
be taken as In spite of the problems with the scope of the fl, -o-F 
a crude surrogate index of the health of philanthropy. There are however reasons to 
doubt the quality of the Inland Revenue Commissioners' basic data. The crude data on 
which these figures are based suggest that the Inland Revenue was not concerned to 
y income during this period. For long periods arrive at an accurate estimate of charit- 
Commissioners seem to have been willing to assume that no significant change occurred 
in the income of charities. Between 1948 and 1955, for example, the figures for 
Schedules A and C were not updated at all. Even Schedule D income, which was a more 
contentious issue between charities and the Inland Revenue, appears to have been sulýject 
to no more than a cursory addition for inflation. The Inland Revenue's neglect is not 
difficult to explain. Charity income from all three sources was exempt from income tax 
and represented, on the estimates provided by the Inland Revenue, little more than six 
per cent of total exemptions even at its peak in the late 1930s. These figures reflect the 
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unimportance of charity income in relation to taxable income. The trough of depression 
depicted in Chart 8.1 is, therefore, the product of official neglect, exaggerated by taking 
into account price inflation. These figures do not do not give any sound guide to the 
scope or intensity of the financial problems affecting the voluntary sector during this 
period, although the Inland Revenue's lethargy might be interpreted as an indication that 
the charity sector was not exp., Lmding at a rate sufficient to alarm the Commissioners. 
Reliable souxces with which to compare the Inland Revenue's appraisal of the 
condition of voluntarism are not readily available. One source of comparative data is the 
returns to the Metropolitan Police made by collecting charities in the capital. The 
Metropolitan Police gained powers to licence street collections under the Police Factories 
(etc. ) (N. 
-Iiscellaneous 
Provisions) Ac , 1916. This power to license street collections was 
another of those informal methods of regulation of voluntary organisations that pre- 
existed the 1960 Charities Act. In the 1930s, the Commissioner used this power to put 
pressure on charities to reduce the number of street collections in the capital. The police 
argued that controls were necessary because street collections interfered with pedestrian 
circulation and caused them additional problems in managing London's traffic. The 
number of permits granted for street collections fell from 136 in 1935 to 29 two years 
later when the scheme came fully into operation. The amalgamation of disparate street 
collections required to achieve this reduction had a beneficial effect on the amounts 
collected. The total proceeds of street collections in the Metropolitan Police area rose 
from L242,302 in 1935 to 1296,950 in 1939.15 
Table 8.2 shows the proceeds of London street collections 1938-60. Figure 8.1 
charts the total amount collected during this period and the amount raised per collection. 
For the period under examination, these two series show an almost identical pattern. 
Two features stand out. First, there was an astounding surge in the total amount 
collected between 1939 and 1943. Second, after 1943 there was an equally dramatic 
falling off in the proceeds of street collections in the capital. The chart shows a 50 per 
cent rise in voluntary donations to street collections in the first years of the war. The 
surge crested in 1943 and donations began to fall steeply thereafter. By 1948, the cash 
15 Statistics were compiled and published by the Charity Organisation Society based 
on returns by the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. The COS acti-vely supported 
the scheme and took a lead in helping to reduce street collections. Annual Charities 
Register and D esý 1941,450 ig- I 
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amounts collected had returned to their pre-war level and the total collected fell again in 
the following year. After 1949, there was a partial recoveýas the amounts raised from 
this source settled into a new groove of stability. Of course, this recovery in the cash 
proceeds of street collections conceals a substantial decline in real terms: the L400ý658 
raised in 1956 had little more than half the purchasing power of the L2805 503 raised in 
1938. 
The drop in real income from this source was a serious problem for organisations 
that depended on this source of income. More important than the overall trend, however, 
was its differential impact. Fortunately, the COS/FWA published a more detailed 
analysis based on these figures and returns from some of the major organisers of street 
collections. These all shared the experience of declining revenues from this source 
during the 1950s, but they did not all suffer equally. The experiences of the three 
London street collections shown in Table 8.3 illustrate some trends. The Royal British 
Legion was a large national veterans, organisation. The Alexandra Rose Day Appeal 
was a well-established London 'flag day', which collected money for supplementary 
services in the London voluntary hospitals. Both these collections had special features 
that boosted their figures. The Legion's were the result of a cumulative effort spread 
over the weeks before Remembrance Sunday rather than being the proceeds of a single 
one-off flag day. Similarly, two flag days a year boosted the takings of the Alexandra 
Rose day appeals. The third collection was not for a single organisation but a combined 
collection organised by various animal charities. 
The Legion saw the cash receipts of its annual autumn 'poppy day' improve 
substantially during the war and the Legion remained the most successful single 
collection throughout the period. Although it claimed around a fifth of the total receipts 
from street collections in the capital during the war, it accounted for about a third of the 
total for the ten years after the war. Receipts from street collections held up well in cash 
terms rising from 193,872 in 1939 to 1104,263 in 1941 and continued to rise in 1942 and 
1943 when it reached 1124,000. The Alexandra Rose Day Appeal enjoyed similar 
growth in its cash receipts, increasing its collection from 146,215 in 1939 to 158,732 in 
1943. 
After the war, the fortunes of the two organisations followed a similar pattern. 
Both collections reached a nadir in cash terms in 1949. For the Legion the 1949 slump 
in receipts was sudden and unexpected, for its collections had held up well in the 
preceding five years. The fall in the Legion's income from street collections was short- 
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lived. Although 1950 was also a poor year, the Legion's receipts from the poppy day 
appeal recovered in subsequent years and remained relatively stable in cash terms 
throughout the 1950s. For the Alexandra Rose coHectors the blow came a year earlier 
than for the Legion: the 1948 collection of, 129,013 was already less than half the level 
in the peak year of 1943. As a result, the 126ý 181 collected in 1949 was a 
disappointment but it was less of a shock. Receipts had been in decline since 1943 but 
the sudden slump in collections m 1948 and 1949 was dramatic. Thereafter, like the 
Legion, the Alexandra Rose collections rallied. By the middle of the 1950s, both 
organisations eqjoyed receipts from their annual collections comparable in cash terms to 
the levels of a decade earlier. This, of course, represented a substantial fall in real tenns 
- by more than half M the case of the Alexandra Rose Day Appeal. 
The Royal British Legion and the Alexandra Rose Day Appeal reflected the 
broad trend of all the London street collections in the 1940s and 1950s. The combined 
animals collection was the only major London street collection recorded in the Annual 
Charities Registe to defy, the trend. Though the amount it collected was smaller than the 
two organisations discussed above, it raised a substantial amount of money on the streets 
of the capital during the 1940s and 1950s. Two points stand out. In contrast to the 
Royal British Legion, this growth in its share of the total London street collection 
accompanied growth in the real value of the combined collection. Its share of the total 
amounts collected rose from two percent in 1938 to six or seven percent throughout the 
1950s. Whereas the Legion's larger share of total collections reflected a slower than 
average decline in receipts, the larger share of the combined animal charities was 
reflected growth in real terms. The L25,492 collected in 1957, its peak year, was worth 
almost half as much again as the L6,867 the combined collection had raised in 1939. 
The overall pattern of voluntary contributions to street collections in the capital 
suggests some important features of the financial crisis that affected voluntary 
organisations in the late 1940s and influenced their political supporters. The first is the 
exceptional character the period immediately preceding the downturn of the second half 
of the 1940s. The upsurge of charitable giving during the war was unprecedented and it 
was unlikely to be sustained following the war. Nevertheless, the collecting charities 
experienced the fall from these high levels as a real slump and the impact of inflation 
reinforced the sense of crisis. If the wartime surge is excluded from consideration, the 
generosity of Londoners to the collecting tins of the voluntary orcFanisations and charities 
remained relatively stable, growing by a about quarter in cash terms between the late 
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1930s and the late 1950s though this rate of growth was insufficient to offset the effects 
of inflation. 
The success of the combined animal charities collection in increasing their 
receipts from street collections in contrast to the Alexandra Rose Day Appeal and the 
Royal British Legion suggests that it was possible to resist the downturn in voluntary 
contributions. It is tempting to explain the success of the combined animals collection 
by the fact that the service it provided fell outside the welfare state. The Royal National 
Lifeboat Institute (RNLI), which made considerable play of its voluntary character, was 
also able to maintain the real value of its receipts from its annual flag day in the capital 
during this period. This is not the whole story, however. Royal Society for the 
Protection of Animals in common with a number of other animal charities had long 
enjoyed statutory powers covering the welfare of animals along with substantial state 
subsidy. The Annual Registe provides no information on the partners in the combined 
animal charities so it is impossible to say whether the RSPCA was in fact a beneficiary. 
There was, however, a higher public awareness of the extent of state support for human 
than for animal welfare thanks to the very recent introduction of the welfare state. This 
alone might explain the sudden drop in contributions in the late 1940s though the fact 
that the nadir coincided with the economic crisis of 1947 and 1948 must also have 
contributed to the fall in donations. Thereafter receipts from collections improved as the 
major state intervention in welfare receded from the consciousness of donors and 
organisations like the Royal British Legion and the Alexandra Rose Day Appeal Fund 
adapted their message to stress that their services were in addition to the basic service 
provided by the state. 
One further factor that may have mitigated the overall effect of a decline in 
voluntary contributions was the size of the organisations involved. The COS/FWA 
published statistics on the income of charities in its Annual Charities Register and Digest 
and these are shown in Table 8.4. Coverage was confmed to voluntary bodies based in 
London, though this included some national organisations. As the gaps in the table 
reveal, compilation of the figures was erratic and the FWA discontinued publication 
entirely after 1952, mainly because they proved so difficult to collect. As a result, they 
must be treated with considerable caution. The number of organisations furnishing the 
Register with financial information fell firom more than 1,000 in 1938 to less than 100 
in 
1952. The introduction of the NHS partly explains the decline in the number of 
organisations reporting. The figures for 1939 included 146 London 
hospitals that 
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together accounted for slightly more than a third of the total reported income. A further 
218 organisations covered by the survey also provided medical services, such as 
dispensaries, and were taken over by the NHS in 1948. 
The total income reported fell from almost 112 million in 1939 to 18 million in 
1948, -cmd L1.5 million in 1952. Almost all the difference between the 1939 figure and 
that for 1948 may be accounted for by the removal of the medical charities from the 
reporting organisations. These organisations derived a small proportion of their income 
from voluntary sources and once they had been weeded out, the organisations that 
remained derived a greater proportion of their income from voluntary sources. This 
statistical artefact helps to explain the fact that the mean income per organisation almost 
doubled in real ten-ns over the period taken as a whole. This lends some credibility to the 
argument that the impact of the nationalisation of the hospitals on voluntary social 
service as a whole has been overstated. The imprecision of these figures makes it 
impossible to draw firm conclusions but they suggest that larger voluntary organisations g 
were, on average, better able to weather the downturn in voluntary giving of the late 
1940s. 
The data discussed in this section draws mainly on London sources and this may 
reflect unique circumstances in the capital. The wartfi-ne surge and post-war slump in 
donations, and the nadir reached during the recession in 1947 and 1948 both suggest that 
one off donations were responsive to national political and economic developments. 
Broadly similar patterns of giving may well have affected street collections in other cities 
and regions. Though any conclusion must remain highly qualified, the data tend to 
support the notion that voluntary organisations experienced a downturn in at least one 
source of voluntary contributions in the late 1940s and that this crisis coincided with the 
introduction of the welfare state, though this was not the only factor influencing 
contributions to charity collections. The data also suggest, however, that the crisis was 
temporary and that its impact was variable. The interaction of the downturn in street 
collections with the ideas of voluntary organisations on funding was both more profound 
and more enduring. This impact arose from the character of street collections and 
from 
developments within the voluntary sector. These -, ire discussed in the next section. 
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The cost of caring 
Table 8.4 serves as reminder that street collections were not the only source of voluntan, 
income for voluntary organisations. The voluntarv income in the table includes other 
types of donations and subscriptions. One item of voluntary income, legacies and 
bequests, were listed separately and, as the table shows, these appear to have held up 
well on average during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Donations to street collections 
represented a different type of transaction from donations solicited directly from 
supporters, and from subscription, legacies and bequests. Solicited donations, regular 
subscriptions, legacies and bequests assumed a relationship with the donor. Street 
collections implied a single, transitory interaction with each donor. The distinction was 
not hard and fast, of course. No doubt, subscribers were more inclined than other 
members of the public to put a few pennies into the collecting tins of organisations they 
already supported with regular contributions. 
The previous section has also suggested that in weathering the downturn in street 
collections organisations depended partly upon public consciousness of their cause. 
Organisations like the Royal British Legion and the RNLI actively promoted such a 
consciousness through advertising campaigns. Advertising campaigns often coincided 
with an organisation's mobilisation towards a flag day but they also aimed to foster long- 
term support for the organisation's objectives. Advertising implicitly sought to generate 
a relationship between the voluntary organisation and potential supporters. 
16 The 
balance of this relationship is indicative of an important change in the character of the 
-voluntary funding. Advertising could make much of one side of the relationship, the 
object of charity; the donor could not be addressed in person but only in the abstract. By 
the mid-twentieth century, marketing to the abstract donor was central to the strategy of 
voluntary organisations. Increasingly the methods of raising voluntary income from all 
sources resembled the methods employed in street collections. 
16 Offer has argues that the strategy of business advertising is to create the illusion of a 
personal relationship between buyer and seller. Advertising for voluntary organisations, 
followed much the same pattern. See Avner Offer, 'The Mask of Intimacy: 
Advertising 
yI and the Quality of Life', Avner Offer (ed. ), In Pursuit of the 
Quality of Life (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996), 211-255 
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Changes in the fort-ns of accounting adopted by voluntary organisations help to 
trace the structural changes that had occurred in the voluntary sector as it adapted to a 
mass market. In 1848 the Earl of Shaftesbury could boast at a May Meeting "that 
everything in the way of religion and charity that is done in this country, is done by a 
small knot of chosen persons, whose names you will find repeated in the catalogue of 
every char ity. " 17 These 'catalogues, provide an excellent map of the changing 
economics of voluntary social service. For much of the nineteenth century a list of 
subscribers was often regarded as sufficient account of the organisation's operations. The 
g fact that this or that distinguished individual patron supported it was an adequate 
guarantee of an organisation's bona fides. Their wealth and reputation attracted further 
financial support for the organisations they endorsed. Accountability through the list of 
subscribers reflected the business culture of the early nineteenth century, and shielded 
from demands for public disclosure by the doctrine of 'trustworthy unaccountability' 
voluntarý, social senrice was slow to adapt. As late as 1888, Edivin Hodder in his 
biography of the Unitarian and radical MP for Bristol, Samuel Morley, could discuss his 
subject's philanthropy in terms of the business standards of an earlier age. Morley's 
reputation as a businessman underwrote the philanthropic enterprises he backed, for he 
made "the disposal of his money a matter of earnest and most careful solicitude. " 18 
Social and economic change, as well as pressures from within the voluntary 
sector combined to alter this. As voluntary organisations drew support from a wider 
base, it was not longer possible for each donor or subscriber to keep a close scrutiny of 
the activities of the organisations they supported. A new method of ensuring the 
accountability of charities was required. The COS led the way in calling for higher 
standards of reporting, especially financial reporting, by voluntary organisations. In a 
paper read at a conference of the COS in May 1882, Loch presented a detailed critique of 
existing charitable organisation, and called for a programme of public persuasion "to 
purify, charity and pleadings for the necessity of science". Flis suggestions for improving 
the public accountability of charities were directed principally at the Trustees of 
endowed charities, but they were equally applicable to all forms of voluntary endeavour. 
One of the deficiencies identified by Loch was the paucity of infon-nation emanating 
17 Quoted in Clyde Binfield, George Williams and the Y. M. C. A.: A Study in Victorian 
Social Attitudes, (London: Heinemann, 1973),, 151 
18 Edwin Hodder, Lite of Samuel Morle , (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1888), 219 
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from charities. He called for the publication of "an annual statement or reports, giving, 
besides the usual balance sheets, the conditions of admission and any particulars of 
public interest. " He also called, for example, for "the adding up of contribution lists. " 
He regarded this as "an obvious safeguard, easily applied. " 19 
Standardised financial reporting remained an elusive goal even in the 1940s. The 
Society's campaign was successful in that the inclusion of some kind of financial 
statement in an annual report became the habit of many voluntary organisations. Even 
leading, modernist voluntary organisations might be in default of this desideratum. 
Although the NCSS endorsed the principle, it was not until after the appointment of 
Haynes as General Secretary that annual accounts became in fact, a regular feature of the 
Council's own published annual report. The financial statement increasingly usurped the 
list of subscribers. There was nothing particularly sinister about this. The growing 
numbers of individual donors meant that for larger organisations the list became an 
increasingly unwieldy appendage. The last list of subscribers published by the NCSS in 
its 1938/9 Report took up almost 16 pages of small print. Paper rationing following the 
fall of Norway no doubt contributed the Council's decision, but the National Institute for 
the Deaf maintained the practice until 1943/4. In that year's report, which covered two 
years, the list of subscribers comprised 21 pages out of 73 - almost a third of the report. 
20 
Progressively, across the voluntary sector, donors and subscribers were aggregated 
anonymously as a category of income in the financial report. 
The anonymity of donors and subscribers was of some symbolic importance. The 
organisation itself moved into the foreground as the annual report, and the financial 
statement in particular, usurped the role of the notable individual sponsor in testifying to, ý4ý 
reputation. The announcements of patrons, which still survive on the title pages of many 
19 C. S. Loch, 'Some Necessary Reforms in Charitable Work', Paper Read at a 
Conference of Members of the Charity Organisation Societies and Others, May 2,1882, 
British LibrgU P4pers of the Charity Organisation Socie1y, 8277. dd3. -), 4. In adopting 
this stance, the Society was ahead of mainstream accounting thought. As late as 1940s 
professional accounting bodies opposed a requirement on companies to publish a profit 
and loss statement, arguing that a simple balance sheet ought to be sufficient. Nissam 
Aranya, 'The Influence of Pressure Groups on Financial Statements in Britain', Abacus, 
vol. 10 No. 1, June 1974,3-12 
20 NCSS Annual Repo 1938/9; National Institute for the Deaf Annual Repo , 
1943/4 
-182- 
annual reports, represented a vestigial survival of list of subscribers, but the increased 
prominence given to the accounts attenuated the direct connection between patronage 
and funding. The change reflected a qualitative shift in the character of voluntary 
income. Where Shaftesbury and Morley had occupied a position analogous to that of 
investors in a business, the anonymous donors abstracted in the annual accounts were 
more like consumers. 
This transfonnation of the economic base of voluntary social service has often 
been viewed through the distorting lens of the decline of the voluntary entrepreneur; a 
symptom of the disengagement of wealthier citizens from local communities as they 
turned their attention to national politics in response to micreased national taxation. 21 
This view was current in the 1940s. Beveridge attributed the expansion of the donor 
base coupled with a declining contribution from individual donors to the social levelling 
effects of higher rates of taxation. He was concerned that "the unequal society of the 
past" had at least allowed the entrepreneurs of social service to "interest wealthy 
individual patrons", but that in the social service state they would "find it hard to secure 
22 enough private givers". Many voluntarists shared this view, though they drew more 
optimistic conclusions. The Liverpool Council of Social Service, in a survey of the 
fmances of voluntary organisations in the city in 1947, observed, "redistribution of 
wealth has ... eliminated the wealthy supporters of charitable 
institutions". The 
Liverpool CSS positively welcomed this development, seeing the disappearance of 
individual patronage as having "extended the opportunities of kindly help from an ever- 
increasing circle of possible collaborators. " 23 
Whether the wealthy patrons were in retreat or not, and few voluntary 
organisations entirely abandoned the pursuit of rich men and women, the expansion of 
the donor base favoured a particular style of organisation, one that was orientated 
towards donors and subscribers as consumers rather than as investors. Redefining the 
donor as a consumer of the service raised ethical problems. As far as it was a business, 
the service provided by organised voluntary social set-vice was peculiar, and for most 
21 See Yeo, Religio , 
298 
22 Beveridge, Volunj4a Action, 317 
23 Liverpool Council of Social Service, A Financial Survey of Voluntary Social 
Welfare Societies and Institutions on Merseyside, (Liverpool: Liverpool Council of 
Social Service: 1947), 29 
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voluntary organisations, the scope for commercialisation was circumscribed. 24 The drift 
in the status of donors from investors to consumers was significant because it eroded the 
intellectual coherence of charity organisation. The ideological keystone of charity 
orcr,, i gan sation was the establishment of an enduring, conscious and direct relationship 
between the donor and the object of charity. While the donors, or at least the most 
important donors, were conceived as investors in a voluntary organisation, the notion of 
a continuous and personal relationship between donor and otject was still tenable. In 
this case, the voluntary organisation was merely a mediating link and the guarantor of the 
enduring character of the relationship. The transformation of the donor into a consumer 
altered qualit-atively the function of the voluntary organisation. 
The changing economic environment of voluntarism 
The conception of the charity organisers that direct personal contact between the donor 
and recipient was the essence of charity still had considerable purchase in the 1940s and 
1950s. The letters page of The Times in the autumn of 1955 hosted an exchange of 
views on the financing of charities. The correspondence discussed the difficulties faced 
'14 Improved standards of living for most people meant increased discretionary 
spending of all types during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Voluntary 
organis. -ations sometimes benefited from this trend but usually at the expense of their 
voluntary character. Some classes of local voluntary organisations were able to adapt to 
rising popular consumption in a mass market. Many local football clubs, for example, 
originally religious and community associations, had already begun to transform 
themselves into commercial leisure industries by the turn of the century. Yeo argues that 
for voluntary organisations the prospect of becoming a profitable operation on the model 
, 
Rgligion, of professional sport "represented an ever present magnet of attraction. " Yeo, 
318. It is hard to believe that many voluntary social service organisations entertained 
serious ambitions to follow the path of the football clubs, though the success of 
evangelical and other religious organisations in the United States shows that 
development as a commercial enterprise could, in certain circumstances, be open to those 
selling religion. 
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by charities and voluntary organisations in raising money from the public. It also 
showed the tenacity of the idea that donations to charity were not simply a neutral matter 
of money but that the relationship between donor and the object of charity endowed them 
with a moral content. The correspondence revealed that the methods of raising funds 
, ivailable to voluntary organisations were at odds with the ideology of charity 
organisation. 
F. C. Scott, Chairman of the Provincial Insurance Company, initiated the debate 
on the responsibility of businesses to voluntary effort. Scott rehearsed the argument that 
inflation and high personal taxation had extinguished the middle class family's "margin 
available for charitable giving"'. He thought that generating increased funds from 
voluntary sources would require "either a vast increase in the number of small 
subscribers or the substitution in large measure of the support of industrial undertakings 
and business firms. " Scott favoured the latter and his reservations about the scope for 
increasing revenues from the public are illuminating. First, raising the number of 
subscribers would require "a revolutionary awakening of the charitable impulse in the 
minds of large numbers of people who have not been accustomed ... to recognise 
recognize their charitable obligations". Second, any drive to enlarge the pool of 
subscribers would call into being 6'an immense and costly machinery to organize appeals 
for money. "25 
Scott's appeal for businesses to donate more to voluntary organisations elicited a 
mixed response. Many were supportive, although some like T. H. Brand, Honorary 
Treasurer of the Young Women's Christian Association, thought that businesses would 
be more inclined to support voluntary organisations if they erýjoyed the same tax 
exemptions on charitable donations as businesses in the USA. Several chain-nen and 
treasurers of voluntary organisations leaped to the defence of industry, urging that Scott 
had underestimated the benevolence of private industry. 
26 Some stressed that more 
voluntary organisations would meet with more success if they approached businesses on 
25 The Times, 3 October 1955,9 
26 Ivor Bulmer-Thomas, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Flistoric 
Churches Preservation Trust, praised the outstanding financial contribution of private 
businesses to the Trust. The Times, 19 October 1955,9 
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the basis that it was in their own interest to support the work of an organisation. 27 
.1 
like Ian Henderson Director General of the National Spastics So ie , di puted 
Others, 5c ty 8 
the decline of voluntary giving from the public. He expressed his -appreciation of the 
way in which working-class men and women have accepted the new responsibilities 
attendant upon their increased earning power. 7 28 
There was another strand in the responses to Scott's letter. This came from 
individuals rather than from representatives of voluntary organisations. R. G. Dowse of 
Carshalton set the tone. Ifis oklection was the "company directors who authorise the 
subscriptions do not suffer the impact in their own pockets. " Directors were not, he 
oklected, "keepers of their shareholder's conscience. ý7 29 Others took up this theme. 
Frederick Marsden of Solihull articulated the principles of organised charity when he 
argued that a private donor -deri-vres a satisfaction which is spiritually beneficial" and 
might -go on to the satisfying experience of adding personal service to financial aid. 1130 
Marsden's sentiments were echoed in R. B. Beevor's sarcastic inquiry whether "an 
incorporated company, if still without a body to kicked has yet acquired a soul to be 
damned or saved through charity. " 
The emphasis on the spiritual aspect of charity in those letters that invoked the 
centrality of the relationship between the donor and the object is significant. So is 
Scott's reply. Rationalistic charity organisation in the nineteenth century had vaunted its 
antagonism to the impulse giving of the religious, especially of the Evangelicals. This 
27 Otto Neimeyer, for example, reappearing in his persona as the Honorary Treasurer 
of the National Association of Mental Health, argued that industry had an interest in 
supporting the work of his charity, as "more working days are lost to industry through 
the all-pervading incidence of mental troubles and neuroses than from any other cause. " 
The Times, 25/10/55,9. In similar vein, Donald H. McCullough, Chairman of the 
Publicity Committee of the National Trust, gave details of the Trust's corporate 
membership scheme. This enabled companies to support the work of the Trust and their 
employees to obtain membership of the Trust at reduced rates. The Tisnes, 24 October 
1955,14 
28 The Times, 5 October 1955,9 
29 The Times, 5 October 1955,9 
The Times, 15 October 1955,7 
31 The Times, 22 October 1955,7 
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rationalistic articulation of the centrality of the relationship between the donor and the 
otliect was eerily absent from the columns of ihelimes. Its only defenders were those 
who were prepared to invoke a spiritual dimension. Scott's response to the objections of 
the religious is revealing for he expressed charity organisation in the less ideological 
form that it had assumed by the mid-twentieth century. This was no less antagonistic to 
impulse charity than its nineteenth century precursor but the antagonism had allowed it 
to drift significantly from its intellectual underpinnings. Scott rounded on the 
proponents of the spiritual dimension of charity asserting that he "would welcome rather 
than deplore the loss of the satisfaction which is spiritually beneficial ... of which I am 
depriving the individual. " The dependence of voluntary organisations on individual 
donations left them subject to the whims of individual donors. Scott felt that wider 
corporate support for charity -would almost certainly lead to a more discriminating 
support of charitable institutions and the insistence on greater efficiency and economy in 
administration". He hoped that it would even lead to 66 the reduction in overlapping 
societies. " 32 
Scott expressed the dissatisfaction of many in the voluntary sector with the way 
in', vvhich the demands of fundraising affected individual -\,, oluntary organisations and the 
sector as a whole. In its report on the finances of voluntary organisations in the city, the 
Liverpool CSS discussed the difficulties created by new methods of raising voluntary 
income. One problem was that they often imposed new costs. Some voluntary bodies, 
for example, had resorted to the employment of "a professional salaried collector with 
extensive, and expensive advertising, and a commission on the takings. " 33 In 
organisations that could not afford a professional fundraiser, the task of eliciting 
voluntary donations usually fell on the Honorary Treasurer. The report adumbrates the 
tedious routines followed by voluntary organisations. Names and addresses of 
subscribers were culled from the reports of other voluntary bodies and from local 
directories, concentrating on the ""fashionable" or well-to-do" and these were 
"circularised on behalf of some society in which they have no particular interest". The 
result, the report implies, was rarely proportional to the effort. 
34 
32 The Times, 28 October 1955,9 
33 Liverpool CSS, Financia, 30 
34 Liverpool CSS Financial, 30 
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Canvassing support from a wider public was labour intensive. The report 
acknowledged that money raised from street collections and flag days was, for some 
organisations, a significant source of income and that it was the only way to "collect in 
the total a good man), pennies from some who might otherwise contribute nothing at alr'. 
The indignity of chasing the impulse donor was also keenly felt and the Council argued 
that it had outlived its usefulness, being unreliable, demeaning and an irritation to the 
public. Their conclusion was, they believed all the more cogent for the proceeds from 
such efforts were also in decline. Recent figures for Liverpool suggested a thirty per 
cent fall in receipts from this source between 1929-33 alone. 35 
Sitney, the theorist of social service, expressed a different aspect of t1fis 
dissatisfaction with the distorting impact of voluntary funding on the activities of 
voluntary organisations. He shared the Liverpool CSSs concern at the "dangerous 
proportion of the energy of the supporters absorbed in the sordid business of collecting 
funds". Simey found a "still more unfortunate feature of this form of social 
administration" in the fact that 16 every one of its activities must be turned to account for 
the purposes of money-getting". Simey's distaste for the moral distortion introduced by 
competition evoked a shared vocabulary of voluntary action. He worried that, in 
practice, many voluntary organisations fell short of the ideal. Their preoccupation with 
fund-raising imposed on voluntary organisations, a mentality that thought only of the 
short-term. In some cases this 14 in Simey's view, to the absolute subversion of the 
moral content of voluntary action. Competition for the 611imited income to be derived 
from those who wish them well" encouraged voluntary organisations to conceal failure 
and promote success. This created an inherent tendency against openness and 
accountability and made it "impossible to 'clean up' the unsatisfactory parts of a 
voluntarv organisation". This issued in "insincere and jealous atmosphere" which 
destroyed "much of the value of the work that is perfortned". The "value" that Simey 
had in mind was the moral content of the charitable act, and this in turn derived from 
contact between persons. The dependence of voluntary org. -cinisations on voluntary 
funding actually undermined their work in this respect. 
36 
What the discussion in the letters columns of he Times and the views expressed 
by Scott, the Liverpool CSS and Simey show was that the temporary quantitative 
35 Liverpool CSS, Financia, 31 
36 Sitney, Principles, 136 
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downturn in voluntary funding outlined at the beginning of this chapter overshadowed a 
more profound qualitative problem with voluntary funding. This qualitative dimension 
of the crisis of voluntarism was a conflict between the ideology of organised charity, to 
which many modem voluntary organisations including the NCSS officially subscribed, 
a a: nd their reliance on the kind of impulse charity that the creed of charity organisation 
had condemned. This ideological problem was intensified by structural changes in the 
management of -voluntary organisations and this aspect of the financial crisis of 
voluntarism. is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 9: Professionalism in the Voluntary Sector 
Alongside declining income, mounting staff costs was one of the most consistent complaints 
voiced b-y voluntary organisations in the late 1940s. Squeezed between these two trends, some 
observers doubted voluntary organisations' capacity to meet the challenge of finding a new role 
under the welfare state. This chapter argues that the focus on rising staffing costs was 
disproportionate to their actual effect on voluntary organisations, in the 1940s. The ethos of 
voluntary social service, with its emphasis on doing good without seeking personal reward, 
provided an effective internal mechanism for dampening demands for higher wages. This ethos 
kept in check wage inflation within voluntary organisations in spite of advancing 
professionalisation both of care and of management. 
C -, I oncerns about the excessive administrative expenditure of some voluntary 
organisations were more often than not coded expressions of hostility to the employment of 
paid staff at all. This reflected anxieties about more than simply the money involved, it gave 
voice to an underlying unease about the implications of organisation for the ideal of voluntary 
social service. It was a manifestation of strains imposed by organisation on the ideology of 
voluntary social service. 01ganisation disrupted customary relationships associated with 
voluntary social service. 
Deferential servants 
The employment of paid workers was not a new development in the twentieth century. It was 
already clear by the middle of the nineteenth century, that the rich could no longer discharge 
their moral obligation to the poor directly. Instead, their spiritual counsellors advised them, 
"they should support agencies for the purpose - district visitors, scripture readers, missionaries 
andclergy. "l As long as those employed by voluntary organisations occupied a spiritual or 
quasi-spiritual role, the financial benefit they enjoyed could be accommodated by existing 
conceptions of social hierarchy - they existed merely as an elaboration of the relationship 
between congregation and cleric. Charity organisation, with its emphasis on a professional 
I Boyd Hilton, The Age of Atonement: The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and 
Economic Thou! gbt (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 280 
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approach to casework, helped to undermine this accommodation. Asvoluntary social services 
expanded and as questions of social and economic welfare became politically contentious 
during the first half of the twentieth centun, the strains imposed by organisations and 
, 
the 
employment of professional carers and especially of professional managerý` S 
The professionalisation of voluntary social service remained controversial in the 1940s, 
although the practice of employing staff was already firmly entrenched. Henry Mess, head of 
research at the NCSS during the early years of the war, still found widespread objection on 
)4 
principle to the employment of paid workers. As a professional social worker himself, Mess, of 
course, did not endorse this view. He thought that the historic situation in which most "of the 
work of the earlier charitable societies was done by unpaid amateurs" had given rise to a great 
deal of "confused thinking on the subject". Mess hoped that hostility to the payment of salaried 
staff in voluntary organisations was "being superseded by the view that the voluntary and 
philanthropic nature of an association gives that association no warrant to underpay those who 
serve it for wages or salary. " As Mess acknowledged, there were still many who considered 
payment for work in voluntary organisations to be a contradiction in terms, asserting that the 
term 'social service' should be confined to services provided by volunteers. 
Anxieqr about the principle of employing paid staff in voluntary organisations 
inevitably merged with concern that rising wage costs imposed an unsustainable burden on the 
finances of voluntary organisations. Pownell, the Chief Charity Commissioner, confirmed the 
general anxiety about the financial difficulties faced by charities. In his evidence to the 
Charitable Trusts Committee, he observed that charities were finding "it difficult to get an 
efficient clerk now on the same salary as you could get 50 years ago. -3 
The Government's commitment to the maintenance of fall employment after the war 
added to the strain on the budgets of voluntary organisations and the NCSS complained in 1946 
that the rise in "general salary levels is making it increasingly difficult to recruit staff of a 
quality necessary for the Council's work. ý0 The fear that increased opportunities for 
employment in local and central government social services would drive up wage bills in the 
voluntary sector proved unfounded. Eileen Younghusband thought the influence generally 
worked in the opposite direction. Commenting in 1959 on the low salaries available in 
Henry Mess et al., Volunt4U Social Services since 1918, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner, 1947). 7 
3 'CT(50) 4th Meeting', 19, CAB 124/138 
NCSS Finance. and General PWoses Committee, 23 January 1946, LMA/4016IS/01/48(l) 
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statutory services, she argued that they were still "influenced bY the early development of the 
sendces, when a large number of those undertaking social work were untrained or employed by 
charitable organisations with limited resources. " 5 
There are good reasons for accepting Younghusband's opinion. Just as the evidence of 
a funding crisis of -\,, oluntarism proved ambiguous, the evidence for an irresistible and 
insupportable rise in wage costs in the 1940s and 1950s is not clear-cut. Talk of a funding 
crisis obscured a deeper concern with the moral quality of the sources of funding available to 
voluntary organisations. The discussion of rising staff costs often hid a more profound conflict 
at the heart of the voluntary sector. Table 9.1 shows the wages and salary bill of the NCSS 
and, for the sake of comparison, figures for the COS/FWA are given in Table 9.2. The figures 
are indexed for inflation and the tables show the proportion of overall spending taken by 
salaries. The complexity of the voluntary sector, the variety of organisations and services it 
encompassed and the specialised roles that both the FWA and the NCSS played within it make 
generalisation from these figures hazardous. The NCSS and the FWA were leading national 
voluntary organisations and their experience was not typical of the voluntary sector. The tables 
offer an example of the trends in staff costs for two of the larger national voluntary 
organisations. 
Two features invite comment. First, salaries and wages were a large proportion of 
overall expenditure for both organisations. The proportion of NCSS total expenditure going on 
staff costs was slightly higher than for the FWA, but in both cases, for most of the period in 
question, they accounted for more than half of total expenditure. The second noteworthy 
feature of the tables is the relative stability of wages and salary costs over the period as a 
whole. During the early years of the war the National Council's staff costs rose slightly faster 
in real terms than its overall expenditure, but after 1941, wages and salaries fell in real terms. 
As the Council's overall expenditure also fell during this period, the decline reflected the 
contraction of the Council's activities and the call-up of its staff during the wartime emergency. 
Both overall expenditure and salary costs recovered rapidly following the war, though in most 
Years up to 1950 salary costs grew more slowly in real terms than expenditure as a whole. The 
sudden increase in salary costs in two years after the war may well have alarmed Havnes, -Cind 
the other leaders of the National Council, but it hardly reflected an excessive wage pressure on 
the Council. Indeed as a proportion of total spending, salaries remained below their pre-war 
level until 1951. 
5 Nfinistry of Health, Social Workers, 17 
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The pattern M the case of the FWA was somewhat different. Though its staffing costs 
also tel-I in real terms and as a proportion of overall expenditure during the war, there were two 
main differences compared with the NCSS. The FWA's overall spending remained at its pre- 
war level throughout the war. The Association experienced some wage pressures during the 
in-u-nediate post-war years, and by 1948, its wages and salary bill was rising as a proportion of 
total expenditure. It remained considerablv lower than it had been before the war, however. .1 
Both organisations clearly experienced some pressure from rising wage and salary costs 
in the early 1950s reaching a pepk in the case of the NCSS in 1950-1, before declining sharply 
in real ten-ns. Overall NCSS spending also fell markedly during these years. The FWA's 
salary costs followed a similar pattern, peaking in 1949, before falling off. After 1950, salary 
costs fell sharply in real tenns and as a proportion of total expenditure at a time when the 
FWA's overall spending was buoyant. 
These figures help to explain the concerns expressed by voluntary organisations and 
their supporters in the later forties. The upsurge in salary, expenditure may well have appeared 
as an inflation in costs in this area. From the perspective of the 18 years covered by these 
figures, this increase looks somewhat less dramatic than it appeared to contemporaries, What is 
more notable is the close relationship between salaries and total expenditure. These remained 
broadly constant during the 1940s, and 1950s. Indeed rather than wages and salaries 
representing a rising cost during the 1950s, the FWA salary bill fen from a peak of 55 per cent 
of overall spending in 1948 to less than 30 per cent in 1955, Throughout t1le 1940s and early 
1950s, indeed, the FWA's spending on salaries was lower in relative terms than it had been in 
the late 1930s. Although these figures confirm that wages and salaries were a mz(Jor proportion 
of the spending of both organisations, they do not support the belief expressed by Haynes and 
others that voluntary organisations were overwhelmed by rising staff costs. The staffs of these 
two voluntary organisations do not appear to have participated in the growing prosperity of 
workers in other sectors of the British economy during this period. Between 1950 and 1960 the 
wages bill of the NCSS rose in real terms by 60 per centý but average weekly earnings almost 
doubled in the same period .6 Since there 
is no evidence that the NCSS reduced the number of 
people it employed during this period, the figures suggest that that the wages and salaries and 
salaries stagnated. 
K. G. J. C. Knowles, 'Wages and Pioductivity', G. D. N. Worswick and P. H. Ady (eds. ), 
The British Economy in the Nineteen-fifties, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 536 
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The pattern of wages in the voluntary sector in the later 1940s showed two opposing 
tendencies. Pressures to increase wages certainly existed, but a countervailing ideological 
current helped to rein in staff costs. This had reasserted itself by the early 1950s and mitigated 
the post-war tendency for wages to rise. Two surveys carried out at the end of the war 
confkmed that salaries and wages in the voluntary sector were low. During 1946-7, Sitney 
conducted a survey of the salaries and conditions of workers in voluntary social services under 
theauspicesoftheNCSS. This revealed the pattern of low wages and poor conditions of 
service that were endemic in the voluntary sector. I-Es findings accorded substantially with 
those of Youngliusband's parallel study for the Carnegie LJK Trust, w1dch also reported in 
7 
1947 . 
Table 9.3 reproduces the results of Simey's survey of the salaries of 500 social workers. 
More than 90 per cent of those surveyed earned less than 1400 per year, almost three-quarters 
less than 1300, and a fifth less than L200 per year. Only five individuals earned more than 
1700. Younghusband's report confirmed Simey's findings. Starting salaries were "normally 
L200-250 over the whole field of social work" and the majority of social workers could expect 
to rise to about L350 per year. She noted that some chief officers of voluntary organisations, 
received salaries of U, 00041,200 a year, but these were exceptional .8 Simey believed matters 
had improved during the previous 15 years but that there remained "a great deal of leeway ... to 
be overtaken. "9 
Simey and Younghusband regarded these rates of pay as falling far short of those in 
cognate professions. In youth work, for example, Simey noted that although starting pay had 
risen from 190 a year before the war to about 1250 this "would still compare unfavouratbly with 
that of a school teacher". 10 Youngliusband thought it "deplorable that a trained social worker 
should start at the same salary as a good shorthand typist". Her sense of outrage was 
aggravated by the fact that the social worker was often expected to do "things which the 
shorthand typist in a large office would expect to delegate to the office girl. " Opportunities for 
advancement were also limited: those who remained in case work could not expect to "do more 
T. S. Sitney, Salaries and Conditions of Social Workers, (London: NCSS, 1947)-, Eileen L. 
Younghusband, Report on the Employment and Training of Social Workers, (Edinburgh: 
Constable, 1947) 
8 Younghusband, EXuploymen, 12 
9 Simey, Salaries, 45-6 
10 Sitney, Salaries, 46 
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than double their salaries in the course of their working life. " The secret to getting on was to 
move into administration for it was "only where some ... degree of administrative responsibility 
is associated with professional skill that salaries begin to take wings. "" 
Not all those employed in administration eqjoyed the better pay that Younghusband 
thought went with a managerial position. Table 9.4 shows salary scales for NCSS clerical 
officers. The Council was committed to providing good pay and conditions for its staff, so 
these salary scales reflect the best rates for this class of employees. 12 Comparing the figures for 
1946 with those provided by Simey indicates that these workers were paid at substantially 
lower rates than social workers. There were also significant regional differentials, as the two 
sets of figures given for 1951 indicate. The lowest paid central office staff earned almost twice 
as much as their regional counterparts. The differential was smaller in the case of senior 
grades, indeed a regional officer at the top of the Grade I was as much as Ma year better off 
than the equivalent worker at headquarters. 
The trend in clerical salaries was downwards. The figures show that salaries for almost 
all clerical grades failed to keep pace with rising prices or rising wages during this period. In 
the case of the lowest grade, grade IH, they fell by as much as a third in real terms. On average, 
the value of the remuneration available to this group fell by around a fifth during these twelve 
years. Job security also eluded this group of employees and they were especially vulnerable 
when voluntary organisations had to make economies. In 1952, when the Council faced an 
urgent financial crisis requiring a reduction of its budget for 1952/3 by L15,000, it was "agreed 
that the chief cuts should be in clerical staff". 13 It is impossible to say how far the figures in 
these tables reflect conditions across the whole range of voluntary organisations. They suggestý 
however, that neither social workers nor clerical staff experienced a rapid rise in living 
11 Younghusband, Elpploymen, 12-13 
12 One example of the NCSS's commitment to the salaries and benefits of its staff was its 
payment of family allowances for workers with children to boost their income. The NCSS 
continued this practice even after the introduction of statutory family allowances. It resisted 
attempts to reduce or abolish these benefits even under pressure of its 1952 financial 
difficulties. The Finance and General Purposes Committee rejected a proposal to reduce family 
allowances for staff which some members argued was no longer justified since that the staWs 
contribution for second and third children was about to rise from 5 shillings to 8 shillings. 
NCSS Finance and General PpMoses Committee, 22April 1952, LMA/4016/IS/01/50(l) 
13 NCSS Finance and General PWoses Committee, 22 January 1952, LMA/4016/IS/01/50(l) 
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standards at the expense of contributors to voluntary social services during this period. The 
anxieties about increased staffing arose elsewhere. 
Countervailing tendencies 
The vulnerability of clerical staff to cuts was made worse by the attitude of many members of 
the charitable public to staff costs in the voluntary sector and to paid employment in principle. 
In the case of charitable trusts, the Charity Commissioners policed administration costs, though 
somewhat inadequately. Pownell explained the procedures in his evidence to the Charitable 
Trusts Committee. The Comniission received the accounts of around 70,000 charities annually. 
These were 61. examined in a general way" by the clerks in the Accounts Department, "to see if 
they disclose on the face of them any improper action on the part of the trustees. " Ihe 
Commissioners might investigate trusts where the accounts showed that "the amount spent on 
.Y 
the administration of the charity stood out as being excessive as compared with the amount 
spent on the objects, of the charity. " As Pownell. explained, this was an imprecise art. The great 
variety of property administered by charities and the kinds of services they provided made it 
difficult to ascertain a realistic level of administrative spending. An endowment whose 
principal was invested and provided a regular income for distribution required less 
administration than one whose income came from a row of houses, the rents of which had to be 
collected weekly and the properties maintained. Pownell hesitated to quote any definite 
percentage spent on administration that would provoke an investigation, though he noted that 
some trust deeds limited administration costs to five per cent. 14 
The dilatory approach of the Charity Commission did not lead to an explosion of salary 
costs within the voluntary sector as there a significant countervailing tendency operated to 
prevent such an explosion. Younghusband offered gender as the main explanations for the poor 
wages and conditions of social workers in this period. Looking back some twenty years later 
Younghusband characterised the 1950s as a period of continuing low pay which she attributed 
to the "legacy of social work as a middle-class, female occupation in voluntary 
oro, anisations. "15 In her 1947 report, she had commented on the assumption of a feminine g 
14 CT(50) 4th Meeting, 17-18, CAB 124/13 8 
15 Eileen Younghusband, Social Work in Britain: 1950-1975, vol. 1, (London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 197 8), 3 01 
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gender in social work. She pointedly used the feminine pronoun throughout, and observed that 
assumptions about women's work prevented improved pay and conditions within the voluntary 
sector. Mana,. (, )Fement committees were able to deprive social workers of a decent living 
standard because "'she' ... was alleged to have no dependants to support and to be happy to 
work for pin mone-y because a sense of -vocation would be killed by a decent salary. "16 
Younghusband's acid comment on appeals to the sense of vocation to justify low wages 
connects her explanation with that of Simey. He noted "the frequency with which social work 
is regarded as its own reward. " 17 Ne-vertheless, he felt that this social pressure was an 
inadequate explanation for the persistence of low salaries. The poverty of the employing 
organisations partly dictated low salaries, but the mzýjor influence, he believed, was supply and 
demand of labour. Too many people were prepared to accept "a salary merely sufficient to 
meet basic needs ... 
for the sake of the satisfaction which the work affords. "'8 Part of the tenure 
on charitable property claimed by social workers and others employees in the voluntary sector 
was, like that of trustees and committee members, a claim to satisfactions of an immaterial 
ch, aracter. 
Employees were critical of the conditions that obtained in the voluntary sector and there 
were attempts to mobilise to change them. Echoing Younghusband's comments, an 
ýanonymous young social worker' argued that poor salaries undermined any sense of vocation 
and lamented the ethos that dictated that discussions of money were considered in poor taste. 
She earned less than those who attended the youth club that she administered. Unlike them, she 
could not afford 'the new look' leaving her an outsider and positively hindering her in her work 
with other young people. 19 Another correspondent complained that a fliend of his, a supervisor 
of pools canvassers, had been delighted when informed that he earned more convinced that, 
because 6'all wages are, ultimately, paid for by the community" his higher wages proved that 
"[t]he community ... values his work more 
highly than it does mine. ý20 
16 Younghushand, EpIploymen, 9 
17 Sitney, Salaries, 46 
18 Simey, Salaries, 46 
19 Anonymous Young Social Worker, 'Worthy of his hire', Social Service Quarterly, XXIII 
(3), Dec 1949-Feb 1950,132-3 
1 20 E. L. Packer, 'Salaries - variations on a theme', Social 
Service Quarterl 7, XXIII (4), 
March-May 1950,162 
lg-, 7 
This resentment failed to cohere into anything approaching a trade union consciousness. 
There were objective difficulties. Endorsing the findings of Simey's enquiry, the National 
Council pondered how to proceed. Simey proposed the establishment of a national wage- 
bargaining system along the lines of WIfitley Councils administered by a committee established 
under the auspices of the NCSS. As the Executive Committee noted "the functions of such a 
body could only be vested in the committee with the consent of the employing agencies on the 
one side and of the social workers generally on the other. " This presented two difficulties. 
First, they believed 16 that to obtain the consent of the employing bodies would be a very long 
and difficult process, in -view of the enormous number of separate agencies, and their diversity 
in size, importance and functions. " It is indeed unlikely that many voluntary organisations 
would have consented at all to this diminution of their control over their organisations' 
resources. The difficulties on the other side of the equation were as great. Although some 
professional organisations of social workers did exist, -the vast majority of persons engaged in 
paid social work are unorganised, so that adequate representation of their circumstances and 
views would be very difficult. """ 
As important as a limiting factor in mobilising support for better pay and conditions as 
these technical difficulties were the sentiments of employees themselves. Although they might 
be increasingly vocal in their obýjection to the treatment they received, their identification of 
their role with the benefit of a wider social welfare, common throughout the voluntary sector in 
the 1950s, restricted their capacity to take effective action in support of their claim. An example 
of this was the British Federation of Social Workers. The BFSW, founded after the war to give 
a voice to social workers, was mainly concerned with the pay and conditions of social workers. 
This concern failed to develop into a trade union consciousness. When discussion of the 
salaries of social workers was at its most intense, in the late 1940s, for example, it claimed it 
had "always maintained that a certain standard of living is essential for professional social 
workers" but that this was an auxiliary to the more important aim of achieving "their ideals of 
service to the community". Decent pay and conditions were necessary if social workers were to 
carry out their role of being "interested, alert and stimulating members" of society. 
22 
The Federation suffered a financial crisis in the late 1940s and this prompted a 
constitutional upheaval in which the Federation sought a new relationship with its members. 
Individual membership replaced a structure dominated by affiliated organisations. This new 
21 NCSS Executive Committee, 9 October 1947, LMA/4016/IS/01/32(l) 
22 Btitish Federation of Social Workers Quarterly News Shee October-December, 1949,1 
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membership organisation did not mark any fundamental change in the obýiectives that the 
Federation set itself. It urged social workers to join in order to provide the Federation with a 
secure financial basis and in order to 66 unite all social workers for the mutual benefit of their 
work and the well-being of the community as a whole". 23 
Professionalism and commitment to the voluntary ethos was, it transpired, more 
important than pay. Social workers were anxious to establish their credentials as a new 
profession and they sought, as have other newer occupations aspiring to professional status, to 
emulate the characteristics of traditional professions. They sought the "monopolisation of 
particular forms of expertise, the erection of social boundaries around them through entrance 
qualifications and extended training, and an ideology of public service and altruism". This 
ideolop., entails a "claim to serve higher goals than mere economic self interest. " The danger 
in accepting this 'trait model' as a definition of professionalism is that it was supportive rather 
than subversive of the status quo, simply giving "tacit support to the views which those 
professions project of themselves to the public. " Its uncritical acceptance "obscure the middle- 
class nature of the codes of ethics and the ways in which the profession also act as agents of 
social control. " 24 Though social workers certainly did aspire to middle-class status, their 
comn-titment to this mode of pursuing it ensured that they were bereft of a strategy for securing 
the material benefits which announced it. The 'new look' remained beyond their means. 
The debate about voluntary action may have given a further stimulus to this ethos by 
boosting the self-consciousness of those working within the sector. It inflated their sense of 
importance, and raised the possibility of employees developing trades union consciousness and 
of agitation for improvements in salaries and conditions within the sector. This stimulus, 
combined with increased recruitment of social workers by the state created conditions in which 
claims for improved pay and conditions might arise. This did not happen: the debate on 
\Auntarism raised the consciousness of staff within the sector but it did so within narrow limits 
of the voluntary ethos. 
Echoes of the tensions that professional aspirations could cause between paid social 
Workers and voluntary supporters occasionally rose to the surface. They are hinted at in J. 
Macalister Brew's contribution to the NCSS publication The Good Neighbour. Though short- 
23 British Federation of Social Workers QuarterLy News Shee_ý -July-September 
1948,3 
24 Pamela Abbott and Claire Wallace, 'The Sociology of the Caring Professions: An 
Introduction', Pamela Abbott and Claire Wallace (eds. ), The Socioloay of the Caring 
Professions, (London: The Falmer Press, 1990), 2 
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fi-%,, edý The Good Neighbour was a serious attempt to popularise the work of the Council and 
e-,,. -tend its influence beyond the readership of Social Service Quarterly, whose target audience 
was professional social workers. It. is, therefore, significant that Brew chose to confront the 
tensions between paid staff and voluntary workers. Brew saw these tensions as a barrier to the 
induction of new voluntary workers into the voluntary sector and his recommendations, for 
dissolving thern are instructive. Assuming the guise of a voluntary worker, Brew noted that 
-,, olunteers were often confined to low status activities and in particular that they were excluded 
from involvement in casework. Setting volunteers to work licking stamps or rattling collecting 
tins in the rain, Brew assured potential volunteers who might be put off by the prospect of such 
., 
arose "not from lack of appreciation of our offers, but from a des e to protect routine tasks. ir the 
work". Brew counselled patience and a willingness to learn from the paid staff. 2' Brew, in 
other words, asked volunteers to defer to the superior knowledge and skill of the professional 
social workers. Professional wisdom, Brew hoped, trumped the moral virtue of the unpaid 
volunteer. 
Managerial voluntarism 
If staffmg costs and the general transformation of ý social work' and 'social administration' 
provided the foreground of the changing pattern of concerns to do with the professionalisation 
of the voluntary sector in the 1940s, it has tended to obscure an equally important development 
at the top of the professional hierarchy in the voluntary sector. This was the growing influence 
and authority of the professional managers of voluntary organisations. Professionalisation of 
management presented repxwstfiied a more serious challenge to the -voluntary ethos than did 
paid employment as such. By the middle of the twentieth century, voluntarism was often 
defmed in tenns of its method of management. 
The dispute between Beveridge and Bourdillon on the standing of the Women's 
Voluntary Service shows that it was the independence of their management structure rather 
than their reliance on labour time given free of charge which by the 1940s had come to 
distinguish voluntary organisations from other institutions. Even this element of voluntary 
25 J. Macalister Brew, 'On being a voluntary worker', The Good Neig-dibour, H (2), March 
1950)28 
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control was tested by the rise of professional managers who had more knowledge, and therefore 
more effective control over their organisations' direction and activitieS. 26 
Like the tension between voluntary and professional workers, the increasing role of the 
professional manager occasionally, rose to the surface. The advance of the professional 
manager at the expense of the voluntary committee member was positively welcomed by some. 
Harold King, in a combative editorial in Social Service Quarterly pointed out that although "the 
great. voluntary societies still proliferate their voluntary committees ... in the more complicated 
circumstances of to-day they tend to be more completely in the hands of their (professional) 
officers". He believed that those with professional training had more to contribute that the 
amateur members of a committee. King asserted, "that the effective members of such 
committees tend to be retired social sei-vants or even present-day professionals, "sening in 
another capacity"". 27 King's observation that retired professional social workers were among 
the most important members of management committees is important. King saw the future role 
of lay members of management committees as being confined to the margins of social service, 
rather than being at its centre. 
King's prescription elicited a reply from A. M. Struthers, Honorary Secretary of the 
Scottish Council of Social Service, who condemned the "professional arrogance" of the 
officers, deprecating the secretary who was often able 6'to arrange for the kind of connnittee he 
would like to have". Struthers angrily rejected King's call for a "professional hierarchy" to 
replace management by voluntary committee in established ServiCeS. 28 The angry tone of 
Struthers's riposte served merely to confirm the accuracy of King's description of the trend. 
Struthers's Canute-like call for voluntarv committee members to undertake more 
responsibility for the governance of their services clearly had little impact. Four years later 
Brian Rodgers returned to the theme of how committees could -exercise their proper functions 
'76 This issue of the professionalisation of management in the voluntaq sector was also a 
gender issue. Social work was a female preserve while men increasingly dominated the distinct 
field of social administration. In the early twentieth century the female preserve of social work 
had been closely integrated with the discourse on social policy, not least because this discourse 
was conducted at a local level and at the intersection between (state) poor law provision and 
(voluntary) social work. Lewis, 'Women', Daunton (ed. ), Ch 19 
27 , Editorial', Social Service 
-Quarter , 
XXIV (2), 1950,50 
28 A. A Struthers, 'The Volunteer Comrnittee Member', Social Service Quartert\_7XXIV (3), 
Dec-Feb 1951,126 
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of control" in a situation inwhich its members were "asked to supervise a process which they 
can only understand when it is explained to them by the person doing it. " Rodgers accepted 
that a looser supervisory role for committees was inevitabl , tl ou h wanted to reasse eI gh e rt 
control, for if management committees 66suffendered ... power to the personnel of the 
ore ganisation then the whole constitutional plan of the organisation has gone awry, and it can no 
longer be regarded as a fully responsible body. "29 Exactly how far this process had gone 
varied, but particularly in the larger national organisations, the balance of power had clearly 
tilted to the advantage of the permanent full time officials. 
The influence of professional managers played an important role in determining the 
approach of voluntary organisations to the debate on voluntary social service during the 1940s 
and 1950s. The dominance of this group helps to explain the alacrity with which the NCSS 
joined the debate and the appeal of the disparate schemes for funding the voluntary 
organisations that emerged in the course of the debate. In particular, it helps to explain why the 
NCSS embraced the charities register introduced in 1960. 
The ambiguity of the professional managers' position and their identification with the 
organisations they administered helped to obscure the fact that they entertained a sectional 
interest in the future direction of -voluntary social service. For managers of voluntary 
organisations cross-subsidisation of different activities was an essential "long-term strategy ... 
for financing the consumption of loss-making activities". 30 This meant seeking out sources of 
fmance to maintain an administration capable of pursuing the organisation's mission on a wider 
front. Haynes shared with the managers of other voluntary organisations a preoccupation with 
finances. The managers' problems with fundraising were fundamental to the development of 
the intellectual framework of voluntarism in the 1940s. In order to maintain the work of 
voluntary organisations, it was necessary to secure funding that allowed for cross-subsidy 
between projects and of the administration. Tlis put the managers of voluntary organisations 
in a double bind. On the one hand, administration was increasingly necessary in order to 
undertake the type of long-term commitments that charity organisation theory demanded. On 
29 Brian Rodgers, 'The Better Management of Voluntaiy Organisations, Social Service 
Quarterly, XXVHI (3), Dec 1954-Feb 1955,107-9 
30 Estelle James, 'How Nonprofits C-Ti'ow: A Model', Susan Rose-Ackerman (ed. ), The 
Economics of Nonprofit Institutions: Studies in Structure and Polic , (New 
York: University 
Press, 1986), 188 
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the other hand, the suspicion that professionalisation engendered made it difficult to attract 
donations to support administration. 
Relentless competition with other organisations for the elusive charitable pound 
exacerbated this problem. The spontaneous generation of solutions to new social situations wasý 
according to its supporters, the cardinal virtue of the voluntary sector but this virtue could seem 
to managers of voluntary organisations a salutary vice. As the comt-nents of the Liverpool CSS 
attestý concern about the misuse of charitable property was not just the preserve of critics of 
charity, like Simey. Emily Kinnaird,, doyenne of innumerable committees and a leading light 
in the Young Women's Chtistian Association since her youth, expressed concern in the 1920s 
at. "the lamentable multiplication of societies" which she attributed to the fact that 6'scope is not 
given to the young to enter into the inner workings of societies already at work. " She urged 
long-standing voluntary activists to follow the example of '6older American secretaries" of 
making room for youth by standing aside in order not to "hinder a younger movement. 01 
Rivalry within the voluntary sector could lead some voluntarists to adopt apparently 
perverse positions. Right from the start of the debate on the future of voluntarism there were 
those who opposed any attempt to improve the fmances of voluntary organisations. At the 
confýrence in October 1949 to obtain the views of voluntary organisations on the issues raised 
in the Lords debate on voluntary social service, a number delegates had opposed proposals to 
create Common Good Funds. New fimding seemed a dubious blessing to existing voluntary 
organisations if it encouraged the entry of new competitors or boosted the funds of existing 
fivals. "Many speakers", Social Servant reported, "doubted whether there should be any 
attempts to 'raise' money ... pointing out that this could only 
be done by entering into 
competition with existing money-raising efforts. " 32 L. R. Ferguson, Chairman, Association of 
Charity Officers, expressed similar concerns in his evidence to the Charitable Trusts 
Committee. The ACO brought together chief officers of 23 of the older charities. Ferguson 
was director of the Royal United Kingdom Beneficent Association. Other affiliates included 
the Distressed Gentlefolk's Aid Association and the Governesses' Benevolent ]Institution. 
33 
These organisations supported increased central funding for voluntary organisations but 
demanded that the money 66 SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED AS TO INCOME BY 
TRUSTEES SELECTED FROM AMONG MEN AND WONYIEN EXPERIENCED IN THE 
31 Emily Kinnaird, Reminiscences, (London: John MuiTay, 1925), 116 
32 Social Servant', 'Money Matters', Social Service Quarterly, XXIE[1(3), (1949-50), 100 
33 Ferguson to Nathan, 14/2/50, CAB 124/151 
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WORK OF VOLUNTARY SOCEETEES. - The ACO wanted to secure a prior claim on any 
new ftmds calling for them to be "de-%,, oted to valid charitable objects, for the development of 
which voluntary bodies already exist, rather than to the establishment of new machinery for the 
purpose of exploring fi-esh fields. , 34 
The anarchy of relations between voluntary organisations in the 1940s was not very 
different from the situation which had prompted the forerunner of the NCSS, the COS, to 
attempt to regulate the competition between voluntary organisations that engendered an 
.3 35 atino sphere of sectarian rivalrýy and petty jealousy". For Haynes, unencumbered with the 
hostility, to the state expressed by the leaders of the COS, the debate on the future of voluntary 
social service represented an opportunity to escape the straitjacket of voluntary funding. 
Cooperation between the NCSS and the state was already well advanced by the 1940s. The 
principle obstacle to its further expansion of NCSS and to the state incorporating more 
voluntary organisations in service delivery was not ideological. The state required some 
assurance of the quality of the organisations that undertook services and took public money. 
Regularising the administration of charitable status was one way for the government to obtain 
this assurance. For voluntary organisations., charitable status already provided a gateway to 
substantial tax benefits. The register of charities with its streamlined procedure for obtaining 
charitable status enhanced this privilege, but it also made possible a mutual embrace of 
voluntary organisations and the state. 
34 Association of Charitable Officers, L. R. Ferguson, Chainuan ACO, CAB124/151,2 
(upper case, in original) 
35 Prochaska, Voluntgry IMpulse, 69 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
The preceding chapters have examined the origins and progress of the political debate on the 
Raure of voluntary social service that began in the late 1940s and which led to the passing of 
the 1960 Charities Act. Particulars of this legislative outcome have been contrasted with 
proposals that emerged during the political debate and in the report of the Charitable Trusts 
Committee. In spite of the disappointment of many of the expectations that had been raised 
during the early stages of the debate, and in spite of opposition from some quarters to closer 
regulation of voluntary organisations, the NCSS embraced the Charities Act and assisted in the 
programme of registration begun by the Charity Commission in 1960. Chapters eight and nine 
considered some aspects of voluntary fundraising and the management of voluntary 
organisations in the 1940s and 1950s. There were, it was suggested, good underlying reasons 
for the stance the NCSS adopted and for other leading voluntary organisations acquiescing in 
the new regulatory regime. Although some in the voluntary sector nursed misgivings about the 
Act - the subject of registration of voluntary organisations was especially fraught - the NCSS 
faced no serious challenge to its role as the tribune of the voluntary sector. 
It is now possible to reflect on some of the implications of this discussion. I propose to 
do this under three headings. First, the debate and its outcome eýýreveals that consensus 
is an inadequate framework for understanding the politics of the 1940s and 1950s, at least as far 
as policy towards the voluntary sector is concerned. This also has a bearing on the 
historiographical consensus concerning the relationship between the Charitable Trusts 
Committee and the Charities Act, 1960. The outcome of the debate and the acceptance of the 
dispensation contained in the 1960 Act have implications for our understanding of the character 
of the voluntary sector in the twentieth century. These I take up in the second section. Finally, 
I return to some of the issues posed in the introduction on the nature of the 'intellectual 
framework' of voluntarism. 
- 
los- 
The consensus onvoluntary social service in the 1940s and 1950s 
The distance between the post-war debate on voluntary social service and the Charities Act was 
more than a matter of the passing of time. Some of the reforms proposed by Beveridge, 
supported by Samuel and taken up by George Haynes -and the NCSS were eventually included 
in the recommend. -ations of the Charitable Trusts Comrnittee. The political environment had 
changed, however. Support for government planning that characterised the 1940s had created 
an illusion of cross-party agreement on the need to encourage voluntary social service. Labour 
and Conservatives expressed support for the establishment of national and local Common Good 
Funds. This consensus evaporated as methods of fmancing the funds came under review. The 
broad coalition of support for reform, which had gathered in the years immediately after the 
war, came up against both the opposition of existing charitable trusts and a Conservative 
government eager to revert to the posture it had adopted towards the voluntary sector in the 
1930s. It was never likely that this government would countenance the radical overhaul of 
voluntary sector finance implicit in the package of measures submitted by the Committee. The 
expression of opposition to the Committee's proposals from within the voluntary sector 
relieved the pressure on the Conservati'Ves to implement the recommendations in full. 
In spite of some&ir early successes in attracting publicity, the would-be champions of 
reform failed to achieve their primary objective of creating machinery to transfer resources 
from charitable endowments to voluntary organisations. Securing wide agreement that 
voluntary social service required extra resources was relatively easy, but the creation of a new 
central funding agency came up against both the resistance of the Treasury and the suspicion of 
some voluntary organisations. Once the Treasury had made it clear that no substantial injection 
of funding would be forthcoming from the bona vacantLa, the refon-ners had two options: 
voluntary organisations, could continue to rely on their traditional sources of support, which 
meant in effect increasing reliance on departmental funding, or the resources must be found 
from within the voluntary sector through a maJIor reallocation of existing resources. The 
Labour Government with the support of Liberal in the House of Lords were disposed to 
consider the latter course, but enthusiasm for planning which had inspired Beveridge to urge 
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redistribution within the voluntary sector, was on the w-ane even before the first debate in the 
House of Lords. ' 
In spite of the erosion of public and political support for planning, the Charitable Trusts 
Committee adhered to this objective. Reform of the rules for changing the olýjects of trusts was 
a critical component of the Committee's recommendations. Relaxation of the cy-pres doctrine 
was central to the Committee's proposals, for it was designed to release resources held by 
moribund charitable trusts and channel them into the voluntary sector. This was not an obscure 
technical matter. The Committee, supported by the NCSS came to see reform of the procedures 
for altering the terms of endowed charitable trusts as a mechanism for financing Cornmon Good 
funds. The Conservative Government, which inherited the Charitable Trusts Committee in 
1951, lacked enthusiasm for the project and never came under pressure to take action in this 
area. Although it was disengaged from the planners' grander schemes to revive voluntary 
social service, the registration of voluntary organisations did have a financial dimension and 
this made it a powerful influence on the future shape of voluntary social service. 
The consensus on the future of voluntarism, which animated the first Lords' debate, 
represented a very narrowly based agreement. As soon as the argument came down to cases, as 
it did in the Charitable Trust Committee's report, consensus withered. The Lords, the 
Government and 'the public' generally agreed that voluntarism was 'a good thing'. The 
political establishment could agree that it required financial as well as moral support, at least in 
the short term. There was agreement on neither how the money was to be provided nor where 
it was to be found. The funding of the voluntary sector was a complicated matter, and all the 
available sources of funding raised issues of principle, all (including, as we have noted, the 
traditional sources) could be construed as morally objectionable. The Charitable Trust 
Committee ýs practical proposals for the funding of voluntary social service proved the 
y action. shortcoming of the vague agreement on the value of voluntan 
It was evident from the Committee's report that the target of the proposed reforms was 
neither the major voluntary organisations nor the large national endowments. The Committee 
singled out what it imagined to be a large array of small uneconomic and hitherto unnoticed 
AC 
dIgUC; S WdL twVIUIUUIICA-; 1-1-i government planning had dissolved 
following the winter 
fuel crisis of 1947. If he is right, then the Beveridge, Samuel and Nathan were already out of 
step with the political mood during the Lords debate in 1949. Martin Chick-, Industrial policy 
Britain, 1945-1951: economic planning, nationalisationz-and the Labour governments, 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1998), 6 
-207- 
endowments langFuishing at a local level. The Conu-nittee hoped to reSUITeCt these by re- 
asserting the public interest in their operations. Nevertheless, the mechanisms the Committee 
devised to reassert the public interest in these smaller charities had wider ramifications. The 
public interest in the operations of charities and voluntary organisations was not itself at issue. 
'Publicness' was intrinsic to the legal definition of charity. What mattered to those who 
ot1jected to the Committee's programme was how and by whom this public interest was to be 
go iven expression. The Committee's proposals for registration aimed to do more than improve 
the system of centralising information about charitable trusts, As a result, the Committee's 
proposals became controversial as some individual trustees, managers and committee members 
sought to defend themselves against what they saw as increased state intenlention. in the 
voluntary sector. This opposition was fleeting, however. The quarrel between Lidderdale and 
Horobin at Church House Westminster in February 1953 was the nearest the opposition came to 
derailing the advocates of reform. Hqrobin and his allies had no more lasting influence over 
the direction of policy than had SirLmest Gower's tilting at the introduction of the National 
Health Senice in 1948. 
The scheme proposed by the committee, the opposition that it ignited, and the final 
fon-n that registration assumed show that underneath the formal consensus among politicians 
there was conflict over the future of voluntary social service. In the debate on the future of 
voluntarN7 social service in the 1940s, agreement rather than disagreement performed a 
rhetorical function. The protagonists relied on airy assertions of common ground in order to 
conduct the debate. 
The consensus on the history of the voluntary sector in the 1940s and 1950s has been 
based on seeing the introduction of the welfare state as the primary determinant of the 
development of the voluntary sector in this period. Yet, economic planning in industrial policy 
had at least as much of an impact on the ideas of leading voluntarists as the nationalisa-tion of a 
large slice of the existing voluntary sector. One important reason for tl-ds was that the providers 
of health and income maintenance were not voluntan7 services in any meaningful sense by the 
1940s. Be-veridge tried to conflate mutual insurance and voluntary social service but 
voluntarists themselves baulked at the comparison. The remoteness of these institutions from 
control by their members rendered the comparison absurd. Both the Labour government and 
the NCSS saw Beveridge's comparison as a ruse designed to win sympathy for the commercial 
interests of the leading mutual insurance companies. An analogous situation existed in the 
y in health sector. By the 1940s, voluntary hospitals were voluntan name only dominated by 
large, quasi- commercial enterprises more often financed on mutual principles than by voluntary 
ly 
-- 
subscriptions. A more important reason for the durability of voluntarists' support for state 
intervention was the altered structure of the Aioluntary sector in the 1940s. 
The 'st-atified' voluntary sector 
In the vocabulary employed by the political supporters of voluntar'V social service such as 
Beveridge and Samuel, the value of -voluntary action was still held to be its role as guarantor of 
the primacy of civil society over the state. in practice, professional managers under the aegis of 
the state administered its mzýjor institutions. As a result, the language in which the moral 
content of charity had been discussed in the nineteenth century was transformed in the course 
of the twentieth. The discursive tradition within the voluntary sector that had emphasised that 
the value of social service accrued to the conscientious individual donor or volunteer was 
superseded. In the new discourse, almost imperceptibly, the role assigned to the donor was 
drained of moral content. The changed funding environment helped to drive this process. A 
new ideological construction of the donor was clearly necessary as donors became more like 
consumers than the investors they had been in the nineteenth century. 
The professional managers of voluntary organisations occupied an increasingly 
influential position within the voluntary sector. The role of the professional managers led them 
to identifý,, closely with the organisations they managed and this facilitated their assimilation to 
the voluntary management. This identification could never entirely suppress the difference 
between professional managers and voluntary committee members, but the distinction was 
blurred as more and more professional managers sat on voluntary conu-nittees. The ascendancy g 
of the professional manager was not necessarily detrimental to the institutions of the voluntary 
sector: after a brief period of adjustment in the 1940s, voluntary social services continued to 
flourish in the 1950s and beyond. 
Although voluntary organisations continued to grow, the emphasis of 
ideas that 
informed their operations shifted. The relationship between individual donors and 
individual 
objects that had lain at the heart of nineteenth century conceptions of voluntary action was 
essentially bilateral. In the twentieth century voluntary organisations 
interposed themselves 
tu e int e into this bilateral relationship. The intellec al frain work that otin d -volunumism 
in the 
1940s and later was a multilateral relationship between donors and voluntary organisations 
on 
one side and between voluntanZ organisations and objects on the other. 
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George Haynes played an important role in these developments in the 1940s. Haynes, 
the epitome of the voluntail ue in c y sector manager, was a key fig r the bureau ratic layer that 
encased the voluntary sector, his achievement was to articulate a plausible division of labour 
between voluntary social service and state welfare within which a formal distinction between 
voluntary organisations and the state could be aftirmed. Taking his cue from the legal doctrine 
N of py-pres, Haynes's proposals to the Charitable Trust Committee stressed the importance of 
the general charitable intent expressed in a donation at the expense of the concrete means for its 
expression. hnplicit in this privileging of the general charitable intent was the detachment of 
the donation from the donor. In Haynes's submission to the Committee, this separation was 
seen as applying primarily to charitable trusts. It was intended to operate to the advantage of 
voluntary organisations and was motivated on ethical and efficiency grounds. Haynes invoked 
the rescue of the general charitable intent from the mire of its worldly manifestation in order to 
justify the transfer of resources from, supposedly defunct, endowed charities to, implicitly 
vibrant, voluntary organisations. 
The direct impact of registration on voluntary organisations should not be 
overestimated. It is true that voluntary organisations came under the purview of a single 
regulatory authority, for the Charity Commission was given "jurisdiction over virtually all 
charities, whatever their legal form", finally ending an important legal distinction between 
voluntary organisations and charitable trusts .2 Lack of resources at the Commission meant.. 
however, that the exercise of its new jurisdiction was rarely intrusive ano, once the initial drive 
to re -ster them was completed in 1965, the day-to-day act of the register on the majority of 91 , imp 
individual voluntary organisations was largely theoretical. The obligation to register certainly 
had no discernible dampening effect on the growth of the voluntary sector. There was some 
symbolic importance in that the activities of voluntary organisations, which had previously 
been regulated through non-specific legislation such as company law and ad hoc enactments, 
were brought within the ambit of the regulatory system governed by the Charity Comi-nission, 
but the in-unediate consequences of this were slight. 
The simplicity and transparency of the new system of registration had clear advantages 
for voluntary organisations. It was a double-edged benefit, however, for it encouraged self- 
regulation of the voluntary sector. The register represented a gateway to financial benefit: 
but 
only for organisations, and services that conformed to the defmition of charity contained 
in 
existing legal precedents. TI-tis system of self-regulation determined the kinds of -voluntarY 
2 Chesterman, Charities-. 104 
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organisations that developed during the following thirty years and, inevitably, constrained the 
ability of voluntaiy organisations to provide an independent and critical response to social 
conditions. This development was implicit in the gradual assimilation of voluntary social 
service to charity law, which had proceeded at an irregular pace for three centuries. Miat was 
distinctive about the period preceding the passing of the Charities Act was that it was the 
conclusion of a political debate at the highest level and that, in spite of some opposition, the 
Act was embraced by many important national voluntary organisations, the NCSS being the 
most notable and the most influential. 
Underpitming this response by major voluntary organisations lay important changes in 
the structue ofýýolunku-y sector. The growing importance of professional managers in the 
voluntary social services was one of the most visible aspects of these changes. The pre- 
eminence of this group and the influence they exerted was symptomatic of wider changes in the 
economics of voluntary social service. The embracing of a closer relationship with the state 
y the financial requirements of voluntary organisations. Managers had an was driven b- 
incentive to pursue reliable income streams and the Charities Act replaced the informal system 
of registration with a straightforward administrative route to charitable status and the tax 
benefits it conferred. Charitable status became a gateway not only to tax advantages but also to 
grants in aid and other forms of central and local government funding. This released the 
managers of voluntary organisations, from the obligation to pursue voluntary donations and 
subscriptions. 
Spontaneity and reason 
The altered attitude of voluntary organisations to the state was not driven by a lack of clear 
thinking about the relationship of voluntary social service and the state. It flowed from the 
material circumstances of voluntary organisations. Ironically, the more organised voluntary 
social services became, the less appropriate the traditional theories of charity organisation 
appeared. The fostering of conscious long-term relationships between donors and objects of 
charity could be carried indirectly by means of organisations sustained by administrative 
machinery that had to be paid for. Traditional sources of funding could not meet the financial 
needs of this sort of machinery. The professional managers of voluntary organisations 
increasingly relied on an emotive appeal to individual donors and subscribers 
in order to gather 
the small amounts of money they received from this source. The tendency was to stress 
the 
need to 'do something' in. response to a social problems and to avoid an analysis that risked 
alienating an increasingly anonymous donor. TWs tendency was reinforced by the 
requirements of conforming to the legal definition of charity, which channelled voluntary work 
into defmed fields. 
The experience of the'voluntary sector in the 1940s and 1950s suggests Harris's thesis 
cannot provide a complete explanation for the changing relationship between the voluntary 
sector -and the state in the twentieth century. Her declinist argument substitutes a description of 
a symptom ofsocialfor the analysis of the underlying syndrome. That political thought 
became less concerned with the political concepts and discourse of an earlier period can hardly 
be denied. That the leading lights of the voluntary sector were administrative technicians like 
Hay, mes rather than trained academic philosophers like Bosanquet, is also evident from this 
TrIl I study'. The shrivelled intellectual fi-amework within which mid-twentieth century voluntarists 
was not simply a matter of intellectual laziness, as Harris seems to imply: it was a rational 
response to altered conditions. It grew out of the practice of, \Toluntarists rather than arising 
from a conscious choice between rival political and social theories. Changes in the social 
constituency to which voluntary organisations had to appeal for financial support required .1 
broadcast arguments. This made the articulation of a thoroughgoing social analysis 
increasingly difficult. The appeals met with most success in gaining support fi-om the 
charitable public were those that carried an immediate emotional punch. 
Central to the ideology of voluntarism in the post-war period was the conviction that it 
was important to 'do something' when confronted with a social problem. In this intellectual 
framework-, the ýfeel' of a group of ideas was more important than the integrity of the 
individual concepts or their unity. The usurpation of the role of social enquiry and analysis by 
the impulse to do something as the core of voluntary social service seems to indicate a victory 
for the libertarian conception of voluntarism. This was not clear-cut, however. The creation of 
the welfare state failed to provoke hostility towards the state within the voluntary sector. There 
were isolated attempts to rouse opposition to the expansion of state services but these never 
gained the support of mainstream voluntary organisations. This muted reaction suggests that 
voluntary organisations did not see the new welfare dispensation as the menace to its existence 
portrayed by proponents of the libertarian thesis such as Prochaska. It is true that politicians 
like Beveridge and Samuel rehearsed the libertarian case for voluntary social ser\fices and 
warned that their extinction would lead to a totalitarian society, but these concerns were voiced 
for rhetorical effect. They were coined to make the case for greater cooperation between the 
state and voluntary organisations, not to launch a crusade against the state. 
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George Haynes, the leader of the NCSS was, as we have seen, positively sanguine in the 
face of the creation of the welfare state. Haynes's optimistic prognosis for the future of 
voluntary organisations belies the interpretation of the welfare state as an onslaught on 
voluntarism. The fact that those most intimately concerned with the administration of 
voluntary social service did not see the extension of state welfare provision as a threat raises 
doubts about the validity of Prochaska's contention that the state and voluntarism were 
fundamentally inimical. Ironically, Prochaska's idolising of voluntary organisations is not 
libertarian enough. The voluntary organisations of the twentieth century were increasingly 
confort-nist. This conformity was not achieved by repressive means, indeed the legal 
framework that produced it was actively sought by the leading voluntarists like George Haynes. 
Haynes and other professional management gave expression to the intellectual framework 4 
social service. This pr(&cted something called 'society' as the principal beneficiary of 
voluntan,, social service, but society was little more than a rhetorical symbol. Haynes, as we 
have see-'hied away from giving too explicit a definition of society in his plans for the NCSS. 
11 
U) 
In the absence of any coherent alternative theory of society, the beneficiary of the public good 
in voluntary action was, in practice, the state. 
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Table 8.1. Inland Revenue Esthnates of Charity Income from various sources, 1935-1960 
ý1'0001'000) 
Year Schedule A Schedule C ! Schedule D Total Index of total 
charity income 2 
constant 9 (1935 51t 
100) 
19 35 16.4 7.111 19.211 42.8 100.0 
1936 1 'ý7.0 9.5 It 19.8 it 4 6.3) 104.9 
1937 17.0 9. - 19.8:: 46.6 100.0 
1938 18., '-, ' It 10.21 20.911 49.3 102.8 
1939 18.5 It 10.21 20.81: 49.5 100,2 
1940 18.4 It 11.0 1; 4 51.8 93.6 
1941 18.5 It 10.1 8 51.4 84.1 
1942 18.01 10.81 22.2 It 51.0 77.9 
1943 18.1 10.81 22.2 it -51.1 74.7 1944 1 11.3 23.01 76.8 
1945 1 S., 2 11--ý 24.01 54.0 75.7 
1946 18., -) 11. -7 0 1: 54.0 72.7 
1947 18.8 1 12.01 24.71 55.5 70.7 
1948 19.01 10.01 22.0 it 5 1.0 61.5 
1949 19.0:: 10.01 20.01: 49.0 - ý. 
j 
1950 19.01 10.01 21.01 -50.0 
56.4 
1951 19.01; 10.0i 1.0 it 50.0 51.3 
1952 19.01 10.0: 21.01i 50.0 47.1 
1953 19.01 10.01 21.01 -50.0 
45.8 
1954 19.01: 10.01 22.01 51.0 46.1 
1955 
I 19.011 I 10.01: ?. '). Ol -- 51.0 
43.8 
1956 20.01 12,011 23.011 55.0 45.0 
1957 1.0 17.01 26.0 It 64.0 50.6 
195-5 8 21.0i 17.01; 26.01 I 
64.0 48.9 
1959 
I 21.011 I 18.01: 27.0 '1 66.0 50.4 
1960 1.0 it 19.01 'IC). O: i 69.0 52.1 
1961 2 1.0;; 20.011 40.01 81.0 59.2 
1962 22.01: 20.01 45.01 87.0 61.0 
1963 22.01 20.01 50.01 92.0 63.2 
1964 15.0 1; 20.01 65.011 100.0 66.7 
1965 1.01 20.01 80.01 101.0 64.3 
Source: Reports of the Conunissioners of Her Majesty's Inland Revenues 1935-65 
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Table 8.2. Charity Street Collections in Greater London 1938-60 
Y Year E , 
Permits Granted ITotal Collected IAmount raised per I Ii Number 
I 
F- Icollection 
1938 19 
F 
2 VII, 280,503 10,389 
1939 19 271, 290)8101 10,771 
1940 19 26 531)5281, 20)443 
19 41 271 509) 525 18871 
1942 221. 547)519'- 24)887 
1943 2 3- 633)5961 27,548 
1944 27,1 579)7661, 213473 
1945 22, 505)4091 22,973 
1946 1911 386,289'1 201331 
1947 201 357,295 17)865 
1948 2011, 285)15911 14)258 
1949 191, 243)6471 12)824 
1950 18, ' 259 12V 14396 
1951 18i 287,794 15,989 
1952 201, 311) 9071 15,595 
1953 19, 308) 910, ' 163258 
1954 191 343,3471 183071 
1955 211.1 377)746.. 17,988 
1956 i 221 i 
400,658 i 18,212 
1957 6911 376)6531 5,459 
1958 
L 
68,1 
1 
369,031, 
1 
5)427 
1959 1 661 1 362,3781 5; 491 
1960 i 65_1 390)934i 61014 
Source, Annual Charities Reqister and Diqest 1939-61 
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Table 8.3 Results of Selected London Street Collections 1938-60 
Year 
Royal British 
Legion 
Combined 
Animal Welfare 
Charities 
Collection 
Alexandra-Rose 
Day Appeal 
Total Street 
Collections 
1938 N/A N/A N/A 280,503 
1939 93,872 6,867 46,215 290,810 
1940 N/A N/A N/A 531,528 
1941 104,263 N/A 50,359 509,525 
1942 106,253 N/A 52,740 547,519 
1943 123,914 N/A 58,732 633,596 
1944 112,859 N/A 54,358 579,766 
1945 108,235 11,172 54,262 505,409 
1946 107,746 10,785 51,740 386,289 
1947 112,039 13,971 47,762 357,295 
1948 105,018 15,408 29,013 285,159 
1949 84,207 15,545 26,181 243,647 
1950 95,788 17,938 31,698 259,121 
1951 105,388 18,601 36,421 287,794 
1952 106,313 20,572 41,336 311,907 
1953 100,658 20,198 44,839 308,910 
1954 102,728 22,221 46,071 343,347 
1955 109,235 23,542 47,680 377,746 
1956 114,588 24,398 49,401 400,658 
1957 100,666 25,492 48,109 376,653 
1958 96,179 23,789 44,592 369,031 
1959 L 101,536 25,217 45,659 362,378 
1960 105,198, 24,178, 44,5121 390,9341 
Source: Annual Charities Register and Digest 1939-61 
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